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This inquiry is confined to elections for offices in

Massachusetts state government in 1970.
threefold:

Its purposes are

first, to establish the cost of campaigning, the

sources of funds, and the rewards for contributions; second,
to explore the commonwealth's response since the 1970 elec-

tion to the problem of ceunpaign finance; emd third, to sug-

gest what should be done by state government to remedy the
deficiencies in Massachusetts' system of campaign finance.
To accomplish the inquiry's objectives the following
sources of information were essential:

the campaign finance

reports submitted by candidates and committees to the secretary of state in compliance with state law; other public
records, documents, and publications; accounts about cam-

paign finance in the press, particularly in the Boston Globe
numerous interviews with persons, public and private, who

were knowledgeable a±)out campaign finance in Massachusetts;
and a miscellany of materials, published and unpublished,
the latter provided by elected officials and other public

personnel, private groups, and individual citizens.
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;
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It was determined that a total of about $5,500,000

was spent in the Bay State in 1970 on behalf of all candidates for six statewide offices, the eight-member Governor's
Council, and the 240-member state legislature.

In general,

the larger the size of the electoral district, the more

powerful and prestigious the office, and the more competitive the ccunpaign, the greater the cost of the campaign.

Incumbency was decidedly advantageous.

Although a few cam-

paigns were extremely expensive, many campaigns were underfinanced.

Most of the funds which financed these campaigns
were raised by committees established on behalf of candidates.

The fund-raising efforts by the two major political

parties were much less important, and with one exception,
there was virtually no fund raising by organized interest
groups.

Although there was some evidence of self-f inancing,

the typical candidate did not use his personal funds.

The

lucrative testimonial dinner was a major source of funds for
some candidates, and large contributions ($500 or more) were

important to some candidates at all levels, but especially
to gubernatorial candidates.

Two rewards for campaign contributions, jobs and
access, were examined.

Although the patronage available to

other elected state officials was discussed, attention centered on certain judicial and executive-branch appointments
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by the incumbent Governor, and appointments by the incumbent
Attorney General.

Access to legislators and administrators

was illustrated by three case studies; two involved campaign
contributions by lobbyists to legislators and elected executives, and one by bankers to the incumbent Treasurer.

Enough evidence was advanced to support the conclusion that
"money talks" in Massachusetts politics; politicians are

responsive to persons who support their campaigns financially.

There has been a serious and constructive response
since 1970 by many public officials and private parties to
the problem of campaign finance.

Substantial changes in the

state's campaign finance law have been enacted, especially

by Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972, Chapter 1173 of the Acts
of 1973, and by the voters' approval of an initiative peti-

tion in 1974.

Nonetheless, the evidence presented in this

inquiry supports the conclusion that some form of public
subsidy of electoral campaigns in Massachusetts, especially
for statewide elections, deserves a trial.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
In a modern society money is a major resource which

enables people to accomplish many things.
tible:

Money is conver-

it can employ the energy, talents, and services of

people; it can purchase material goods; and for those who

have enough, it can buy leisure and the time to follow whatever pursuits are desired.

Money is one basis for power; it

can protect and advance the interests of those who employ it
effectively.

Money shapes human behavior; it affects not

only the lives of those who possess it, but of persons who
are dependent on its use by those who have it.

money "counts."

In short,

While the author would agree with those

people who argue that there is much money cannot buy, he

would insist, at the same time, that money is important in

many areas of life.

Politics is no exception.

Justification for an Inquiry into Campaign
Finance in Massachusetts

Nominations and elections are central to a democratic
order, and money, however provided, is essential for the con-

duct of electoral campaigns.

To the extent that the wealth

of some individuals and groups unduly influences the choices
of who the candidates will be, and who will ultimately govern.
1
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the practice diverges from the democratic ideal.

Elections

should not be so expensive as to bar able men and women of

modest means from participating as candidates, nor should
any candidate have to become unduly obligated to others
simply because they have the resources necessary to finance
campaigns.

If those who are chosen to govern are overly

responsive to their financial supporters, the democratic
ideal is further compromised.

Campaign contributions should

not "buy" appointments and contracts; they should not block
or guarantee the enactment of legislation, nor impede the

enforcement of existing statutes or administrative rules.
Access to public officials should not be limited to those
who make campaign contributions.

Furthermore, how campaign

funds are spent is as important as how campaigns are funded.
The electorate deserves the opportunity to learn about can-

didates and what they stand for.
electorate is expensive.

Comnunicating with a mass

There must be adequate money pro-

vided for this purpose, and the money spent should be well
used.

False image building and the avoidance of issues are

not consistent with the democratic ideal of an informed
The

electorate choosing its governors in a responsible way.

campaigns should be adequately funded, informative, and allow
the voters to make intelligent choices.

The financing of

the electoral process, clearly, is vitally important.

Money

should not be the determinant of who runs, who wins, and how
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the victors conduct themselves, once elected.

Any inquiry into campaign finance, for the reasons
offered, is important.

In addition, it is timely.

For more

than two years there has been an unprecedented coverage
in
the mass media of Watergate, a term intended to include
not

only the break-in itself, but events prior and subsequent
to
that incident.

Millions of Americans today have a greater

understanding of the cost of presidential elections, the size
and sources of contributions, the uses to which sc^e of the

money went, and the rewards which some sought or received.
From this scandalous chapter in our history, not yet fully
written, many citizens have had some of their suspicions

reinforced about the role of money in politics.

Many have

more than a passing acquaintance with the "milk fund," the
ITT settlement, illegal corporate contributions, ambassador-

ships for sale, the use of campaign contributions to buy the

silence of pcurticipants in the break- in and cover-up, and the

personal enrichment attained by some persons in public office.
Thoughtful citizens in the Bay State c«mnot help but speculate

about the financing of electoral campaigns in their own
state, and wonder whether such abuses are a way of life in

their state and local governments.
In addition to its importance and timeliness, an

inquiry into ceunpaign finance in Massachusetts can be justified because the topic is too- little-understood.

The average
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citizen's participation in politics is essentially confined
to the act of voting; only a very few make campaign contri-

butions.

Although most citizens have had little or no direct

personal experience with campaign finance, there are some

with more than a passing acquaintance or interest.

Among

them are candidates, campaign aides responsible for financing
elections, bureaucrats who administer the campaign finance
law,

legislators assigned to committees whose jurisdiction

includes Ceunpaign finance, political party officials, lobbyists, members of the press, individuals and groups whose

interests are clearly affected by public decisions on a
recurring basis, and the Massachusetts branch of John Gardner's citizens' lobby. Common Cause.
to be all-inclusive

— surely

The list is not meamt

many political scientists would

be ranked among the informed

—but

is presented to help

explain why campaign finance is not widely understood.

Cam-

paign finance is a rather sensitive subject for most of
those mentioned; they do not readily volunteer information

about it, nor have they made it their business to inform the
general public.

The two principal exceptions are the press

and Common Cause/Massachusetts.

A major reason why the public is poorly informed
generally about campaign finance in Massachusetts is that,
spart from the accounts in the press, little has been

written about it.

Although the Citizens' Research Foundation
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of Princeton, New Jersey has published about twenty valuable

works about campaign finance since 1960, including several
state studies, none deals with Massachusetts.

There is not,

in fact, one published book devoted exclusively to the subject, nor is much research or writing in progress, according

to the director of the Citizens' Research Foundation,^ and

several persons associated with Ccanmon Cause/Massachusetts,
the state legislature's joint Committee on Election Laws,

and the commonwealth's Division of Public Records.

One

factor explaining this is that campaign finance data is not

very inviting to reseeurchers.

To review and digest the cam-

paign finance reports available for public inspection is a

very tedious and time-consuming task.

Although it could be

done, the summary statements issued after each election by

the secretary of state are not detailed enough to be of much

value to researchers.

And, until Common Cause/Massachusetts

was established in 1971, there was no permanently organized
group in the state with an interest in gathering, analyzing
and publicizing information about the topic.

There has, nonetheless, been some attention given

campaign finance in the Bay State.

About a decade ago,

Rubin's thesis about the state's newly enacted full dis-

closure law, and its initial tests in the 1962 and 1964
^Letter from Herbert E. Alexander, Director, CitiFoundation, September 16, 1971.
Research
zens'
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elections, was written. 2

At about the same time Levin's

Kennedy C ampaigning appeared.

In his discussion of the 1964

campaign for the U.S. Senate, Levin devoted one chapter,
-Serious Money," to the deficiencies of the 1962 campaign

finance law and the ways the candidates circumvented

it.*^

Atkins' Getting Elected , a book published in 1973, dis-

appointingly included very little of value—contrary to its
title's promise
finance.^

— in

its brief chapter about campaign

The most recently published book, Mileur and

Sulzner's Campaigning for the Massachusetts Senate , devotes

considerable attention to the cost and funding of the Senate
elections in 1968, and is valueUale for that reason to students of campaign finance.
In the last two or three yecurs, three other book-

length works, all unpublished, have been written.

The first,

a dissertation by a sociologist about the funding of

^Gertrude S. Rubin, "Regulation of Campaign Finance:
The Massachusetts Full Disclosure Law, 1962-64," (Senior
Honors thesis. Smith College, Northampton, Mass., 1965).

Murray B. Levin, Kennedy Campaigning; The System
and the Style as Practiced~by Senator Edward Kennedy (Boston;
Beacon Press, 1966)
^Chester G. Atkins with Barry Hock and Bob Martin,
Getting Elected; A Guide to Winning State and Local Office
Houghton Mifflin, 1973)
(Boston:

Mileur and George T. Sulzner, Campaigning
Electioneering Outside the
for the Massachusetts Senate;
University of MassaPolitical Limelight (Amherst, Mass.
chusetts Press, 1974)
5 Jerome M.

;
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Massachusetts Congressman Robert P. Drinan's
extremely
expensive 1970 campaign, was completed in 1974.6
The second,
a senior honors thesis about campaign
finance in Massachusetts, was not available for review when it was
completed in

mid-1974; it will be, when revised by the author to
protect
her confidential sources.*^

The third, a manuscript completed

early in 1974 by Representative Francis C. Lapointe (DemocratChicopee) of the Election Laws Committee, is not yet published.

Nor will Lapointe, helpful to the author on numerous

occasions, allow his four-state study to be reviewed until
then.

Although little has been written about campaign
finance in Massachusetts, a number of works, most of them

dealing with various problems associated with the financing
of federal campaigns, have been published recently.

Some of

the problems discussed are similar to those in the Bay State.

These works were not used in researching this study, but they
were valuable in providing a perspective on a complex subject.

They include Alexander's Money in Politics

,

Adamany's Cam-

paign Finance in America , and Election Reform;

Basic Refer-

ences , a by-product of the U.S. Senate's Watergate
^Judy Stull, "The Sociological Dimensions of the
New Politics" (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College, 1974)
''patricia Taaffe, a 1974 graduate of Wellesley
College, researched her thesis while employed in Lieutenant
Governor Donald R. Dwight's office in Boston.
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Investigation. 8

Alexander's book examines the pros and cons

of a variety of campaign finance reform proposals
and offers

his suggestions, intended to provide adequate money to

finance campaigns and to insure competition between the

political parties.

Adamany's book explores federal and state

elections in Connecticut, especially in 1966 and 1968.

Using

his conception of money as a political resource which is

convertible for campaign purposes, Adamany examines how well
politicians have used it.

He is also concerned with ade-

quately funding campaigns and maintaining competition.

Adamany thinks there is a massive unrepresentativeness in the
manner in which campaigns are financed.

Election Reform is

valuable because it contains chapters not only from Alexander
and Adamany's books, but excerpts from many other recent

writings as well.

It also includes a very extensive and

varied bibliography on campaign finance.
Scope of the Inquiry

This study was confined to elections for state

offices in Massachusetts in 1970.

The decision to limit the

inquiry to the Bay State was made for two reasons:

(1)

the

^Herbert E. Alexander, Money in Politics (Washington,
Affairs Press, 1972) David W. Adamany, Campaign
Public
D.C.:
Finance in America (Belmont, Cal.: Duxbury Press, 1972)
United States Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities, Election Reform; Basic References , Pursuant to
U.S.
S. Res. 60, 93rd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1973)
;
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author's familiarity with the state's politics and government,

and

(2)

the feasibility of research.

Confining the study to

the Bay State facilitated its accomplishment, whereas a study

involving one or more other states would have required additional time to become familiar with their political systems.

The feasibility of research was a more compelling reason,
however, for confining the study to caiapaign finance in Massa-

chusetts.

Considerations of time, convenience, and cost

most importantly, access to information
that decision.

— virtually

— but

dictated

The proximity of the author's home in Bridge-

water to the state capital, Boston, assured reasonable access
to campaign finance reports and other public records, and to

public officials. State House reporters, members of private
groups, political party personnel, and other knowledgeable

persons.

A second way the study was confined was to examine
only the campaign finance of candidates for the Bay State's
six statewide executive offices, the Governor's Council, and
the state legislature.
yecirs)

Every four years (in even-numbered

the voters in Massachusetts elect a governor, lieu-

tenant governor, attorney general, secretary of state,

treasurer and receiver general, and auditor.

Every two years

(also in even-numbered years) they also elect eight members

to the Governor's Council and the entire state legislature,

forty senators and 240 representatives.

Although all of
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these offices are not always contested in the primary
or

general election, there are literally hundreds of
candidates
involved in any given election year.

In order to ensure that

the inquiry would be manageable, a decision was made to
limit
it to campaigns for these offices.

As important as many of

them are, all federal, county, city, and town offices, therefore, were deliberately excluded.

A third way in which the study was confined was to
examine only the 1970 election.

The decision to focus upon

that year's csunpaigns was made because 1970 was the most

recent year in which en election for statewide offices had
been held.

The big prize in Massachusetts politics is the

governor's office.

The gubernatorial campaign usually

attracts the most money, and the winner is in a position to

dispense many rewards.

To have omitted any consideration of

that campaign seemed unwise.

Moreover, the decision to

write about campaign finance was made several months before
the November, 1972 election.

It was intended that the study

be as up-to-date as possible, but the campaign finance

reports for the 1972 election would not have been available
until late in that year.

The reports for legislative and

councillor campaigns in 1970 were already available for
study, and would be, until the end of 1974.

Hence, the

decision to focus the inquiry upon the 1970 campaign.
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Confining the inquiry to campaign finance in

Massachusetts in 1970 seemed reasonable, but was not wholly
advantageous.

By limiting the study to one state, the bene-

fits of a comparative study of campaign finance in two or

more states had to be foregone.

By confining it to state-

wide, councillor, and legislative campaigns, whatever find-

ings which would have resulted from a broader study embracing
federal, county, and municipal offices had to be sacrificed.

And by focusing only upon campaigns in 1970, no comparison
of the cost of campaigning, the sources of funds, and the

rewards for contributions for that election year with the
findings of any other year was possible.

Objectives

Politicians in Massachusetts, as in almost every
other state in the nation, today rely on private contribu-

tions to finance their campaigns for public office, and that

was surely the case in 1970.

Three important questions

which immediately occur about the campaigns in 1970 are:
(1)

what did they cost?

(2)

how were they funded?

rewards did those who made contributions receive?

(3)

what

Although

other questions arise, the answers to these three should

certainly assist public officials, private groups, and
individual citizens to appraise the Bay State's system of

campaign finance more intelligently.

question

— what

The answer to a fourth

has the response been by Massachusetts state
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government to the situation since 1970?-- should allow
judgments about the adequacy of this response, and of the

necessity for further reform of the way by which electoral
campaigns are financed.

These four questions are central

to the purposes of this inquiry into campaign finance in

Massachusetts in 1970, which briefly stated, are threefold:
first, to establish the cost of campaigning, the sources of

funds, and the rewards for contributions;

second, to explore

the commonwealth's response since the 1970 election to the

problem of campaign finance; and third, to suggest what
should be done by state government to remedy the deficiencies
in Massachusetts' system of campaign finance.

Chapters II,

III, and IV address themselves to the first tliree questions

about costs, funding, and rewards; Chapter V treats the fourth

question about the nature and adequacy of the state's
response since 1970.
In Chapter II the cost of c€irnpaigning for the six

statewide executive offices, the Governor's Council, and the
state legislature are explored.

The primary objective in

this chapter is to establish how much was spent in campaigns

for these offices in 1970.

A secondary objective is to make

a judgment about how much statewide, councillor, and legis-

lative campaigns ought to cost.

In making this judgment for

each office, five factors, in addition to the actual costs

incurred in 1970, are taken into account:

(1)

the size of
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the constituency,

(2)

the power and prestige of the office,

(3)

electoral competition,

(5)

the limitation on media expenditures imposed by law in

(4)

the impact of incumbency, and

1972.

In Chapter III, the funding of electoral campaigns

for statewide, councillor, and state legislative offices is
examined.

The principal objective is to establish the rela-

tive importance of the fund-raising efforts by candidates and

their campaign committees, political parties, and interest
groups.

In exploring the funding of campaigns by candidates

and their committees, notice is taken of the great variety of
ways by which funds are raised, but emphasis is given to one

common and lucrative technique used, the testimonial dinner.
In addition, the importance of large contributions to the

1970 campaigns of statewide, councillor, and legislative can-

didates is explored.
In Chapter IV, an effort is made to relate some of

the rewards dispensed by elected officials to individuals who

made large contributions to their 1970 campaigns.

Although

several kinds of rewards are available to these officials,
the discussion in this chapter is necessarily limited, for

reasons explained in Chapter IV, to only two of them:

ments and access.

appoint-

While discussing the patronage available

to all state elected officials,

Chapter IV mainly treats cer-

tain judicial and executive appointments of Governor
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Francis W. Sargent and the appointments of assistant attorneys

general by Attorney General Robert H. Quinn.

In addition, it

explores access to legislators and administrators, using
three case studies which involve campaign contributions by

State House lobbyists William F. Malloy and Bruce D. Kinlin
to legislators and elected executives, and contributions by

several Massachusetts bankers to Treasurer Robert Q. Crane.

The difficulties inherent in this admittedly limited effort
to connect the "giving and the getting" are noted later in

this chapter, and in Chapter IV.
In Chapter V, the legislative response by Massachu-

setts state government since the 1970 election is examined.

Beginning in 1972, five major efforts were made to amend the
commonwealth's campaign finance law, three of them successful.

These are discussed with the primary objective of providing
an understanding of the substantive changes enacted by

Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972, Chapter 1173 of the Acts of
1973, and the Quinlan initiative petition of 1974, which

should allow a judgment about the adequacy of the govern-

ment's response to the problem of campaign finance in the
Bay State.

Having explored and appraised this response, the

author was led to the conclusion that a partial public subsidy of campaigns, especially statewide contests, is desirable.

Sources of Inforroation
To accomplish the study's three objectives, the

author relied upon a variety of sources, principally cam-

paign finance reports, and other public records and publications; accounts about campaign finance in the press,

especially in the Boston Globe

;

numerous interviews with

persons, public and private, who were knowledgeable about

various facets of campaign finance in Massachusetts; and a
miscellany of materials, largely unpublished, provided by
elected officials and other public personnel, private groups,

and individual citizens.
The public records maintained by the secretary of
state were indispensable, especially the campaign finance

reports submitted to the Division of Public Records by candidates and committees in compliance with the state's cam-

paign finance law.

Hundreds of these reports for 1970 were

reviewed, mainly to establish the cost of statewide, councillor, and legislative campaigns.

In addition, perhaps a

score of reports for the 1968 and 1972 elections were examined.

One public document. Election Statistics

published

,

biennially after each state election, was useful for its
summary statement about campaign costs, and was repeatedly

referred to as a source of detailed information about all
elections, such as the names of candidates, their
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partisanship, and the votes they received.^

A Manual for the

Use of the General Court, also published
biennially, was
helpful in numerous ways, among them ascertaining
the names
and titles of public officials in every
branch of government
for 1970 and other years.

Throughout the study it was necessary to have an
essential grasp of the state's campaign finance law
which
effective during the 1970 election.

was

This was particularly so

when tracing the three major amendments to the law which
were

enacted in 1972, 1973, and 1974.

To gain a familiarity with

the law before these changes, numerous references were made

to the General Laws Annotated

;

to become conversant with

the amendments in 1972 and 1973, reference was made to the

state's Acts and Resolves

;

and to acquire an understanding

of the change enacted in 1974 by initiative petition, refer-

ence was made to Official Information to Voters . ^-^

By them-

selves, these references proved helpful, but not fully sat-

isfactory.

When supplemented by other sources such as

^Especially, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Secretary of State, Election Statistics, 1970 (Public Document 43)

lOEspecially, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, A Manual
for the Use of the General Court for 1971-72 .
'-^Massachusetts, General Laws Annotated (1958),
c.

55, as amended by c. 444 of the Acts of 1962.

^^Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves (1972)
Also, Acts and Resolves (1973), c. 1173.

,

c.

810.

^^Massachusetts, Official Information to Voters ,
August, 1974
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explanations offered in the press, information
gained during
personal interviews, materials published for
candidates by
the secretary of state, a report published by a
special com-

mission established in 1966,^^ and especially one appraisal
of the law by the Massachusetts Junior Chamber of
Commerce, ^5
the objective of gaining a working understanding of
the

state's campaign finance law was achieved.

News accounts and editorials which appeared primarily
in the Boston press, especially in the Boston Globe , were of

considerable value in providing factual information, and more
importantly, in alerting the author to developments in cam-

paign finance in Massachusetts since the 1970 election.

Although their coverage was not as extensive as the Globe 's,
some items were also gleaned from the Boston Herald American ,

the Christian Science Monitor , the Real Paper

Boston newspapers.

,

and other

No attempt was made, however, to system-

atically survey the coverage in any newspaper, because none
is indexed.

A private collection of hundreds of news items,

dating from the mid-1960

's

and mostly from the Boston press,

was made available to the author early in his research by
'•Massachusetts, House No. 3900, Report of the
Special Commission Established to Make an Investigation and
Study Relative to the Financing of Political Campaigns ,
July 21, 1966.

Greater Boston Junior Chamber of Commerce Survey
(Mimeographed.)
of Depository System," (Boston:
[1963]).
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attorney Jerome Medal ie;

it was a helpful introduction
to

the press' coverage of campaign
finance.
In every area of the inquiry-campaign
costs, funding

of campaigns, rewards for contributions,
and the legislative

response— interviews proved invaluable

in providing informa-

tion and sharpening insights about campaign
finance in the
Bay State. About fifty persons were
interviewed, all but a
very few in person. They included elected
officials, candidates, campaign contributors, campaign aides,
legislative
staffers, bureaucrats, party personnel, members of
interest

groups. State House reporters, lobbyists, and private
citizens.

Most interviews lasted less than an hour, some but a

few minutes, and a few perhaps two hours.

without some value.

No interview was

On several occasions, the person inter-

viewed provided written information, or suggested someone
else who had other information which had been overlooked.
In a few cases, the initial interview established a relation-

ship which thereafter led to several informal and usually
brief, but useful, conversations.

This was the case with

Representative Francis C. Lapointe (Democrat-Chicopee) of the
legislature's joint Committee on Election Laws, Peter Keyes
of Common Cause/Massachusetts, and with personnel in the

Division of Public Records, the depository for campaign
finance reports.
^^Medalie is with the Boston law firm, Widett and
Widett.
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In addition to the information obtained
from public

records and reports, accounts about campaign
finance in the
press, and interviews with knowledgeable persons,
a miscellany
of sources, mostly unpublished and too numerous
to mention

individually, were very helpful.

Among the unpublished

materials provided by public officials, private citizens, and
groups were several press releases, fact sheets, handwritten
and typed lists, financial statements, and letters.

Among

the most useful privately published materials which were

directly pertinent to the objectives of this study were the
Citizens' Research Foundation's Political Contributors of
$500 or More

,

and several publications by Common Cause,

including the Common Cause Manual on Money and Politics

^"^
.

Most of these miscellaneous sources are cited in the bibliography, and several are elaborated upon in the text or in

footnotes.

Although scores of persons willingly provided infor-

mation which greatly facilitated the completion of this
inquiry into campaign finance in Massachusetts, it should be

noted that it was impossible to acquire certain factual
information, psurticularly in the area of rewards for campaign

contributions.

—public

Many persons in a position to know

'^Herbert E. Alexander and Katharine C. Fisher,
Political Contributors of $500 or More
eds., CRF Listing of;
Citizens' Research Foundation,
in 1970 (Princeton, N.J.;
1972); The Common Cause Manual on Money and Politics (WashCommon Cause, 1972)
ington , D.C
. :
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officials, candidates, campaign aides,
contributors, and
appointees, for example-willingly shared
information,

to a

point.

On several occasions, however, such
persons were too
"busy" to talk or answer correspondence,
responded to questions with answers which were not believable,
refused
out-

right to tell what they knew, or cordially
provided information which, in retrospect, was less than they
could have.

These people, of course, were under no obligation,
legal or
otherwise, to provide any information, even that
required in

campaign finance reports.

Moreover, it obviously would have

been very foolish of them, indeed, to share information

potentially damaging to themselves or others.
It should also be noted that there is some question

about the reliability of the information contained in the

campaign finance reports submitted in 1970 to the secretary
of state by candidates and committees.

During the author's

research, several persons expressed the opinion that these

reports did not accurately reflect all contributions received
or expenditures incurred.

One candidate with ten years'

experience as a campaign manager, largely with legislative
campaigns in Massachusetts, claimed that the true cost of
campaigns was several times the reported cost.

He readily

suggested a number of ways businesses made "contributionsin-kind,"

A corporation, he pointed out, might allow

a can-

didate's campaign workers to use its telephones for a "boiler
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room" operation just before the election
(to get out the
vote), or print campaign stationery f
ree-of -charge ^® To
.

the extent that candidates in 1970 accepted
such assistance,
the equivalent of money, and thereafter did
not report it,

the public record understated the cost of their
campaigns.

There is, however, no way to establish conclusively
how
extensive such practices were.
Another way, many said, that the campaign finance

reports for 1970 were unreliable was that they did not
reflect
all cash transactions fully or truthfully.

Some cash con-

tributions, it was claimed, were not reported at all, and in

other cases, contributions were not reported in the names of
the true givers.

in 1970.

Neither practice was legal in the Bay State

One reporter, predicting a "severe cut" in cash

contributions in the 1974 election in xMassachusetts because
of the publicity generated by Watergate (hundreds of thousands
of dollars in cash contributions went unreported in the 1972

presidential campaign)

,

wrote,

"Insiders estimate that as much

as 30 per cent of the funds funneled to most state-wide can-

didates in Massachusetts in the past has been in cash."^^
The writer did not elaborate further, but the point is clear.

^^Interview with Ed Mettar, an unsuccessful candidate
in 1972 for the Republican nomination for county commissioner,
Middlesex County. Boston, 3 August 1972.
^^David Farrell, "Sargent Errs in Choice of Fundraising Watchdog," Boston Globe, 23 November 1974, p. 23.
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Cash transactions were

coiranon

in the 1970 election.

A

difficult question is, how much cash went unreported?

Another is, how much of the cash reported was actually
given
by persons other than the true givers? As with contributionsin-kind, there is no way to establish conclusively how
wide-

spread these practices were.
It is the author's judgment that some campaign

finance reports in 1970 were as true to the penny as was

humanly possible, but that many probably understated the cost
of campaigns by as much as 25-35 per cent because some cash

contributions and contributions-in-kind were not reported.

The reliability of the 1970 reports is also questionable to
the extent that some contributions were reported in the names
of persons other than the true givers.

How extensive this

practice was is also a matter of opinion.
it probably was not widespread.

It occurred, but

Although the information in

the campaign finance reports examined was not totally reliable, these reports contained the only significant, publicly

available data about campaign contributions and expenditures.

They were, necessarily, relied on extensively throughout this
study, particularly in establishing the cost of campaigning
in the Bay State in 1970, a topic which now will be explored.

CHAPTER

II

THE COST OP CAMPAIGNING IN

MASSACHUSETTS IN 1970
There is no question that the 1970 election
in
Massachusetts was expensive and that its cost
represented
a dramatic increase over the cost of campaigns
in previous

years.

In 1970 the cost of all campaigns waged in the Bay

State exceeded $10 million, whereas in 1960 the cost
was

about $4 million.

If the coat of campaigning for the six

statewide offices in Massachusetts government is compared
for the election years of 1964, 1966, and 1970, the trend
is still apparent, although less striking.

In the 1964

election (two years after the state's campaign finance
statute was eunended to insure more complete reporting of

campaign contributions and expenditures)

,

the total cost

reported by all candidates for these six offices was
$3,345,000.

In the 1966 election the total dropped slightly

to $3,305,502, but it rose sharply in 1970 to $4,677,711.^

One factor accounting for this rather dramatic rise in
^ Election Statistics

(Public Document 43); for 1960,
see pp. 3-4; for 1964, see pp. 3-5; for 1966, see pp. 3-6;
for 1970, see pp. 4-7. As of 1964, the information in PD43
is greater and more effectively presented than in previous
years.
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spending was the substantial Increase
In the cost of living.
Everything rose In price, and the
expenses commonly associated with campaigns-printing, postage,
and advertising,
for example-were no exception. Campaign
techniques have
changed, too, and this has been reflected
In Increased campaign expenditures. Television, an effective
medium for
reaching the voters, but a very expensive
one, has been used
more extensively by major candidates. There
has been
a

decline, also. In assistance to candidates from
their political parties. Candidates have been thrown back
upon their

own resources to a greater extent as campaigns become
Increasingly more candidate-oriented.

There has been a

consequent duplication of effort and waste of resources by
candidates within the same party as each goes his own way.

These reasons are but a partial explanation as to why there
has been a significant Increase In the cost of campaigning
In the Bay State In recent years.

The high, and mounting, cost of campaigning for

public office raises some Important questions related to the

democratic premises which. In theory, underlie the political
system In Massachusetts.

running for office?

First, are some excluded from

Can only some afford It?

Is the elec-

toral process, for all practical purposes, open only to the

well-to-do who can finance their own campaigns, or who have
access to others with money?
the public the loser?

If this Is the case. Is not

Second, of those who do run, are some
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candidates handicapped from the beginning?
enjoy an undue advantage?

Do incumbents

Are challengers able to raise

sufficient funds to offset the advantages
of incumbency?
If not, the public does not reap the
rewards of a competitive

campaign.

Third, does the necessity to raise large
sums of

money to finance campaigns, and the willingness
of some to
make large contributions, create a situation which

is poten-

tially unhealthy for candidates and contributors
alike?
the candidates unduly obligated?

Are

Do those who make large

contributions exercise disproportionate influence, not only
in determining the victors at the polls, but in shaping

their behavior once they assume office?

good served?

It seems not.

If so, is the public

Fourth, despite the high cost of

campaigns, are elections, in fact, adequately financed?

candidates

— incumbents

and challengers alike

—with

Are

the

resources avail«a>le to them, able to communicate effectively

with the voters?

Can the electorate

leaurn

enough about the

candidates and the issues to make intelligent choices, or
does the cost of campaigning prohibit this?

public interest is again not served.

If not,

the

And, fifth, is there

some better way of f inauicing campaigns which would allow

able men and women, who otherwise might not run for office,
to do so?

Can the advantages of incumbency be offset fairly?

Can the potential for the corruption of both candidates and
contributors be curbed, and the integrity of the electoral
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process be more adequately insured?

Can campaigns be more

adequately funded to permit the intelligent
choices a democratic political order assumes? In this
chapter, the cost
of campaigning for statewide office, the
Governor's

Council,

and the state legislature in Massachusetts in
1970 will be
examined as a first step toward answering the above
questions.
In these campaigns an effort will be made, not only
to establish the actual cost of campaigning, but to
estimate

campaign costs if vigorous opposition existed in both the
primary and election.

Before discussing the costs of par-

ticular campaigns, some remaurks are in order about the factors which affect the cost of any campaign.

Factors Affecting Campaign Costs

Any analysis of the cost of campaigning for public
office in Massachusetts in 1970, or any other year for that
matter, would have to take a number of factors into account.

Among the more important would be the following:

the funds

available to the candidate; the size of the constituency;
the power and prestige of the office; the competition faced;
the candidate's status (incumbent or challenger); the parti-

san preference of the electorate; the ceunpaign strategy and

methods employed; the assistance received from political

parties and interest groups; the law regulating campaign
finance; and the general level of prices prevailing during

the campaign.

Some brief comments about each of these

27

factors will be useful before discussing
the costs of
particular campaigns.

How much money a candidate and his
organization are
able to raise to finance his campaign is
dependent upon many
things, chief among them, perhaps, his
prospects for winning
the election. IVhether a candidate's campaign
is well funded
or underfinanced, however, it is likely that
most of the

money that is raised will be spent.

It is a rare candidate

who concludes his campaign reporting a substantial
surplus
of funds. The essential point is that the cost of
a

candi-

date's campaign will be governed by how much money is available to himj he cannot spend what he does not have.
In general, one would expect that the greater the
size of the electorate in a particular constituency, the more

costly a campaign will be.

The appeal to the voters in

Massachusetts of a statewide candidate should be more expensive than the campaign of a candidate for the Governor's

Council (there are eight councillor districts in the state)

;

a campaign for the Council should be more costly than a race

for the state Senate (forty senators are elected); and a

campaign for the House of Representatives should be the least
expensive of all (240 are elected).

A factor affecting the cost of campaigns which is
related to the size of the electoral district is the power
and prestige of an office.

This is based on a number of
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things, among them the authority
of the office and the
willingness and ability of the
occupant to exercise it.

contributors with a stake in public
decisions care who win
the more powerful and prestigious
offices. The winning
candidates will be in a position
to advance or oppose the
interests of such people. Candidates
for the more important
offices are apt to attract campaign
contributions more
readily; their campaigns, in turn,
will be more
expensive.

Whether a candidate has competition will
affect the
cost of a campaign. The typical candidate
seeks his

party's

nomination before running in the final election.

In Massa-

chusetts in 1970, winning the nomination required
running in
a primary election open to fellow partisans
and independent
voters alike; and for statewide candidates,
campaigning for
a party's endorsement at a pre-primary convention. ^

a can-

didate who faces no competition will obviously incur no
expense other than the minimal cost necessary to place his
name on the ballot.

For a particular constituency, the cost

should be greatest, in general, for a candidate who has oppo-

sition for his party's nomination and is challenged, also, in
the November election.
of course.

The quality of the opposition varies,

A candidate can anticipate a more expensive

2

In 1973 the law requiring the pre-primary convention, which for many years served the Republicans better than

the Democrats, was repealed.
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campaign when he faces serious, able,
well-known, and
adequately financed opponents.
Being well-known often means being the incumbent,

affords certain advantages that either help reduce
the
cost of campaigning, or attract funds which make an
effective campaign more likely."^ Often one of the first
tasks of

vrtiich

a challenger, particularly one who has not been
actively

engaged in public affairs previously, is to make himself

known to the electorate.

An incumbent, especially one who

has been in office for more than one term, does not suffer
from this disadvantage.

An incumbent is also in a position

to do something for his constituents, thereby winning sup-

port, whereas his opponent has no opportunity to "run

errands," and can only make promises until he gains power.

An incumbent can use his staff for such constituency service, as well as for other campaign purposes.

Because

incumbents, as a rule, are more likely to win than their

opponents, they attract funds more readily from contributors who, for whatever their reasons, want to side with the

probable winner.

Incumbency is advantageous, too, because

it provides opportxanities for free exposure to the voters
-^Regardless of party, incumbents are likely to
attract twice as much in contributions as challengers,
according to the most recent and exhaustive study of the
advantage of incumbency. See Common Cause, 1972 Congressional Campaign Finances; New England States (Washington,
D.C.
Common Cause, 1974), p. vii.
:
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while an officeholder goes about doing
his job. There is
little free publicity for a challenger.
And finally, the
electorate is unlikely to replace an
incumbent with a relatively unknown person unless the incumbent
has erred
badly;

the voters seem to prefer a familiar
face and name in office.
One characteristic of a district which
affects the
cost of a campaign is the partisan preference
of the voters.
Despite the erosion of the partisan spirit in
Massachusetts,
the electorate in Massachusetts still lias a
strong preference
for Democratic candidates. ^ This preference is
most impor-

tant in districts which are decidedly one-party in
their

makeup.

Many seats in the House of Representatives and some

in the Senate, for example, are so safe for Democrats
that

Republicans often do not contest them at all.

in such cases,

the only candidates who incur any expense are those who seek
the Democratic nomination, which under the circumstances may
be hotly contested since it is tantamount to election.

There

is also little genuine competition for seats on the Govern-

nor's Council, and races for the lesser statewide offices are
often feebly contested by underfinanced Republican candidates.
The strategy adopted by a candidate and the methods
he employs to communicate with the voters can affect the cost
^In 1970 there were 2,628,581 registered voters in
Massachusetts. Only 547,393 of them were Republicans;
1,135,103 were Democrats; 946,085 were Independents, according to a record maintained by the Secretary of State's Elections Division.
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of his campaign considerably.

One incumbent, for example,

might elect to remain "on the job" and
ignore his lesser
known opponent; another, taking nothing for
granted, might
carry the fight vigorously to his challenger.
One candidate
might rely heavily on highly paid political
consultants and
a paid staff, whereas another might rely much
less on

profes-

sional assistance and emphasize volunteer efforts to a

greater extent.

One candidate might employ radio and TV

lavishly and sample public opinion frequently, whereas his

opponent might travel around the district more, and emphasize
newspaper ads, billboards, and mailings to the electorate.
The possibilities are numerous, and the choices made by a

candidate obviously affect his campaign's cost.
There are many ways whereby members of a political

party or interest group can assist a candidate with his campaign which are not reflected in his reported campaign
expenses, but which certainly are the equivalent of money.

A party or group, for example, can promote someone's candidacy by openly endorsing him; it can conduct voter registration drives; it can publicize his name and voting record
in its communications with its members, provide volunteers

during the campaign to distribute his literature, and on

election day encourage voters to vote by telephoning them
and offering transportation to the polls.

All of these

services would otherwise have to be paid for by the
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candidate, or be foregone,

if a party or group provides

them, a candidate's campaign costs can
be reduced considerably.

The law regulating campaigns affects their
cost.

The Massachusetts campaign finance statute in
1970 was

essentially a full disclosure law; that is, it required
all
candidates and their committees to report to the secretary
of state the sources of their contributions and
the purposes

for which they spent any money.

Names, addresses, dates,

and amounts were required in these periodic reports.

Apart

from the prohibition against any corporate contributions,

and another provision which limited an individual's support
of any candidate to $3,000 in a calendar year, the law con-

tained no provisions which seriously impeded the free flow
of funds from contributors to candidates.

It also placed

no restriction on how much any candidate for any office

could spend to finance his campaign, nor did it forbid any
specific type of expenditure, except for alcoholic beverages.

At the same time, there was no provision in the cam-

paign finance law which served to ease the burden on candi-

dates of the need to meet the costs of their campaigns.
There was, for example, no partial subsidy by the state of
the cost of campaigning by any candidate for any public

office.
^ General

Laws Annotated (1958), c. 55, as amended
by c. 444 of the Acts of 1962.
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Most, if not all, of the costs associated
with

campaigns are related to the level of prices
prevailing at
the time. As prices in general rise,
therefore, so will the
costs of campaigns. Any valid comparison of Uxe
costs of
recent elections, particularly in the 1970 's, would
have to
take the inflation of the past several years into
account.

Now that most of the principal factors affecting the
cost of campaigning have been identified and commented
upon,
the balance of the chapter will focus on the cost of
running
for statewide office, the Governor's Council, and the legis-

lature in Massachusetts in 1970.

No attempt will be made to

give attention to each of the aforementioned factors in discussing these campaigns.

For example, the last factor men-

tioned, the price level, will be ignored because this inquiry
is not concerned with trends in the costs of campaigns.

Another factor, campaign strategy and methods, will only

receive infrequent comment because the number of elections
studied prohibits more than this.

will be emphasized:
(2)

(1)

Four factors, however,

the size of the electoral district,

the power and prestige of the office,

faced, and

lenger.

(4)

(3)

the competition

the candidate's status, incumbent or chal-

The first campaign which will be examined is the

gubernatorial contest.

34

The Cost of Campaic^ninq for

Gov^rnr^r-

In 1964 the voters of Massachusetts
amended their
Constitution to provide a four-year term
for governor,
1966 the incumbent governor. Republican
John A. Volpe, was
elected for a four-year term, and
Republican Francis W.

m

Sargent was elected lieutenant governor.

Early in 1969

Volpe became President Nixon's secretary
of transportation,
and Sargent became the Bay State's governor.

In 1970, as a

result of a constitutional amendment enacted
in 1966, the
candidates for governor and lieutenant governor
ran for the
first time as a team, as the presidential and
vice presidential candidates do. In that year Governor Sargent
defeated
Kevin H. White in the most expensive election in Massachusetts history.
White, formerly secretary of state, was serving his

first term as mayor of Boston when he announced his intention to seek the Democratic nomination for governor.

At his

party's pre-primary convention in the summer of 1970, White

met opposition from two serious contenders for his party's
nomination, Maurice A. Donahue and Francis X. Bellotti.
Donahue, a veteran legislator, was then serving as president

of the Massachusetts Senate.

Bellotti had served in 1963-64

as lieutenant governor, and had been an unsuccessful candi-

date for governor in 1964 and attorney general in 1966.
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Maurice Donahue won the endorsement of
his party at the
pre-primary convention, but as is common
in Democratic
politics in Massachusetts, the nomination
was contested in
the primary. Donahue was not only opposed
by White and
Bellotti, but by Kenneth P. O'Donnell as
well.

O'Donnell,

who had never held an elected position in
state or national
government, had been an adviser and intimate of
President
John F. Kennedy. His strategy was to avoid the
bloodbath at
the pre-primary convention and conserve his
resources for
the September priraary.^

Kevin H. White, the runner-up to

Donahue at the party's convention, won the nomination,
polling 231,605 votes to Donahue's 218,665 votes.
In the November election the Democratic nominee and

Governor Sargent, who had encountered no opposition in either
his party's pre-primary convention or in the primary, con-

ducted vigorous campaigns, including a debate on statewide
television.

Although White once again proved to be an

effective fund raiser. Governor Sargent was even more so.

White raised $907,490 and spent $823,849, and Sargent raised
and spent in excess of $2 million to retain his seat as

Now that there is no longer a pre-primcory convention
at which the major parties endorse their statewide candidates, all such candidates (including incumbents) must now
gather 10,000 signatures to get their names on the primary
ballot. The impact of the new law, enacted by a Democratic
legislature which overrode Republican Governor Sargent's
veto, upon the cost of winning a nomination is unknown.
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governor. 7

Although he apparently had no difficulty
raising
funds. White was at a disadvantage
financially; he had to
overcome opposition from his fellow
Democrats, not only at
the party's pre-primary convention,
but during the primary
as well.
This required him to spend $251,191 of
all the

money he raised before the election campaign
began.
who reported spending $755,556 during the
primary,

Sargent,

outspent

Mayor White in the general election by more
than two to one.
Table 1 indicates the receipts and expenditures
of Governor
Sargent and Mayor White in their primary and election
campaigns.

Sargent won the election.

He and his running mate,

Donald R. Dwight, received 1,058,623 votes (51.8 per
cent of
the total vote cast)

;

Mayor White and his running mate,

Michael S. Dukakis, received 799,269 votes (39.1 per cent).^
If the amounts spent by Maurice Donahue, Francis

Bellotti, and Kenneth O'Donnell are added to the amounts

spent by Governor Sargent and Mayor White, the total for the
1970 gubernatorial campaign exceeded $3,400,000.

Senator

7por White's finances, see the report filed by
Kevin H. White for Governor Committee with the Secretary of
State's Division of Public Records. For Sargent's, see The
Sargent Committee's report; see, also. Election Statistics,
1970 (Public Document 43), pp. 5-6. This source provides
the combined receipts, expenditures, and liabilities reported
by all candidates for governor as of December 31, 1970.

^There were an unusually high number of blank ballots
recorded in the 1970 election. The 1966 constitutional amendment required the voter to cast a single ballot
for governor and lieutenant governor; many voters did not.
Their votes were recorded as blanks.
(176,007)
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TABLE 1

RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE
REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC NOMINEES FOR
GOVERNOR IN MASSACHUSETTS IN 1970

CAI^IPAIGN

Francis W. Sargent
(R)

Kevin H. White
(D)

PrjLmary

Receipts
Expenditures

.

.

.

$1,106,598
755,556

$283,206
251,191

Election
Receipts
Expenditures

.

.

.

1,142,295
1,259,722

624,285
572,658

Tota l
Receipts
Expenditures

.

.

.

2,248,892
2,015,278

907,490
823,849

SOURCES: For White, the report filed by the
Kevin H. White for Governor Committee with the Secretary of State's Division of Public Records. For Sargent, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Secretary of
State, Election Statistics, 1970 (Public Document
43), pp. 5-6.

Donahue's campaign for the nomination required approxi-

mately $250,000.

Bellotti's effort required more than

$200,000, and O'Donnell's at least $150,000.^

Ignoring

the amounts spent by Dwight and Dukakis, the two nominees
for the lieutenant governor's office, each of Sargent's

primary votes cost $4.13 (White's cost $1.08); each of
Sargent's votes in the election cost $1.19 (White's cost
^Reports filed by Donahue, Bellotti, O'Donnell, and
their committees with the Secretary of State's Division of
Public Records.

$0.72)

10

The 1970 gubernatorial campaign
was indeed a very
expensive one, so costly that
legislation was enacted in
.

1972 which will limit expenditures
in the 1974 election.
The limitation seems reasonable.
White demonstrated that a
stiff primary fight could be
won, and a respectable election
campaign waged, with a total expenditure
of much less than
$1,000,000.
It should be noted, however, that
in 1970 White
was a powerful incumbent mayor and
was well known throughout
Massachusetts, factors which probably served
to keep his

campaign's cost down.

Allowing for this, it seems reasonable

to conclude that a campaign for governor
ought not cost much

more than $1,000,000.
The Cost of Statewide Elections
other than for Governor
In addition to electing a governor every four
years,
the voters in the Bay State also choose a lieutenant
governor, attorney general,

secretary of state, treasurer and

receiver general, and auditor.

Table

2

lists the expenditures

^^For each man, the reported expenditures in the primary were divided by the number of votes received to determine the cost per vote. The same was done for the election.
^^ Acts and Resolves
(1972), c. 810.
Chapter 810,
enacted in 1972 but effective January 1, 1974, limits most
of a gubernatorial candidate's expenditures for "image advertising" purposes to $500,000 in seeking the nomination. He
and the nominee for lieutenant governor may together spend
no more than $500,000 for those purposes during the general
election. Chapter 810 is discussed further in Chapter V.

TABLE

2

CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES REPORTED BY NOMINEES
FOR STATEWIDE OFFICE, OTHER THAN FOR
GOVERNOR, IN MASSACHUSETTS IN 1970

Office

Amoiint

Attorney General
ROJDert H. Quinn (D)
Donald L. Conn (R) a

'

Lieutenant Governor
Michael S. Dukakis (D)
Donald R. Dwight (R)^

'

'

§014 o^^
Sl^TlS

\

[

134^668

210 771

Treasurer and Receiver General
Robert Q. Crane (D) . . .
Frederick D. Hannon (R)

37,508
11^975

Auditor
Thaddeus Buczko (D)
Frank P. Bucci (R)

16,257
1^841

Secretary of State
John F. X. Davoren
Mary B. Newman (R)

(D)

48,417
74,544

SOURCES: For all candidates except Dukakis,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Secretary of State,
Election Statistics, 1970 (Public Document 43), pp.
5-6.
For Dukakis, reports filed by his two committees with the Secretary of State's Division of
Public Records.

^Conn was among the three candidates who
reported liabilities. His totaled $19,000;
Dukakis', $2,372; and Newman's $14,302. A liability
is a financial obligation such as an outstanding
loan, or an expense incurred which had not been paid.
^All winners were incumbents except Dwight (the
office had been vacant since early 1969)

40

reported by the nominees for these offices
in 1970. other
than the governor's office, the second most
powerful elective
office in the executive branch in state government
is that of

attorney general.

In 1970 the incumbent. Democrat Robert H..

Quinn, was opposed by Donald L. Conn.

Quinn, a former

speaker of the House of Representatives, had no primary
opposition; neither did Conn.

Conn, formerly an assistant attor-

ney general under Eliott L. Richardson (Quinn's Republican
predecessor)

,

was reasonably successful in raising campaign

funds in a year in which incumbent Governor Francis W. Sar-

gent virtually monopolized fund raising from Republican
sources.

Conn waged a serious, but underfinanced campaign,

spending $91,715 and incurring liabilities of $19, 000.

Quinn encountered little difficulty in raising the money to
finance his campaign.

By April

7,

1970, more than one-half

year before the general election, he had reported contributions of more than $88,000 to the secretary of state.
later reported spending a total of $214,271.
in November was hardly close; Quinn

477,502 votes.

v;on

He

The election

with a plurality of

In this race Quinn enjoyed the advantages of

^^Report filed by the Committee to Elect Donald L.
Conn Attorney General with the Secretary of State's Division
of Public Records.
The campaign receipts, expenditures, and
liabilities which are subsequently mentioned for other
statewide candidates are derived from the reports they and
their committees submitted, and from the summary statement
in Election Statistics, 1970 (Public Document 43), pp. 5-6.
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being an incumbent, and outspent his
opponent by more than
two to one.^-^
The race for lieutenant governor in 1970
can be distinguished from previous contests for that
office in that for
the first time in the history of the Bay
State, the nominees
of each party for governor and lieutenant
governor were

required to run as a team.

There was some short-lived com-

petition from the Republican nomination.

Martin A. Linsky

of Brookline, the assistant minority leader in the
House of

Representatives, was Governor Francis W. Sargent's original

choice for the nomination.

Linsky 's alleged involvement in

an "early morning" incident, which was reported extensively
in the Boston press shortly before the Republican pre-primary

convention, was politically embarrassing for Sargent, and

Linsky thereafter did not seek the nomination,

Until then,

he was a serious contender; Linsky 's reports to the secretary

of state indicated that he had received almost $17,000 in

campaign contributions and had spent almost $15,000.
Donald R. Dwight, Sargent's second choice, was the convention-

endorsed choice of the Republican Party for the nomination,
and ran uncontested in the primary.

There were five con-

tenders for the Democratic nomination for lieutenant governor.
1

3

For additional information about the financing of
Quinn's 1970 campaign, particularly about contributions from
his assistant attorneys general, see Chapter IV.
"^^See, for example, David Nyhan, "Linsky Charges
'Smear'," Boston Globe, 6 June 1970, p. 1.
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but Michael S. Dukakis clearly
outdistanced his fellow
Democrats. Dukakis, a former well-known
state legislator,
reported spending $210,771 and incurring
liabilities of
$2,372.

Although endorsed by the Democratic
pre-primary
convention, a substantial portion of
Dukakis' money was
spent in winning the Democratic nomination.
Dwight,

unopposed in the primary, reported spending
$134,668, about
$75,000 less than Dukakis. Although Dukakis outspent
Dwight, the outcome of the election for
lieutenant governor
was to a large extent influenced by who the
gubernatorial

nominees were.

The electorate could not, as in previous

elections, cast separate ballots for their choices for

governor and lieutenant governor.

In the November election

Republicans Sargent and Dwight emerged the victors over
Kevin H. White, Sargent's opponent for governor, and
Dukakis; their plurality was 259,354 votes.

The elections in 1970 for attorney general and lieutenant governor provide some basis for a judgment about the

cost of a statewide contest.

Conn, who had no opposition

for the Republican nomination for attorney general, spent

less than $100,000 and lost to Quinn, the incumbent, by

almost one-half million votes.

Quinn, also unopposed for

the nomination, spent about $215,000.

In a vigorously con-

tested race for attorney general in which a candidate had

opposition for the nomination, a minimum expenditure of
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$300,000 to $400,000 would seem necessary; this would
average
out to 15 to 2 0 cents per voter in a statewide
election in
which about 2,000,000 ballots are cast.^S ^he recent
consti-

tutional amendment which requires the nominees for
governor
and lieutenant governor to run as a team makes a
judgment

about the cost of a caiapaign for lieutenant governor somewhat

more difficult than for attorney general.

Candidates for

each office must win the nominations on their own.

After the

nominations have been decided, however, a candidate for attorney general must continue to campaign independently whereas
the campaign efforts of a candidate for lieutenant governor

can be joined, to a significant extent, with his running
mate's.

The expenditures required to capture the lieutenant

governor's office should be less, therefore, than those of a
candidate for attorney general. -^^

The expenditures by

Dukakis, the unsuccessful Democratic nominee in 1970, and by
Dwight, the Republican victor, are helpful in making a judg-

ment about how much money is required for a race for
^^Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972 allows a candidate
for attorney general to spend no more than $250,000 for certain mass media purposes in seeking the nomination. It permits $250,000 in additional expenditures for those purposes
during the general election period, a total of $500,000.

candidate for lieutenant governor is limited by
Chapter 310 to $100,000 in expenditures for certain mass
media purposes in seeking the nomination. He and the candidate for governor together may spend $500,000 for those purposes during the general election period.
•'•^A
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lieutenant governor.

Dukakis had opposition in the primary

and spent more than $210,000; Dwight had none,
and spent
about $135,000. In a vigorously contested
election for lieu-

tenant governor in which a candidate had opposition
for the
nomination, an expenditure of $200,000 to $300,000
would

seem

reasonable.

Campaign Costs for Treasurer, Auditor, and Secretary
of State.

For more than two decades Democratic candidates

have been successful in every election in capturing each of

three minor statewide executive offices (treasurer and

receiver general, secretary of state, and auditor)

.

The 1970

election was no exception.
In the race for treasurer and receiver general in

1970 the Democratic candidate was Robert Q. Crane and the

Republican candidate was Frederick D. Hannon.

Crane, the

incumbent treasurer, easily defeated his Republican challenger by a plurality of 595,699 votes.

Hannon, who had no

opposition for the Republican nomination, was politically
unknown to most voters and his campaign was clearly underfinanced.

He reported spending only $11,975, whereas Crane's

reported expenditures were $37,508.^^

Crane, unopposed in

the Democratic primary, not only had the advantages of being
the incumbent, but outspent Hannon by more than three to one.

^^An incumbent treasurer has a "natural" campaign
finance constituency, the banking community. For a discussion of this point, and for additional detail 2aDOUt Crane's
csunpaign financing for his reelection in 1970, see Chapter
IV.
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Incumbent state Auditor Thaddeus Buczko won
by the
greatest plurality of any statewide candidate
in the 1970
election; his margin over his Republican
opponent, Frank P.
Bucci, was 648,605 votes. Bucci's campaign
was even more

underfinanced than Hannon's.

Bucci, who had no opposition

in the Republican primary, reported spending
only $1,841.

Clearly a "sacrificial lamb," he was offered as a token
opponent by the Republican Party to the well-entrenched
incumbent, Buczko, who reported spending $16,257 in his campaign.

The lack of vigor in Bucci's campaign is demonstrated by the
fact that until October

1,

1970 he had reported but $35 in

campaign contributions to the secretary of state.
The elections of 1970 for treasurer and auditor pro-

vide little, if any, insight as to what it costs to run for
a statewide office in Massachusetts.

They do emphasize the

fact, however, that underfinanced and unknown Republican

candidates cannot successfully wage campaigns against Democratic incumbents in a state which traditionally elects

Democrats to the lesser statewide offices.

The race for

secretary of state, however, does afford an idea of the cost
of campaigning for one of the three lesser statewide offices.
In 1970 Mary B. Newman, a Republican legislator for more than
a decade and a person considered by many to be one of the

ablest members of the House of Representatives, ran as the

Republican candidate for secretary of state against the
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incumbent, John P. x. Davoren, a
former speaker of the House
of Representatives. Mrs. Newman
waged an effective campaign
but lost the November election.
Davoren polled 1,001,528
votes; Newman polled 831,150 votes.
No Republican candidate
other than Governor Francis W. Sargent
(and his running mate.
Lieutenant Governor Donald R. Dwight)
polled more votes than
Newman. Davoren's plurality was
170,378 votes, a substantial margin.
Davoren, who was unopposed for the nomination,

reported spending $48,417, of which almost half
($23,646) was
spent in the general election campaign. Newman's
campaign
cost $79,699, almost twice as much as her
opponent's.

In

a report to her contributors, she stated:

We needed a little more money, a little
earlier. If an additional $15,000 could have
been put into television beginning three weeks
before the election we are convinced that
enough votes could have been changed to insure
victory. In other words, we believe we could
have won with a budget of $100,000.19
18

Letter from Mary B. Newman to her campaign contributors, December 1, 1970. This amount, spent as of
November 10, 1970, differs somewhat from the amount officially reported in Public Document 43. According to that
source, as of December 31, 1970, Newman's campaign for
secretary of state had required expenditures of $74,554,
with liabilities outstanding amounting to $14,302. Despite
the discrepancy, the text which follows relies upon the
letter from Newman to her campaign contributors because it
provides subst^mtial detail.
19 Ibid.

After the November election, Newman sent
a report to each individual who had contributed to her campaign^ explaining how her campaign had been financed and
detailing how the contributions she had received had been
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Most of the money spent by Newman's
committee was
used to communicate with the voters
by radio, television,
and the printed word.

Approximately $57,000 was used for

that purpose.

More than $30,000 of that sum was
spent on
a five-week radio effort which
consisted of 1,963 one-minute
messages played on more than thirty different
stations.

Slightly more than $8,000 was used to finance
eighty-nine
half -minute spots on television (using
eight of the state's
nine commercial television stations) during
the final six
days of the campaign.

More than one-half million handout

items (bumper stickers, match books, hand cards,
etc.) and
signs required an expenditure of approximately
$18,000.

A

staff of five people working out of one rented office,
and
a headquarters office which had been furnished at no charge,

required an additional expenditure of slightly more than
$5,000.

A detailed breakdown of Newman's expenditures is

found in Table 3.

Newman not only required "a little more money, a
little earlier," but failed to offset all of her campaign

expenses with contributions.
from 1,302 contributors.

She was able to raise $59,578

Although almost $35,000 was raised

spent. This report is valuable because it is the only known
report of a statewide candidate in recent years which has
been made available in a form that is readily understood.
It is of particular value because it provides reliable,
detailed evidence about the cost of a recent statewide race
in Massachusetts for a minor office.

TABLE

3

CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES OF MARY B. NEWMAN
BETWEEN
APRIL 1, 1970 AND NOVEMBER 10, 1970

Expenditure

Amount

RADIO

T^®
Production
PRINTING
Stationery
Mailings
Handouts
Signs
Bumper strips
TELEVISION
Time
Production
SALARIES
ADVERTISING
Agency fees
Ad space
Ad production
MOVIE BENEFIT EXPENSES
OFFICE EXPENSES
Rent
Office supplies
Mimeo supplies
Office equipment
Equipment rental
POSTAGE
TELEPHONE
CONVENTION
ART WORK
TRAVEL EXPENSES
ELECTION NIGHT
PHOTOGRAPHY
SPECIAL SIGNS
PETTY CASH
CAMPAIGN MATERIALS
NEWSCLIPS

TOTAL

!.*

Total

$30,437
$28,565
1 872

18,136
1,512
743
9,338
4,' 115
2,428

\

8245
6,985
1,260
5

4^112
'
1,331
2,656
125
.

.

2,970
2,502

.

1,020
289
532
86

575

2,215
1,770
949
802
750
597
486
180
175
140
119

$79,699

SOURCE:
Letter from Mary B. Newman to her
campaign contributors, December 1, 1970.
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from contributions of $100 or
more, including sixteen
contributions of $500 or more, more
than 1,000 of her contributions were less than $100.
The average contribution
received was $46. Because Newman
was unable to generate
sufficient cash contributions she was
required to finance
her campaign partially with loans.
As late as mid-November,
1970 she reported a deficit in excess of
$20,000, of which
$12,000 was accounted for by personal or
guaranteed loans
from seven individuals. Most of the
money which she received
was contributed after her ncmiination in
the Sept^ber primary,
in which she was unopposed. Apart from
any loans, her cash
contributions prior to September 15 amounted to less
than
$11,000.

In the six-week period, September 16 through
Octo-

ber 31, 1970, she received more than $42,000 in
contributions.
In a letter to campaign contributors Newman stated

that she did not claim to know what a statewide campaign

should cost, but she noted the tremendous range in expenditures that had been reported by candidates for governor as

well as for other statewide executive offices.

She argued:

In theory it should cost no more to run for
Governor than for Auditor. In fact, from our
experience, there is an extra burden on a candidate for a lesser known office who must make the
public aware of the office
if not of its very
existence. 20

—

Newman's statement has some merit in that all candidates for
20 Ibid.
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statewide office have a constituency of
the same size. The
governor, however, is the most powerful
and prestigious
figure in state government. Candidates
for governor are not
only more apt to attract campaign
contributions but require
substantially more money for their campaigns.
The public,
in general, and the candidates' parties,
in particular,

expect candidates for the top office to wage more
vigorous
and visible campaigns, to travel throughout the
state

more,

communicating with the electorate about a variety of
issues
and concerns, many far more important than those to
which a
lesser statewide candidate ordinarily addresses himself.

Based on Mary

Newirian's

campaign for secretary of state in

1970 it would seem reasonable to conclude that an able can-

didate, assisted by a skilled staff, could conduct an effec-

tive campaign for one of the lesser statewide offices (secre-

tary of state, treasurer, and auditor) with a budget of

approximately $100,000 to $125,000 if no vigorous opposition
for the nomination was encountered.

The cost of winning a

statewide race would increase substantially, of course, if
there was primary opposition.

In that case, an expenditure

of at least $200,000 would probably be required.

In an

election in which 2,000,000 votes were cast this would average
^^Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972 limits a candidate
for secretary of state, treasurer, and auditor to spending
no more than $100,000 for most media expenditures in seeking
the nomination; an additional $100,000 is allowed for the
election campaign.

out to a modest 10 cents per voter.

If the candidate was

an incumbent, or well known throughout the
state, the cost
could be appreciably less; Davoren's campaign
in

1970 illus-

trates this.
It is not uncommon that voters do not know the
names

of the occupants of the lesser statewide offices.

This is

also true of the Governor's Council, perhaps the least
"visible" political institution in the Commonwealth.

The

cost of campaigning for the Council is discussed next.
The Cost of Campaigning for
the Governor's Council

The Governor's Council, an institution which dates

back to Colonial times, consists of eight members who are
elected every two yeaors from councillor districts comprised
of five Senate districts.

The principal function of the

Governor's Council today is to approve or disapprove of the

governor's judicial nominations.

The Council usually meets

once a week, and the job pays $4,000 annually.
In 1970 the eight seats on the Governor's Council

were won by Democrats.

Six incumbents retained their seats;

two councillors did not seek reelection.

There was some

competition in the Democratic primary in five councillor
districts, but only one of the eight seats was contested by
a Republican candidate in the general election.
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In three districts (the Second,
Fourth, and Fifth)

incumbent Democratic Councillors Herbert
L. Connolly of
Newton, Patrick J. McDonough of Boston,
and Thomas J. Lane
of Lawrence were unopposed in both
the primary and general
election. Connolly reported spending
nothing to retain

his

seat; McDonough reported spending only
$443, and Lane but
22
$1,049.
It is interesting to note that Patrick
J.

McDonough, a former state legislator from 1941-46
and a
member of the Governor's Council from 1947 to
the present,
was the beneficiary of one of the largest testimonial
dinners held recently for a Massachusetts politician.
On Sep-

tember 25, 1972 at Anthony's Pier

4

in Boston, McDonough

was honored by a $100-per-person dinner aboard the S.S. Peter
Stuyvesant, an affair attended by virtually every politician
of importance in Boston.

The races in the five councillor districts (the
First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth) in which there was

some competition for the Democratic nomination afford some
idea, although an inadequate one, as to the amount of money

required to run for a seat on the Council today.

In the

^^Reports filed by Connolly, McDonough, and Lane with
the Secretary of State's Division of Public Records. The
subsequent discussion of expenditures by candidates, in addition to these three, relies upon the reports they filed.
23
'•'David Nyhan,

"McDonough a Beacon for His Big
Night," Boston Globe , 26 September 1972, p. 3. Other testimonials are discussed at length in Chapter III.
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First District, Nicholas W. Mitchell
of Fall River, the
incumbent, spent $4,848 in defeating
two primary opponents;
in the Third District, incumbent
George F. Cronin, Jr. of

Boston, spent $4,442 in defeating two
opponents in the Democratic primary; in the Sixth District,
incumbent G. Edward

Bradley of Somerville spent $811 to defeat
one opponent for
the nomination; in the Seventh District,
William J. McManus
of Worcester spent $6,832 in defeating four
fellow Democrats; and in the Eighth District, Edward M.
O'Brien of East-

hampton defeated four Democratic rivals in the primary and
spent $10,310.

McManus and O'Brien, the Democratic nominees

in the Seventh and Eighth Districts, waged the most
expen-

sive campaigns; they v/ere not incumbents.

ful in the general election.

Each was success-

The costs incurred by the eight

Democrats who won seats on the Council in 1970 are presented
in Table 4.

A better indication of what it costs to run successfully for a seat on the Governor's Council is provided by
the race in the Eighth District, won by Edward M. O'Brien.

O'Brien met opposition not only in the Democratic primary,
but was the only candidate for the Governor's Council in 1970
to have a Republican opponent in the November election.
H. George Wilde, of Lee,

the Republican nominee, reported

spending a total of $12,032 in the primary and election.
Wilde, although having an opponent in the primary, spent most

of his money ($10,868) against O'Brien in the election.

Of
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O'Brien's four opponents in the Democratic
primary,
Anthony W. Ravosa of Springfield made the
most serious bid
for the nomination.
Ravosa reported spending $15,447 during
the primary whereas O'Brien spent less,
$10,310.
In the

November election O'Brien reported spending
$6,478.

Although

he was outspent by his Republican opponent, Wilde,
he won the

election handily; O'Brien received 131,770 votes, and
Wilde,
73,756.

The expenditures reported by these three candidates

were as follows:

O'Brien (D)
Ravosa (D)
Wilde (R)

Primary

Election

$10,310
15,447
1,164

$

6,478

—

10,868

Total
$16,788
15,447
12,032

It seems plausible that candidates for the Governor's

Council might have some difficulty raising sufficient funds
because the Council is not known to many voters, its power
is essentially limited to the confirmation of judicial

appointees, and its prestige still suffers from evidence of

corruption unearthed by the Massachusetts Crime Commission
in the mid-1960 's.

A councillor district is quite large,

nonetheless, containing approximately 250,000 voters, and a

candidate with substantial opposition in both the primary
and election would undoubtedly need more than the $16,788

reported spent by O'Brien in 1970.
to $50,000

An expenditure of $40,000

(15 to 20 cents per voter)

in a hard fought campaign
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is a distinct possibility. 24

how readily a candidate could

attract this much money in campaign
contributions is another
matter.
Our attention now turns to the cost
of campaigning
for the Senate, a far more "visible"
institution than the
Council, whose members are chosen for a
two-year term by
constituencies only one-fifth as large as councillor
districts.

The Cost of Campaigning for
the Massachusetts Senate
In 1970, 101 candidates, thirty-five of whom were

incumbents, contested forty seats in the legislature's upper
house.

In some cases, candidates met no opposition in either

the primary or election.

In other cases, they met opposition

in only the primary or election.

met opposition in both.

And in a few cases, they

Because campaign finance reports

filed with the secretary of state were available for only

ninety-three of the 101 candidates, what follows pertains only
to them.

The primary objective in this section is to provide

evidence as to how much it cost to run for a Senate seat in
1970, and to suggest what it might cost to run in a competitive

campaign in the future.

Of the ninety-three candidates whose

24

Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972 limits a candidate
for Governor's Council to spending no more than $25,000 for
various media purposes in either the primary or election
total of $50,000.

—
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reports were examined, only fourteen
spent more than $10,000
during their campaigns; more than
three-quarters of the
candidates spent less than $10,000, and
more than one-half
spent less than $5,000. Eight candidates
reported no expense
whatsoever, whereas the most expensive race
required an
expenditure of $36,867. See Table 5. The
expenditures
reported by the ninety-three candidates totaled
$489,637, an
average of $5,265 per candidate. This figure
is roughly

comparable to a finding by Mileur and Sulzner; they
established that the average expense of Senate nominees
in the 1968
general election was about $4,600.25

as might be expected,

those campaigns which cost the least (if anything at all)
were the thirteen in which the candidate was neither opposed
in the primary or election.

On the other hand, the most

expensive included, but were not necessarily limited to, those
in which a candidate met opposition in both the primary and

election (eleven cases)

.

Sometimes a candidate had a "free

ride" in either the primary or election, but encountered

vigorous opposition in the other phase of the electoral
process.

For example, in five races, candidates who had no

primary opposition reported spending more than $10,000 in
the election; and in four contests, candidates who had no
^^Mileur and Sulzner, Campaigning for the Massachusetts Senate , p. 79. The authors did not include expenditures incurred during the primary; had they, the average
cost would have exceeded $4,600.
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opponents in the election were actively
opposed in the
primary, and reported spending more
than
$10,000.

TABLE

5

CAMPAIGN COSTS^ REPORTED BY NINETY-THREE
CANDIDATES FOR THE MASSACHUSETTS
SENATE IN 1970
Reported Cost

Number of Candidates
0

1- 4,999

5,000- 9,999
10, 000-14,999

15,000-19,999
20, 000-24,999
25,000-29,999
30,000-34,999
35,000-39,999

8

47
24
8

2
2

1
0
1

SOURCE:
Reports filed by candidates
and their committees with the Secretary
of State's Division of Public Records.

Costs are for both the primary and
election and include liabilities (obligations incurred but not paid).
Table

5

affords some insight into the cost of a

Senate race in 1970, but a comparison of the costs incurred
by incumbent senators who ran for reelection with the costs

reported by non- incumbents is more instructive.

Of the

forty incumbent senators, five chose not to run for reelection.

Of the thirty-five who ran, thirty-two retained

their seats; two were defeated in the primary, and one in
the election.

One striking fact about the reelection cam-

paigns of the thirty-five incumbents, which cannot be
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ignored, is that thirteen of them were unopposed
in both the

primary and election campaigns.

Moreover, twenty-six of them

had no primary opponents, and seventeen of them were
unopposed
in the election.

Only three of them met opposition in both

the primary and election.

Table

6

lists the thirty-five

incumbents and their reported expenses.

It also identifies

whether these candidates were opposed in the primary and
election, and if they retained their seats.

When the cam-

paign costs reported by the thirty-five incumbents are compared to the costs incurred by the fifty-eight candidates who
were not incumbents, it is apparent that the incumbents, on
the average, spent less.

Of the $489,637 spent by all ninety-

three candidates, the thirty-five incumbents spent $153,954,
an average of $4,399 each.

The fifty-eight non-incumbents

reported spending $335,683, or $5,788 each; their campaigns

were $1,389 more expensive, on the average, than the campaigns
of the incumbents.

A comparison of the costs of the campaigns

$04

of incumbents and non- incumbents is as follows:

Reported Cost
1-

999

1,000-4,999
5,000-9,999
10,000 or more

Incumbents

7

11
10
3

35

Non-inciambents
4

15
14
14
11
58
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An inquiry into several of
the more expensive
contests for seats in the upper
house in 1970 provides
further insight into the cost of
campaigns. Table 7 identifies the fifteen candidates, of
whom only

five were incum-

bents, who reported spending the
most for their campaigns.
In all cases but one, the reported
expense exceeded $10,000.
Nine of these fifteen candidates,
including all the incumbents, were elected.
In ten of these races there was
opposition for the nomination, and of the
twelve candidates who
were nominated, eleven faced opponents
in the general election.

A brief examination of six of the fifteen most
expensive campaigns, four of them involving
incumbents, is very

helpful in making a judgment about the cost of a
contested
Senate election.

The first was the most expensive campaign

for a Senate seat in 1970 in terms of the araount
spent by

one candidate, as well as by all candidates vying for
that
seat.

In the race for a vacant seat in the Eighth Middlesex

District nine contenders sought the Democratic nomination;
the winner was Irving Fishman (Democrat-Ne\^^ton)

.

The Repub-

lican challenger was Monte G. Basbas, a former mayor of the
city.

Basbas, unopposed for his party's nomination, reported

spending $36,867, more than any other candidate for the

Senate in 1970.

Fisliman spent $20,929.

If the amounts of

money spent, and the votes received, by the nine aspirants
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for the Democratic nomination
are assumed to be sufficient
evidence, Fishman faced serious
and adequately financed oppo-

sition from only three of his rivals
for the nomination. Of
them, Terry P. Segal of Newton
spent the most, $11,758.
If
the amounts spent by the nine
Democratic candidates (approximately $50,000) are added to Basbas'
reported expense, the
ten candidates who sought the seat
in the Eighth Middlesex
District spent in excess of $86,000 in
1970.
That race, in
which Fishman defeated Basbas by approximately
6,000 votes,
was very expensive indeed.

Although the amount reported spent was not nearly
as
much, the contest in the Cape and Plymouth
District bears
a

resemblance to the previous election in that the seat
was
vacant. Unlike the previous race, however, the Cape
and

Plymouth District is a safe Republican district, and although
contested by the Democrats in the November election, was won

handily by the Republican nominee, John F. Aylmer of Barnstable.

The prospect of a Republican victory provoked com-

petition among Aylmer and two other Republican aspirants for
the nomination.

Together, they reported spending approxi-

mately $28,000 in their primary campaigns.

Aylmer, who won

a narrow victory in the primary, beating his closest opponent

by less than 500 votes, reported spending $15,938.

He had no

trouble in the election, winning by a margin of approximately
25,000 votes.
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The second most expensive race for
a Senate seat in
1970 involved an incumbent, George D.
Hammond (RepublicanWestf ield) , who successfully retained
his seat in the Hampden
and Berkshire District. Hammond,
unopposed for the Republican nomination, reported spending a
total of $28,680 in his
reelection campaign. His Democratic opponent,
Robert Ryan of
Springfield, handily defeated an opponent for
his party's
nomination, but then lost to Hammond in the
November election
by approximately 5,000 votes. Ryan spent
$6,958, approximately one-fourth of what Hammond spent.
The election in the Second Middlesex District is

interesting because of the large expenditures by an unsuc-

cessful candidate for the Democratic nomination, David A.
Wylie.

This seat was retained by incumbent Senator Francis X.

McCann (Democrat-Cambridge)
$3,107.

,

who reported spending only

Wylie, however, reported spending $24,339 in the

primary alone.

Although outspent by roughly eight to one,

McCann edged Wylie in the primary by about 2,000 votes.

He

had no Republican opponent in the November election.
In the Norfolk and Suffolk District, an incumbent

senator failed to retain his seat.

As in the above case,

there was a vigorously contested and expensive race for the

Democratic nomination, and there was no Republican opponent
in the November election.

Senator Beryl W. Cohen (Democrat-

Brookline) was defeated in a four-way race for the Democratic
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nomination in which Jack H. Bactaan
of Brookline reported
spending §16,960, whereas Cohen
reported spending but 55,749.

Baokman's margin of victory in the
primary was less than 300
votes.
The final case involves a second
incumbent who failed
to retain his seat.
In a relatively expensive race in
the
First Middlesex District, a newcomer
to the Senate, B. Joseph
Tully of Dracut, defeated incumbent
Democrat John E. Harrington, Jr. of Lowell in a close five-way
contest for the nomination. Tully reported spending $12,885,
and the expenses
reported by his four opponents for the nomination
totaled
$21,079.

Harrington, the losing incumbent, reported spending

Tully received roughly one-third of the votes cast

$8,443.

in the Democratic primary,

topping his nearest rival by

approximately 1,400 votes, and went on to win handily against
a Republican opponent in the November election.

In conclusion, it can be expensive to unseat an incum-

bent senator.

Backman did it in the Norfolk and Suffolk Dis-

trict, and Tully was successful in the First Middlesex Dis-

trict.

Wylie came close, but failed, in the Second Middlesex

District.

It can be expensive, too, for an incumbent to

retain his seat.

The best example of this is Hammond's race

in the Hampden and Berkshire District.

It is apparent, also,

that it is expensive to mount a successful campaign for a

vacant seat, even when the district is not very competitive.
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Aylmer'a election in the Cape and
Plymouth Dietrict is
evidence of this, it is even more
expensive when the district is competitive, as Basbas' and
Pishman's campaigns
demonstrate. How much should a competitive
campaign reasonably cost today? Certainly not $70,000,
the reported cost
of the most expensive campaign waged
by a winning candidate
in 1972. 26

In the typical Senate district in 1970
approxi-

mately 50,000 ballots were cast.

Even if a candidate spent

$1 to appeal to each voter his expense would total only

$50,000.

None of the candidates who ran the most expensive

campaigns in 1970 came close to this.

A total of approxi-

mately $25,000 for all purposes would seem adequate, although
the legislature, in a recent amendment to the campaign

finance law, allowed a candidate to spend a maximum of
$30,000 to offset many, but not all, of the major costs of a
caunpaign.^^

When the voters elect their senators they also elect
240 members to a two-year term in the Massachusetts House of

^^Representative Chester G. Atkins (Democrat-Acton)
elected to the House for the first time in 1970, made a successful bid for the Senate two years later. Atkins reported
spending in excess of $22,000 for the nomination, and more
than $47,000 during the general election period. He also
declared liabilities of $31,000 in his report to the Secretary
of State's Division of Public Records.
27chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972 sets a ceiling upon
the auaount of money which a candidate for the Senate may spend
during the primary and election for television, radio, newspaper, magazine, billboard, and postage expense. A candidate
may spend up to $15,000 for these purposes to win the nomination, and an additional $15,000 during the election.
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Representatives, the second largest
lower house in the fifty
state legislatures. The cost
of campaigning for the House
of Representatives is discussed
next.

The Cost of Campai^ninc^ for the Massarhn^^i-^-,
~
House ot Representatives
In 1970, 581 persons (421 Democrats
and 160 Republicans) who wanted to be state
representatives on Beacon Hill
sought the nominations of the two major
parties. The Demo-

crats nominated 218 candidates and the
Republicans, 129.
There were 364 candidates in the November
election, including
seventeen independent candidates. The Democrats
prevailed in
November, winning about three-fourths of the 240
seats, not

surprising since the Republicans provided opposition
in little
more than one-half of the races. Because so many
candidates

made bids for House seats, only the campaign finance
reports
of winning candidates were examined in an effort to
establish

what it cost in 1970 to win an election for the House of
Representatives.

A review of the records of 225 successful

candidates, 173 of whom were Incumbents, does provide some

idea of what it cost (the campaign finance reports of fifteen

winning candidates were not avail«a>le)
candidates reported no expense whatsoever.

Eleven of the 225
More than one-

half of them (120 candidates) spent less than $2,000.

A cam-

paign costing more than $5,000 was uncommon; only 13.8 per
28Reports filed by candidates and their committees
with the Secreteury of State's Division of Public Records.
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cent (thirty-one candidates) reported
campaigns that costly.
Only four of the 225 candidates spent
in excess of $10,000,
the most expensive campaign costing
$15,921.

See Table

8

for the campaign costs reported by the
225 successful candidates.

TABLE

8

C7VMPAIGN COSTS* REPORTED BY 225 SUCCESSFUL

CANDIDATES FOR THE MASSACHUSETTS HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES IN 1970

Reported Cost
0

1-

999

1,000-1,999
2,000-2,999
3,000-3,999
4,000-4,999
5,000-5,999
6,000-6,999
7,000-7,999
8,000-8,999
9,000-9,999
10,000 or more

Number of Candidates
11
65
44
32
26
16
11
6
3
6

1
4

225

SOURCE:
Reports filed by candidates
and their committees with the Secretary of
State's Division of Public Records.

^Costs are for both primary and election and include liabilities (obligations
incurred but not paid)

The above figures, however, provide only the roughest
guide to the cost of a House campaign in 1970.

A look at the

twenty-five most expensive campaigns in that year affords an
idea of how much it cost to be elected when a candidate had
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opposition.

Of the twenty-five candidates who
spent the

most—nineteen of whom were Democrats, and six
Republicansonly ten were incumbents.

Twenty of the candidates had pri-

mary opponents, and all but three had
opponents in the November election. Seventeen of the twenty-five
were opposed in
both the primary and election. The districts
in which these
campaigns were waged were largely urban and suburban
in

character, and were located in some of the larger
cities and
towns in seven of the Commonwealth's counties.
Fourteen of
these districts were multi-member districts.

The expendi-

tures reported by these twenty-five House candidates, presented in Table

9,

ranged from $5,384 to $15,921.

They

totaled $200,873, an average of $8,035 per candidate.

A more detailed study of the costs incurred by six
candidates for the House of Representatives in 1970 gener-

ally affirms the findings about the twenty-five most expensive House campaigns.

In 1972, members of the staff of House

Minority Leader Francis W. Hatch of Beverly examined the
campaign costs incurred by six successful Republicans in
their first campaigns for the House of Representatives.^^

^^Representative Hatch directed SAVE (Sustain a
Veto) , the effort to elect Republican candidates to the House
of Representatives in 1972.
Three members of his staff,
Peter Berg, William Harwood, and Field Reichardt, analyzed
the campaign costs of six successful first-time candidates
in 1970 in order to provide a basis for advising Republican
candidates in 1972. See "Budgets Used by Successful House
Republican Candidates in 1970," [1972].
(Mimeographed).
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These candidates ran for seats
in a variety of districts
throughout the state. One was
a rural district in Franklin
county, in western Massachusetts;
one was a suburban district
near the city of Brockton; one
was a district in the metropolitan Boston area; and three
were urban districts in Lawrence, Worcester, and Gloucester.
AH but the metropolitan
Boston district were single-member
districts. Three of the
six candidates encountered no
opposition in their primary
races, but all had opponents in
the election. The expenditures reported by the three candidates
with opposition only
in the November election averaged
$5,337. The expenses
reported by the three candidates who were
opposed in both
the primary and election averaged
$6,913. The expenses

reported by the six candidates were as follows: ^0
District

Primary

Worcester
Suburban
Rural
Metro. Boston
Gloucester
Lawrence

$4,580
0

890
0

1,940
0

Election

Total

$5,370
6,890
4,930
5,080
3,130
4,040

$9,950
6,890
5,720
5,080
5,070
4,040

The most expensive campaign in 1970 for the House of

Representatives was waged by Chester G. Atkins of Acton, a
twenty-one year old Democratic candidate who captured a seat
30 Ibid.

Three of these candidates were Representatives Ames, Simons and Lionett, each of whom is included in
Table 9 which lists the twenty-five most expensive campaigns.
There are some discrepancies between the figures in Berg's
study and those in the table, but they are minor.

in the Thirty- third Middlesex
District.

Atkins- campaign

cost $15,921.

Most of this money was raised and
spent in
the primary, although a substantial
amount was spent

during

the election.

Although numerous small contributions were

received by Atkins' committee, the cost
of his primary and
election campaigns was borne largely by
him, with
some

assistance from his parents.
$6,900 toward

Atkins personally contributed

his campaign, and loaned his committee an

additional $1,900.

His parents contributed $2,000, and also

loaned $500 to his campaign.

Together, he and his parents

accounted for $11,300 of the funds spent in this
unusually
expensive race for a House seat.^^

Atkins defeated the

Republican nominee in the November election after having won
a stiff primary fight against an opponent who had
spent only

$2,715.

Atkins polled 1,969 votes in the primary, edging

his opponent by 457 votes.

Each of Atkins' votes in the

primary cost approximately $5.

One would have to agree with

Martin A. Linsky that Atkins' campaign was one of "the most
lavish and heavily personally financed in Massachusetts' history .

""^^

^^Reports filed by Atkins and his committee with the
Secretary of State's Division of Public Records.
-''•Linsky, former assistant minority leader of the
Massachusetts House of Representatives, expressed the same
opinion about Atkins' extremely expensive ccunpaign for the
state Senate in 1972. Atkins soon after co-authored a book.
Getting Elected; A Guide to Winning State And Local Office
In his book Atkins ironically offers prospective candidates

.
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The Atkins campaign, then, was hardly a
typical House
campaign in 1970. Its cost was excessive.
A much more
realistic figure for the cost of a campaign
for a seat in the
House of Representatives—if a candidate had
an opponent in
the primary and election— is provided by the
author's inquiry
into the twenty-five most expensive campaigns, and
the study

by Representative Hatch's staff.

For a campaign in a single-

member district $5,000 to $8,000 would seem quite adequate. 33
Siammary and Conclusions

In siimmary, a total of about $5,500,000 was reported

spent in Massachusetts in 1970 on behalf of all candidates
for statewide office, the Governor's Council, and the state

legislature. 34

The cost of the election for governor far

the advice of using as much volunteer assistance as possible,
and makes no mention in the chapter devoted to campaign
finance about the large expenditures he incurred in his two
campaigns. See Linsky's scathing book review, "A Radiclib
Guide to Winning Elections: Money," Real Paper (Boston), 16
May 1973, p. 4.

—

^3chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972 sets a limitation
upon a House candidate's television, radio, newspaper, magazine, billboard, and postage expense during the primary and
election. A House candidate may spend no more than $5,000
during the primary, and an additional $5,000 during the
election.
All districts will be single-member districts,
beginning with the 1974 election, as a result of an amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution approved by the voters
in 1972.

^^An estimate is necessary because Public Document 43
does not present campaign expenditures in a way which allows
the reader to ascertain the cost of all campaigns for the
House, Senate, or Council. Moreover, although the total
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exceeded any other, accounting for more
than $3,400,000, with
the incumbent reporting more than one-half
of the total.

Only three candidates for other statewide
offices, the incumbent attorney general and the two nominees for
lieutenant
governor, reported spending in excess of $100,000
to finance

their campaigns.

The cost of the elections for the eight

seats on the Governor's Council was surprisingly low,
only

two candidates reporting expenditures greater than
$15,000.
Of the ninety- three candidates for the Senate, who together

reported expenditures totaling almost $500,000, only fourteen
spent more than $10,000.

And of the 225 successful candidates

for the House of Representatives, whose total campaign costs

also approximated $500,000, only thirty-one reported expen-

ditures exceeding $5,000.
Of the several factors which affect the cost of
paigns, four are especially worthy of comment.

the size of the electoral district.

ccun-

The first is

As anticipated, state-

wide elections were, in general, the most expensive.

Cam-

paigns for the Senate and House of Representatives, in that
order, were less expensive.

In elections for the House,

fourteen of the twenty-five most expensive campaigns involved

multi-member districts.

Because there was only one contest

expenditures by all candidates for each statewide office are
given, it is not possible to determine from PD 43 what particular candidates spent during their campaigns. There are
deficiencies, in addition to these, which could easily be
remedied and would make the summary statement more readable
and useful.
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for the Governor's Council in which there
was competition in
both the primary and election, there is scant basis
for a

judgment, although it should be noted that the costs
reported
by two candidates in that race exceeded the costs
reported by

all but six candidates for the Senate.

The second factor affecting the cost of campaigns

which warrants comment is the power and prestige of the
office.

Of all the offices considered, the governor's is

clearly the most powerful and prestigious, and most observers

rank the office of attorney general second.

The other state-

wide offices are definitely of lesser importance.

Quarrels

might arise about the status of a governor's councillor, but
a senator would be ranked above a representative.

As noted

in the above remarks about the size of the electoral district.-

campaign costs in 1970 generally followed this ordering of
the relative importance of these offices, with the expense

reported by the candidates for governor and attorney general

providing the best evidence that the more important the
office, the more expensive the campaign will be.

Competition is the third factor affecting the cost
of campaigns which deserves further mention.

As expected,

when there was serious competition for an office, campaign
expenditures were greater than when competition was minimal
or absent.

The election for governor in 1970, which required

expenditures totaling $3.4 million, is the best exmmple of a
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Vigorously contested statewide race.

The election for

auditor, in which the Republican,
Bucci, reported spending
only §1,841, best illustrates a
statewide contest wherein
competition was essentially absent,
several elections
for the Governor's Council, the
Senate, and House of Representatives there were no opponents for
candidates in the

m

primary or election, or both, and the campaign
expenditures
reported were correspondingly low— if any
expense at all was
reported, when competition was present,
however, the story
was much different.

In the only vigorously contested elec-

tion for the Governor's Council, for example,
three candi-

dates reported spending a total of more than
§44,000, more
than twice the total reported spent by the winners of
the

other seven seats on the Council.

And, of the fifteen can-

didates who reported spending the most in campaigns for the

Senate (all but one spent more than §10,000), ten faced opponents in the primary, and eleven had opposition in the election.

Finally, of the twenty-five candidates who waged the

most expensive campaigns for the House of Representatives,
twenty were opposed in the primary, and twenty-two in the
election.

In brief, competition increased the cost of

campaigns.
The fourth factor affecting the cost of campaigns

which merits attention is whether a candidate was an incumbent or not.

Incumbents, with few exceptions, were
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successful in retaining office in 1970.

No statewide

incumbent, for example, was defeated;
nor was any of the
six incumbents who ran for the Governor's
Council unseated.
Only three of the thirty-five incumbents
who sought reelection to the Senate failed to win, and in
the 225 campaigns for the House of Representatives studied,
only twentyone of 194 incumbents v/ho ran for reelection
lost their
seats.

bents,

Of those candidates who seriously challenged
incum-

several failed to raise sufficient funds to finance

successful campaigns.

One good example of a statewide can-

didate is Mary Newman, the Republican nominee for secretary
of state, who maintained her campaign required "a little more

money, a little earlier."

The most interesting and conclu-

sive evidence, however, pertains to campaigns for the Senate,
in which challengers generally fared badly.

Of the ninety-

three candidates whose expenditures were examined, the

thirty-five incumbents spent an average of $4,399; the

fifty-eight challengers reported spending an average of
$5,788.

Although the challengers spent considerably more,

only three of them unseated incumbents.
incumbency are clear.

The benefits of

Challengers, as a rule, must spend

more than inciambents, if they expect to win.
do,

Even when they

it will not guarantee victory.
In conclusion,

there were a number of relatively

quite expensive campaigns in 1970, cunong them Governor
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Sargent's successful bid to
retain his office, Atkins'
winning campaign for the House of
Representatives, and
Basbas- losing effort to capture
a Senate seat.
Some have
criticized these, and other, campaigns
as too expensive, but
it can be argued that it was
necessary to incur such high
expenditures to meet the competition
and to communicate with
the electorate, thereby assisting
the voters to make their
choices. Although this argument has
some force, the author
is inclined to side with the critics
of such heavy spending.
After all, the cost of each of Sargent's
votes averaged $1.62;
Atkins', $1,89; and Basbas', $1.39.^^
On the other hand,
there were a number of candidates for statewide
office, the

Governor's Council, and the state legislature whose
campaigns
were inadequately funded. The point can be
illustrated using
the cost of mailing campaign literature.

Assuming a competi-

tive House of Representatives district with 10,000
voters
(comprised of 2,500 registered Democrats, 2,500 Republicans,

and 5,000 Independents), the cost of a single mailing by a

Democratic candidate in the primary to all registered Democrats, and a follow-up mailing in the election to all Demo-

crats and Independents, would be about $1,000.

To do the

same in a Senate district with a similar distribution of
voters, the cost would be about $5,000; in a Governor's
•^^The cost per vote was figured by dividing the total
campaign cost by the number of votes received in the primary
and election.

83

Council district, $25,000; and statewide,
$200,000. A
campaign involves far more, of course,
than a mailing to
all voters. The examples are cited
because when these costs
are compared to what many candidates
actually spent in 1970
on their campaigns, one can argue that
not enough— rather
than too much— was spent to enable the voters
to learn
enough to make up their minds.

CHAPTER III
FUNDING ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS

Now that it has been established what it cost to
run
in Massachusetts in 1970 for statewide office,
the Governor's
Council, and the state legislature, it is appropriate
to turn

to the question of how the money to finance these campaigns

was raised.

Funding campaigns adequately is obviously vital

to their success, and is one of the most difficult—and to

some candidates, distasteful— tasks which confront all can-

didates.

In this chapter the roles played in 1970 by the

candidates and their committees, the political parties, and
interest groups will be explored with three objectives in
mind.

The first, and principal, objective is to establish

the relative importance of the fund-raising efforts by the

candidates and their committees, the political parties, and
interest groups.

The second objective is to note the great

variety of techniques which are employed in financing campaigns, and to give particular attention to one of the most

common and lucrative methods used, the testimonial dinner.
The third objective is to establish how important large
C2unpaign contributions were to the funding of campaigns in

1970.

The fund-raising efforts by candidates and their

committees will be discussed first.
84

In examining their
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activities, which were far more important
than those of
either the political parties or interest
groups, the methods
used to raise money and the importance
of large contributions will be covered. Then the fund-raising
efforts by the
parties and groups, in that order, will be
treated.

Funding Campaigns: Candidates
and Their Committees

One of the first tasks confronting any candidate
who

anticipates any opposition in his campaign, no matter what
the size of his constituency, is to raise sufficient
funds
as quickly as possible to begin his campaign.

A candidate

can, and in many cases does, initially approach his close

friends, relatives, and political allies for funds.

are numerous, and the constituency is small
of Representatives district, for example

—a

If they

state House

— contributions

from

them may be sufficient to finance his campaign, or at least
to begin it effectively.

He can also, to the extent he is

willing and able, help finance his campaign with his own

money
Self -Financing by Candidates .

Although the Massa-

chusetts campaign finance statute which was effective during
the 1970 election permitted any candidate to make unlimited

contributions and loans to his campaign, there was very
little evidence of any substantial self -financing of cam-

paigns by most candidates.

The typical candidate did not

reach into his own pocket.

Some proponents of the public
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subsidy of campaigns argue that one
of its benefits would be
that it would prevent well-to-do
candidates from "buying"
elections.

Neither from the author's review of the
campaign
finance reports filed in 1970 by scores of
candidates
for

statewide office, the Governor's Council,
and the state
legislature, nor from conversations with persons
knowledgeable about the financing of campaigns, was
there any reason
to conclude that this happened.

This is not to say that

several candidates and their relatives did not make
contri-

butions or loans.

They did.

In most cases, however, the

contributions and loans were not large in proportion to the
total cost of these campaigns.^

A brief examination of the

extent of the self -financing of campaigns by candidates for
the House, Senate, Governor's Council, and statewide office

will clarify the above points.

Only thirty of the several hundred candidates for
the state House of Representatives spent $500 or more of

their own funds, or made loans of that size, to help finance

their 1970 campaigns.
$3,376

—which

didate.

Together they spent $39,581 and loaned

totals $42,957

— an

average of $1,432 per can-

Most of them spent less than $1,000 of their

similar finding, limited to candidates in the
1968 election for the state Senate, is reported in Mileur
and Sulzner, p. 98.

personal funds. 2

one notable exception was Chester
G.

Atkins (Democrat-Acton)

,

who was elected to the House in

1970 in his first bid for elective office.

Atkins' cam-

paign, discussed in the previous chapter,
was heavily
financed with money contributed or loaned
by him and his
parents. Atkins contributed $6,900 and loaned
$1,900 of
his own money. Most of the thirty House
candidates, like

Atkins, were not incumbents.

The ten who were incumbents

spent a total of only $11,700, whereas the twenty
non-

incumbents gave, or loaned, $31,257.

Only twelve of the 101 candidates for the state
Senate helped finance their campaigns in a substantial way

with their personal funds.

They contributed $20,919 and

loaned an additional $9,804, a total of $30,723."^

This

averages to $2,560 per candidate, a somewhat distorted
figure because one candidate, Edward DerKazarian, contrib-

uted $8,500 to his campaign, and another. Republican incum-

bent George D. Hammond, loaned $7,000 to his campaign committee. Only five of the twelve candidates, including

^Alexander and Fisher, CRF Listing . This valuable
source provides an alphabetical listing of the names of
contributors of $500 or more to all candidates and committees which were required to file campaign finance reports
with public officials throughout the United States. The
data include the address of each contributor, the amount
given, and the date of the contribution. A smaller CRF publication, excerpted from this source, contains data pertaining only to Massachusetts candidates and was used for the
discussion which follows.
3 Ibid.
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Hanunond, were incumbents;

together, they gave or loaned a

total of only $11,804 to help finance
their campaigns. As
was true in the House campaigns, the
non-incumbents running
for the Senate relied more heavily upon
their personal funds
than did the incumbents. The seven non-incumbents
gave
$18,919.

In the election for the Governor's Council, there

was significant self-financing by only one candidate.

Incum-

bent Councillor George P. Cronin, Jr. made contributions
to
his campaign totaling $1,314.^

Statewide campaigns were no different from legislative or councillor races.

With the exception of the cam-

paigns of Mary B. Newman and Donald L. Conn, the Republican
nominees for secretary of state and attorney general respectively, there was no evidence of any substantial self-

financing of campaigns by statewide candidates.

In Newman's

case, her campaign committee reported liabilities totaling

$14,302 as of January 14, 1971; among them were two outstanding loans from Newman to her committee which totaled

$5,339.^

Conn finished his campaign with liabilities total-

ing $19,000.

His committee owed him $10,000, and an

*Ibid.

^Report filed by the Newman Committee with the
Secretary of State's Division of Public Records.
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additional $9,000 to Lloyd E. Conn, no
doubt a relative.
Neither Newman nor Conn was an incumbent,
and neither was
elected to the office he sought.

Although the foregoing discussion of self-financing
of campaigns in 1970 is based only upon
contributions
or

loans of $500 or more, it is reasonable to
conclude that,

whatever the office sought— statewide. Governor's
Council,
House, or Senate— candidates in 1970 generally
relied upon
funds other than their own to finance their campaigns.
If a candidate expects substantial opposition, or

the office he seeks has a large constituency— a statewide
office, for example— it is most likely that the contribu-

tions and loans from his friends, relatives, and political

allies (and whatever personal funds he provides) will have
to be supplemented.

Additional potential contributors will

have to be identified and solicited.

Most incumbents who

have had to raise money for past elections undoubtedly

maintain lists of contributors to those campaigns.

An

individual who has never run for public office does not have
that advantage, but all candidates have available to them a

valuable source which can provide the names and addresses
of potential contributors.

For many years the state's cam-

paign finance statute has required candidates for statewide
^Report filed by the Committee to Elect Donald L.
Conn Attorney General with the Secretary of State's Division of Public Records.
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office, the Governor's Council, and
the state legislature to
file reports with the Secretary of State's
Division of Public
Records. These reports, which essentially
identify a candidate's receipts and expenditures, are kept
by that office for
four years, and are available for inspection
by any citizen.
In an election year, anyone who visited this
office for but
a few hours during a typical day would
likely observe a

number of candidates and campaign workers, reviewing
these

records and diligently copying the names, addresses, and
the
amounts contributed by persons who will soon be approached
in
some fashion by a candidate or his committee.

Election-Year Committees .

Many candidates who needed

a substantial amount of money or faced serious competition

in 1970, despite the size of their constituencies, authorized

election-year committees to assist them in financing their
campaigns.

This pattern was especially discernible among

candidates for statewide office.

Some candidates employed

as many as three committees, the maximum number allowed by
law, although most candidates who authorized committees used
•7

'A revision to the campaign finance statute. Chapter
of
1173
the Acts of 1973, placed the responsibility for the
receipt and review of these records with an independent
office, the Office of the Director of Campaign and Political
Finance.
It was deliberately placed outside the jurisdiction
of the secretary of state in order to facilitate enforcement
of the campaign finance statute.
In the summer of 1974 the
new agency rented office space nearby the State House, meeting its need for Icurger qu£u:ters, and at the same time,
helping to establish its separate identity.

only one.

Under the law, whenever a committee
was

established it was required to notify
the secretary of
state no later than thirty days prior
to the primary or
election for which the committee had been
organized.
In
that notice the committee was required to
designate a

chairman and a treasurer, and to name at least
three other
members of the committee. It had to state
the purpose for
which the committee had been organized and to
submit the

candidate's written consent to the committee's formation.
The notice to the secretary of state also had to
include
the name of the candidate in the committee's title
(most

committees had titles similar to that used in 1970 by the
state's Auditor, The Committee to Re-elect Thaddeus Buczko

State Auditor)

.

The person named as treasurer thereafter

had to file his written acceptance with the secretary of
state; until he did this, the committee could not lawfully

function.

Once a committee had satisfied all of the above

conditions, it was duly authorized to receive and disburse
funds on behalf of a candidate.

It was thereafter obliged

to make periodic reports of its receipts and expenditures

to the secretary of state.®

One final point essential to this discussion concerns committees which were established on behalf of
^

General Laws , c. 55, as amended by c. 444 of the
Acts of 1962.
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-depository candidates.

A major revision to the campaign

finance statute in 1962 designated
certain candidates as
depository candidates. ^ All candidates
for statewide office
were so designated; candidates for
the Governor's Council
and the state legislature were not.
Any committees established by depository candidates are
referred to as depository committees. Depository candidates
and committees were
required to designate a bank in which all campaign
contributions received had to be deposited, and from
which all
campaign expenditures had to be made. The bank
was required
to submit periodic reports of these transactions,
on behalf
of a depository candidate or committee, to the
secretary of

state.

Non-depository candidates were not required to

designate a bank to handle their transactions, but, as indicated above, were required to make periodic reports to the

secretary of state.
In 1970 most of the money raised on behalf of all

candidates who ran for statewide office, the Governor's
Council, and the state legislature, was raised by committees

operating on their behalf ."'^

Virtually all of the money

raised to finance the campaigns of depository candidates,
as presented in Table 10, was raised by their committees.
^Ibid.

^QElection Statistics, 1970 (Public Document
pp. 4-7.
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Committees were important, but to a lesser
extent, to
non-depository candidates. Slightly more
than one-half of
the money raised for the campaigns of
non-depository candidates was raised by their committees.
Whether a candidate
employed a committee or not, if he received or
disbursed
funds for his campaign, the campaign finance
statute obliged
him to make periodic reports to the secretary
of state.
Even if he received or disbursed nothing, he was
required to
file reports.

Once a candidate's committee has been duly authorized
to receive funds it can go about its work.

to identify potential contributors.

Its first task is

The next, equally obi-

ous, is to contact them and ask for money.

The methods

employed by those responsible for fund raising are limited

only by their imagination and the resources at their command.

These methods for reaching potential contributors include
the use of newspaper advertisements, radio and television

appeals, door-to-door canvassing, and telephone and direct-

mail campaigns.

The use of the mails to distribute campaign

literature and letters from candidates requesting contributions is quite common.

Another frequently used technique is

to gather potential supporters, expose them to the candidate,

and provide them with food, drink, or entertainment.

These

gatherings can be large or small, and are usually quite
informal.

The possibilities are endless.

A candidate and
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his supporters can sponsor picnics,
barbeques, and clambakes;
coffee, cocktail, or wine-tasting
parties; dances, concerts,
or movies. Whatever the event, the
objective is to provide
a good time, expose contributors
to the candidate, and
relieve them of their money.

Testimoni al Dinners .

Although it is apparent that

there are numerous ways by which candidates,
veteran campaigners and political novices alike, can finance
their campaigns, one method— the testimonial dinner
(luncheon, or

cocktail party)— is particularly worthy of attention.

The

testimonial dinner, also referred to as the friendship
or

appreciation dinner, merits attention because it is one of
the most lucrative ways candidates for public office in

Massachusetts have funded their campaigns.

It deserves

consideration, too, because it has been abused by some politicians, and until the campaign finance statute was amended
in 1973, it also afforded anonymity to campaign contributors, a situation most acceptable to many politicians and

contributors alike.

The testimonial dinner has been used

for many years in the Bay State, but in the past few years
it has become increasingly popular as caunpaign costs mount.

During that time, it has been used by the incumbent governor

and other candidates for that office, persons running for

other statewide offices, a number of leading senators and
representatives on Beacon Hill, and one prominent member of
the Governor's Council.
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The testimonial, used most
effectively by well-known
personalities and especially by incumbents
who have political clout, helped to finance the
1970 campaigns of Robert Q.
Crane, Robert H, Quinn, and Kevin H.
White. At an affair in
1966 celebrating the fortieth birthday of
incumbent Treasurer Crane, approximately $70,000 was
raised. This testimonial not only helped to finance his 1966
reelection campaign, but provided substantial funds as
well for his 1970
campaign. 11
April, 1970 incumbent Attorney General Quinn
was honored at a $50-per-person affair at Anthony's
Pier 4,
one of the favorite fund-raising spots in Boston;
in October,

m

a similar affair was held at the Harvard
Club. 12

During the

summer of 1970, Mayor Kevin H. White of Boston, a candidate
for the Democratic Party's nomination for governor, offset
a substantial portion of his campaign expense with a testi-

monial which raised $144,000.1^

According to one State

House reporter, "White has held so many testimonials associated with birthdays, that former Democratic State Committee
llunited Press International, "State Bankers Happy
to Help Treasurer Crane's Campaign," Boston Herald American,
10 July 1973, p. 3.
12 Interview with Aaron M. I. Shinberg, Executive
Assistant to Attorney General Quinn, Boston, 10 August 1973.
The Chateau de Ville in Framingham and the Pleasant Valley
Country Club in Sutton are the two other most popular places
in the state for holding large testimonials.

l^Christopher Lydon, "$100-a-Plate Tund-Raising
Party for White Lures 700," Boston Globe 28 October 1971,
,

p. 63.
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Chairman Charles McGlue once said at a State
House hearing
that White 'has got to be the most rapidly
aging man in
Massachusetts*.
There were undoubtedly several other
testimonials associated with the 1970 campaign,
but information about them is not readily available (the
Boston press
is not indexed) .
Subsequent to 1970, as pressures mounted
to enact legislation to remedy abuses of this
fund-raising

technique, there was increased attention to testimonials
by

the Boston press, particularly by the Boston Globe .

Testimonials are lucrative, but precisely how lucrative those held in recent years have been, and who actually

purchased tickets, have been impossible to determine.

Com-

menting about this, A. A. Michelson stated:
The estimate as to the hauls from these affairs
are difficult to make. The big buyers of tickets
usually are not there. They are lobbyists with
extensive expense accounts and others with vested
interests. They send in their checks and let the
public officials being "honored" paper the house
with free tickets for friends or colleagues.
This means, often there are many more attending,
particularly if it's a $100-a-plate affair than
there were ticket buyers. 15

The reason that newsmen such as Michelson were required to

make estimates as to the amount of money raised by testimonial dinners prior to 1974 is that the information
l^Steven A. Cohen, "Testimonials Grow in Massachusetts," Herald Traveler and Boston Record American , 31
August 1972, p. 6.
l^A. A. Michelson, "The Testimonial Gimmick,"
Berkshire Eagle (Pittsfield) , 19 February 1972, p. 11.

98

available from the public record
was very inadequate. The
1962 campaign finance law did not
require persons who were
honored at testimonial dinners,
unless they were announced
candidates, to disclose whether they
had a testimonial, who
bought tickets, and how much was raised
at their
affair.

The 1962 statute only required an
individual, once he became
a candidate, to report that portion
of the money raised that
was actually spent for campaign purposes.
There was no
obligation to report the total amount raised,
or who purchased tickets. Newsmen, who attend the major
testimonials,
could only roughly estimate the amount of money
raised

because a common practice is, as Michelson stated,
to "paper
the house." Lobbyists are among those who have
purchased
tickets, according to knowledgeable observers on Beacon
Hill.
In reporting on a flurry of testimonials in late 1973
before

new legislation curbing the use of testimonials became effective, one State House newsman wrote:

It is well-known on Beacon Hill that well-fixed
lobbyists at the State House buy tables for
such events, the bigger the political figure,
the bigger the purchase. 16

This insight into who purchases tickets to these affairs was

affirmed by another reporter, who wrote:
^Robert F. Hannan, "Politicians Push for Testimonials Before Funds Control Becomes Law," Sunday Herald
Advertiser (Boston), 28 October 1973, p. 25.
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Those who generally come up with the money
for the high-priced tickets are lobbyists
whose demonstration of what they euphemistically term "friendship" is part of the
lobbying procedure at the State House. 17
The criticism levelled at testimonials is not con-

fined to lobbyists, however, because in some cases
officials
in positions of power have taken advantage of their
public

offices to enrich themselves.

Perhaps the best recent

example of this is the testLtionial held on September 25, 1972
for Governor's Councillor Patrick J. "Sonny" McDonough.

As

the leading member of the Governor's Council, McDonough

exerts considerable influence in approving gubernatorial

nominations of judges.

This $100-a-plate affair, hosted by

McDonough aboard the S.S. Peter Stuyvesant at Anthony's Pier
4

in Boston, was attended by an estimated 800 to 1,000

people, including many prominent political figures.!^

McDonough, a member of the Council since 1947, was unopposed
for reelection in 1972.

Despite criticism from the press,

McDonough proceeded with his testimonial, claiming he was
broke.

According to one newsman, "Anyone who is familiar

with the Councillor and his success with insurance and other
business ventures knows that Sonny is not broke. "-'-^

The

campaign finance statute in 1972 did not prohibit McDonough
^^Cohen,

"Testimonials Grow," p. 6.

^®Nyhan, "McDonough a Beacon," p. 3.

^^David Farrell, "McDonough" s High-Gear Drive for
Funds," Boston Globe, 21 September 1972, p. 35.
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from using the proceeds from his
testimonial for personal
purposes. He is only obliged to report
any earnings
received as a result of investing this
money to the state
and federal income tax authorities; and
tax records are not
available for public scrutiny.

Testimonials have also been criticized as political
armtwisting, but for purposes other than personal
enrich-

ment.

A recent example, which was highly publicized in the

Boston press, was the cocktail reception on November
19,
1973 at the 57 Restaurant in Boston for Senator James A.
Kelly, Jr.

(Democrat-Oxford)

,

As Senate Ways and Means

Chairman, Kelly is a key figure in establishing the state
budget.

At this $100-a-person affair. Senator Kelly raised

more than $30,000.20

At one point during the testimonial,

Kelly stated, "You could raise a couple of hundred grand at
one of these if you worked at it."

This provoked the ques-

tion, "They really want to see you that much?"

glinted.

"None of them wants to be left out."^-^

"No," he

Kelly had

previously held a very lucrative testimonial in 1971 at the
Pleasant Valley Country Club in Sutton, Massachusetts.

He

acknowledged that as a result of that fund raiser he had
$116,000 at his disposal which he wanted to increase "to
^^Michael Kenney, "Kelly's Senate-President Campaign Chest Enriched by $30,000 Fund-Raiser," Boston Globe ,
20 November 1973, p. 3.
^'^Michael Kenney, "The High Cost of Campaigning,"
Boston Globe, 27 November 1973, p. 19.
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about $150,000 for the Senate
fight."22

^^^^^ apparently
has no statewide political
ambition, but he does aspire
to
be president of the Massachusetts
Senate when Senate President Kevin B. Harrington
(Democrat-Salem) steps down.
Kelly
contributed more than $10,000 to House
and Senate candidates
in the 1972 election, and admittedly
is ready to make substantial contributions to senators in
exchange for their
votes, if and when Harrington steps
down.^"^
Some public officials have been criticized
because

they commenced funding their campaigns
by testimonials well
in advance of any announcement of their
candidacites. The
1971 testimonial held to honor George L. Sacco,
Jr.

(Democrat-Medf ord)

,

then Vice Chairman of the House Ways and

Means Committee, is one example.

At a $100-per-plate affair

at the Chateau de Ville in Framingham, Massachusetts,
1,500

people contributed well over $100,000 to Sacco. ^4

^t the

time, it was rumored that Sacco had statewide ambitions,

speculation which was substantiated in mid-1974 when Sacco

announced his candidacy for the office of attorney general,
2 2 Ibid.

2 3 Ibid.

The funds raised at the 1971 testimonial
were not necessary for Kelly's 1972 reelection campaign for
which he reported contributions amounting to $1,440, and
expenditures of $923. United Press International, "Kelly
Having Fund-Raiser; He Won't Divulge Proceeds," Boston
Globe 19 November 1973, p. 4.
,

24David Nyhan, draft of a 1972 article, "FundRaising" (in Nyhan's State House files).
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and thereafter resigned from the
legislature. Something
which distinguishes Sacco's testimonial
from virtually all
others held recently is that he
raised approximately $38,000
by selling space in what is known
as an "ad book," in which
a full page advertisement cost
$1,000.
In 1970 using an ad
book enabled politicians and corporations
to circumvent

Massachusetts law which prohibited corporations
from making
contributions to candidates or their committees,
in 1964

Edward W. Brooke, then Attorney General, ruled
that ad books
were permissible.^^
The best example of an unannounced candidate raising

substantial funds "off season" by testimonials is afforded
by the activities of The Sargent Committee, established
for
the 1970 campaign of Governor Francis W. Sargent, the most

effective political fund raiser in the history of Massachusetts politics.

Sargent's fund-raising activities did not

cease once he was elected in November, 1970, despite

repeated demands that he cease his "off season" fund raising
25Brooke in his ruling stated, "Value in advertising
should be received for the amount of money paid. In addition, the advertising should bear a direct relation to the
business being advertised and should be reasonable in amount
considering the size and nature of business, and its ordinary advertising practices and requirements." Sacco's ad
book, however, was not available at the time of the testimonial but was distributed thereafter to ticket holders.
He said, "that he didn't want to spread the book around
indiscreetly." See Cohen, "Testimonials Grow," p. 6.
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at the least, make known the names
of his contributors. 2
Sargent, in response, voluntarily made
public the names of
his contributors.
In a radio-TV address on April
or,

19,

1972,

Sargent announced that he was making available
the following
day to the Secretary of State a complete list
of contributions and expenditures since March 31, 1971
(the date of the

Sargent Committee's last required report concerning
the 1970
election)
Moreover, he announced that it would be
his

.

practice, as well as Lieutenant Governor Donald R. Dwight's,
to make public at six-month intervals audited reports
of all

contributions and expenditures. 27

Although Sargent there-

after made public the names of his contributors, his fund

raisers continued.

One of the largest and most successful

was a dinner on May 21, 1972 planned by Albert T. Manzi, a

Sargent appointee to the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.
It netted $140,000 for the Sargent coffers.

since the

May 21 dinner. The Sargent Committee conducted a number of
affairs, including four $100-per-person dinners in November,
1973.

The first of these, in Hyannis on November

9,

26The fund raisers are coordinated by Victor F.
Zuchero, the full-time Executive Director of The Sargent
Committee, from an office nearby the State House.
27
'The complete text of the radio-TV address is found
in a press kit, containing five other documents, released by
Sargent on April 19, 1972. It will hereafter be cited as

"Sargent Press Kit."
2^Peter Lucas, "Sargent Says Dinner Raised $140,000,'
Boston Globe, 21 July 1972, p. 1.
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attracted 300 Sargent .upporters
and rai.ed an e.timated
$25,000 to $30,000, the aecond, on
November 12 in Agawam,
250 for $25,000, the third, on November
13 in Andover, 260
for $25,000, and the fourth, on
November 20 in
Pramingham,

350 for $35,000.29

^^eae affair., which the Governor
con•idered cancelling because of criticism
he received, generated an estimated $100,000. Sargent
justified them-as he
had previous fund raisers-as necessary
to offset political
expenses he incurs such as commissioning
public opinion
polls, attending Ckjvernors' conventions
once or twice
yearly, and attending his party's National
Convention. ^0
His candidacy for reelection in 1974 affords
a more complete
explanation.

Despite the attacks by its critics, the testimonial
is not without its defenders.

At an affair on April

10,

1972 honoring Senator B. Joseph Tully (Democrat-Lowell),

Senate President Harrington maintained that politicians

were required to resort to testimonials because of the
29por reports about the four dinners see the following articles in the Boston Globe
Peter Lucas, "Sargent
Dinner Brings $25,000," 10 November 1973, p. 1, Jean Caldwell, "Sargent Goes to Agawam for 2nd of 4 Fund-Raisers,
13 November 1973, p. 37, "3rd Sargent Fund-Raiser Draws 260
in Andover," 14 November 1973, p. 4, and Peter Lucas, "Sargent Dinner Raises Another $35,000," 21 November 1973, p. 4.
t

^^Robert Healy, "Stop Passing the Political Hat?",
Boston Globe , 19 November 1973, p. 19.
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"unbelievable expenses in running for
public office. "31
According to Tully, the proceeds from
the testimonial,
attended by about 650 persons who paid
$50 each for a
chicken dinner, were earmarked to
finance his 1972 reelection campaign. County officials
throughout Massachusetts
were invited to Tully's testimonial, which
was "neatly timed
with County budget hearings, " according to
a Boston Globe
reporter. 32 Tully, who spent $12,885 in his
first try for
a Senate seat in 1970 when he unseated
an incumbent (see

Chapter II), expected that $28 of each $50, a
surprisingly

high figure, would be necessary to offset the expenses
connected with his affair. 33
1972 he retained his seat,

m

reporting expenditures of $22,914.

Under the law, whatever

remains of the proceeds—there probably was little, if any—
is his to use as he sees fit.

In conclusion, testimonials have been used in Massa-

chusetts for many years, helped to finance several 1970
election campaigns, and have been used with increasing fre-

quency since then.

They have most often been used by incum-

bent politicians with considerable political clout, and have
been a very lucrative source of funds for their ceunpaigns.

Although defended as a legitimate and necessary method for
3ljoseph Rosenbloom, "Harrington Defends Pols'
Testimonials," Boston Globe , 11 April 1972, p. 16.
32Nyhan,

33n,id.

"Fund-Raising .
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financing campaigns, testimonials
have been sharply
criticized because they have been abused
by some politicians who have used the proceeds for
their personal

enrichr-

or to further their long-term political
ambitions when
they had no immediate need for campaign
funds. The legiti-

raent,

macy of the testimonial was also repeatedly
questioned
because the law insured anonymity for contributors

if the

person "honored" was not an announced candidate when
an
affair was held.

This departure from the idea of a full

disclosure law was corrected in 1973.

The law now requires

any individual who is the recipient of funds raised at a
testimonial

—whether

he is an announced candidate or

not— to

report the names, addresses, and amounts given by his contributors to the Office of the Director of Campaign and
Political Finance. 34

Whatever methods are used for raising funds, and
whoever raises them, large contributions are usually most
welcome.

Whether raised by a testimonial dinner sponsored

by a candidate's campaign committee, a motion picture
premiere planned by a party's legislative leaders, or a

candidate's personal solicitation of a potential contributor, they are gratefully received.

Just how important

large contributions were to candidates in the 1970 election
is worthy of attention and will be discussed next.

^^Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973, effective
1974.

Janueury 1,
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Campaign Contributions o f $500 or Mor^

a small
minority of citizens In the Bay State
helped finance polltleal campaigns In 1970. Of those
who did, only a few thousand may be classified as "large"
contributors, a term
defined for purposes of this discussion,
as any contributor
who gave $500 or more. The vast majority
of large contributors In 1970 In Massachusetts were
Individuals. The campaign finance statute effective during the
1970 election
allowed any Individual to contribute up to
$3,000 to any
candidate or his committees during the year. No
campaign
In the Bay State In 1970 relied solely upon
large contribu.

tions, although some depended upon them more
than others.

Large contributions are attractive to many candidates
and
their campaign finance managers because It Is obviously

easier to offset the cost of a campaign by raising a few
large contributions than many smaller ones.

Campaign contributions of $500 or more, arrayed In
Tables 11 and 12, were an Important source of funds for
several candidates In Massachusetts ceunpalgns In 1970,

particularly gubernatorial candidates.

Governor Francis W.

Sargent, who received the most, reported 737 campaign con-

tributions of $500 or more in his successful 1970 campaign;
they totaled $570,918.^^

His Democratic opponent. Mayor

^^Alexander and Fisher, CRF Listing . All data for
this discussion, with two exceptions, came from It. The
contributions listed In the CRF publication did not Include
those made to legislative candidates In 1970 by The Committee
to Re-elect a Democratic House and The Committee to Elect a
Republican State Senate.

TABLE 11

CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS OF $500 OR MORE TO
CANDIDATES
FOR STATEWIDE OFFICE, THE GOVERNOR'S
COUNCIL, AND
THE STATE LEGISLATURE IN MASSACHUSETTS
IN 1970

Candidates
STATEWIDE OFFICES
Governor
Francis W. Sargent (R) . .
Kevin H. White (D) . . . .
Maurice A. Donahue (D) . .
Francis X. Bellotti (D)
Kenneth P. O'Donnell (D) .
Lieutenant Governor
Donald R. Dwight (R) . . .
Michael S. Dukakis (D) . .
Attorney General
Robert H. Quinn (D)
...
Donald L. Conn (R) . . . .
Secretary of State
Mary B. Newman (R) . . . .
John F. X. Davoren (D) . .
Treasurer and Receiver General
Frederick D. Hannon (R)
Robert Q. Crane (D)
Auditor
Thaddeus Buczko (D)
Frank P. Bucci (R)
GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL
All Candidates .
STATE LEGISLATURE^
House (all candidates)
Senate (all candidates)

Number of
Contributions

Amount

737
565

$570,918
575,686

1

76, 600

40
34

37,747
33,650

)f

61

70,500
l3 , 529

68
29

46,300
24,600

15
3

9,750
2,500

11
10

15,000
7,500

0
0

0

12

10,400

190
80

134,554
75,782

0

SOURCE:
Herbert E. Alexander and Katharine C.
Fisher, eds., CRF Listing of: Political Contributors
of $500 or More in 1970 (Princeton, N.J.: Citizens'
Reseeurch Foundation, 1972) .

*These figures include contributions made to legislative candidates by The Committee to Re-elect a
Democratic House and The Committee to Elect a Republican State Senate in 1970. The Democratic committee
made 71 contributions which totaled $41,350; the Republican committee, 15, which totaled $17,250. These
gontributions were not listed in the CRF publication.
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Kevin H. White of Boston, reported
565 contributions of $500
or more, which totaled $575,686.
Although White received
fewer large contributions than
Sargent, he raised more money
from them. The average large
contribution to White exceeded
$1,000. Moreover, White depended to a
much greater extent
upon large contributions to finance
his campaign than Sargent did. Almost 70 per cent of the cost
of White's campaign was financed by these large contributions,
whereas
Sargent depended upon them to finance
approximately 25 per
cent of the cost of his campaign.

White's three opponents

for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination
also received

many large contributions; together, they received
171,
amounting to $147,997. Maurice A. Donahue reported

97,

amounting to $76,600; Francis X. Bellotti, 40, amounting
to
$37,747; and Kenneth P. O'Donnell, 34, amounting to $33,650.

White's efforts during the primary were more successful,
however, than his three opponents* combined.

Although he

reported receiving fewer large contributions (159), his
contributors were more generous.

Their contributions aver-

aged $1,153, and totaled $183,400.

Apart from the gubernatorial candidates, only a few
other candidates for statewide office reported a substantial number of contributions of $500 or more.

Donald R.

Dwight, the Republican nominee who was elected lieutenant

governor, reported sixty-one, amounting to $70,500.

His

Ill

Democratic opponent, Michael S. Dukakis,
who relied less
heavily upon large contributions,
reported
twenty-six,

amounting to $15,529.

Robert H. Quinn, the Democratic can-

didate for attorney general, raised
$46,300 from sixtyeight contributions of $500 or more.
Quinn was reelected,
defeating Donald L. Conn, who reported twenty-nine
such
contributions, totaling $24,600.

The statewide candidates

of both parties for the offices of secretary
of state,

treasurer and receiver general, and auditor reported
far
fewer large contributions than any of the abovementioned
candidates.

Large campaign contributions were generally of minor

importance in the eight races for the Governor's Council in
1970,

in which most seats were uncontested in either the

primary or election.

Only twelve campaign contributions of

$500 or more, totaling $10,400, were reported by all of the

candidates who ran for seats on the Council.

Eight of these

contributions, totaling $7,900, were reported by two candi-

dates who opposed each other in the prJLmary for the most

closely contested seat.

The large contributions they

received aunounted to about one-third of their combined

primary expenses.
In campaigns for the state legislature large contri-

butions were not reported by most of the 701 candidates who
sought seats in either the House or Senate, but they were
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quite helpful to several,

in all, 270 contributions of
$500

or more, totaling $210,336 were reported.

House candidates

reported 190, amounting to $134,554; Senate
candidates
reported fewer (80), amounting to less
782). 36
($75,

of

those candidates reporting large contributions,
the typical
Senate candidate received two or three, and the
typical

House candidate, one or two.

Although helpful, in neither

case would they do more than offset a fraction of
the cost

of a campaign if there were any substantial competition.

No

Senate candidate received more than six large contributions,

and no House candidate received more than seven.
In conclusion, campaign contributions of $500 or

more were an important source of funds for several candidates in Massachusetts campaigns in 1970.

They were partic-

ularly important to all of the candidates who ran for the
office of governor, especially the two nominees.

They were

important, but to a lesser extent, to a number of other

statewide candidates.

They were of minor importance in

races for the Governor's Council, but were quite helpful in
the campaigns of numerous candidates for the Senate and

House of Representatives on Beacon Hill.
^^Ibid. These figures are the sums of the contributions to legislative candidates listed in the CRF publication and the contributions (not listed) which were given
in 1970 by The Committee to Re-elect a Democratic House and
The Committee to Elect a Republican State Senate, according
to reports filed by these committees with the Secretary of
State's Division of Public Records.
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The vast majority of campaign contributions
of $500
or more were raised by candidates and their
committees.

Although each political party reported some large
contributions, their activities, by comparison, were much
less

important in that respect.

More importantly, the total

funds they raised and disbursed in 1970 to help candidates

were of minor consequence when compared to the funding of

campaigns by candidates and their committees.

Our attention

now turns to the activities of the two major parties.
Funding Campaigns:

Political Parties

The funds raised by the Democratic and Republican
parties in 1970 were raised by committees established by
their legislative leaders and by the elected state and local

party organizations. 37

in the state House of Representa-

tives substantial funds were raised to assist Democratic

legislative candidates, whereas the Republicans did virtually nothing.

In the Senate there was no organized effort

by the Democratic leadership, whereas Republican candidates
benefitted from contributions raised by their leadership.
Neither the Republican nor Democratic State Committee was
of much consequence in the 1970 campaign, although the

^^Each party has elected state and local committees
chosen by pzurtisans every four years in the April presidential primary. The eighty-member state committees are comprised of forty men and forty women, one man and one woman
from each of the state's forty senate districts. The town
and ward committees range in size from three to thirty-five
members.

effort by the Republicans
was more substantial. i„
the
cities and towns, the
elected town and ward
connnittees
evidenced some activity, with
the Republican comittees
raising and spending n,ore
money. The fund-raising
activities of the legislative
co,™,xttees will be treated
first,
then the activities of the
state and local party organi^ltions will be discussed.
The Committee to Re-elect a
Democratic Hon..
1970.

ir.

A significant source of funds
in 1970 for Democratic

candidates running for seats in
the House of Representatives
was The committee to Re-elect
a Democratic House.
Under the
leadership of Speaker David M. Bartley
(Democrat-Holyoke)

more than $100,000 was raised on
October 30, 1569 at a
premiere performance of the motion
picture. Paint Your

Wa^on, at the Circle Theater in
Brookline.

Although approx-

imately 1,100 people attended the movie,
the public record
indicates that 468 persons supported the
affair

financially.

Their contributions totaled $85,660.

Fifty-one contributors

gave $500 or more which accounted for
$39,450.

Although the

contributions made ranged up to the legal limit of
$3,000,
there were, as shown in Table 13, 118 contributions
under
$100.

The most

cora^non

contribution was $100, and the aver-

age contribution was $183.^^
38
-•"Report filed by The Committee to Re-elect a Democratic House in 1970 with the Secretary of State's Division

of Public Records.

TABLE 13

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMITTEE TO
A DEMOCRATIC HOUSE IN 1970 RE-ELECT
Size of
Contribution

Nuinber of

Contributions

Less than $100
$

,

100
150
200
250
300
400
500
750

1,000
1,200
2,000
3,000

us
205
2

68

11
9
4

37
1
7
1
3
2

468

Amount
3,760
20,500
300
13,600
3,750
2,700
1,600
18,500
750
7,000
1,200
6,000
6,000
$85,660a
$

SOURCE:
Report filed by The Committee
to Re-elect a Democratic House in 1970
with the Secretary of State's Division of
Public Records.

*When the receipts for advertisements
in the program book ($14,386) are included,
a total of $100,046 was contributed.

The $85,660 given by the 468 contributors constituted most, but not all, of the money available to Bartley's committee. 39
income.

There were two additional sources of

First, as is not uncommon at some large fund-

raising affairs, a program book ("ad book") was published
•^^Ibid.
The subsequent discussion of the committee's other income relies upon this source.
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and distributed to all
advertisers and persons
attending the
motion picture. Receipts
from the "ad book"
generated an
additional $14,386.40 second,
1970 was not the first
election year in which the
Conunittee to Re-elect a
Democratic
House was active. A substantial
sum, $13,036, was transf erred from the unexpended
funds of the 1968 coiruaittee.
The
interest earned by these funds,
on deposit in five banks,
accounted for an additional
$2,467.
The motion picture proceeds, the receipts from the
program book, the unexpended
funds of the 1968 committee, and
the interest earned by
those funds, placed approximately
$115,000 at the disposal
of the Committee to Re-elect a
Democratic House
in 1970.

A total of $76,150, as presented in
Table

14, was

disbursed by Hartley's committee to 205
House candidates in
1970.41 The committee's contributions
ranged from $100 to
$1,000, the average contribution being $371.
Seventy-one

candidates received $500 or more.

Of the 205 candidates

supported by the committee, 127 were incumbents.

They

received contributions which averaged $428, and
sixty-seven
of them received $500 or more. The seventy-eight
non-

40rphe fourteen-page program book
contained fiftyeight advertisements ranging in size from one-eighth of
one
page to a full page. They ranged in cost from $50 to
$2,500. The average advertisement cost approximately $250.
Corporations which placed ads were listed in the report of
Bartley's committee.

41 The

subsequent discussion of campaign contributions by the committee is based upon the report filed by
The Committee to Re-elect a Democratic House in 1970.

TABLE 14

CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS TO
CANDIDATES FOR
MASSACHUSETTS HOUSE OF REpSseStaT^VES
BY THE COMMITTEE TO RE-ELECT
A
DEMOCRATIC HOUSE IN 1970
Size of
Campaign
Contribution
$100
150

.

200
250

.

.

400
450

.

.

300
350

Number of
Contributions

.

.

.

26

Amount
$

2,600

0

n
u

.

.

.

34
1

6,800

.

.

.

39

11,700

3

.

.

.

.

.

.

31

12,400

0

0

47

23,500

u

0

500
550

.

600
650

. .

8

.

1

4,800
650

700
750

.

6
0

4,200

.

3
0

2,400

800
850

.

.

.

.

.
.

.

0

0

900
950

.

,

1

900

.

.

2

1,900

1,000

.

.

3

3,000
$76,150

•

•

205

SOURCE:
Report filed by The Committee to Re-elect a Democratic House in
1970 with the Secretary of State's Division of Public Records.
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incumbents were less generously
supported.

Their average

contribution from the committee was
only $279, and only four
of them received $500 or more.
According to a salaried
consultant employed by the cormnittee,
the amount contributed
to a candidate depended upon
whether he faced opposition in
the primary or general election, or
both, as well as his
prospects for winning. 42 The incumbents
fared well in two
ways:

only seven of the 127 incumbents
supported by the
committee lost their seats in the House,
and (2) they
received greater assistance from the
committee than did the
non-incumbents. Nonetheless, forty-one of
the seventy-eight
non-incumbents supported by the committee were
(1)

elected.

Only seventeen of the 178 Democrats who were
elected to the
1971-72 House, including Speaker Bartley himself,
received
no campaign contribution from the committee.
Although
the

average contribution ($371) was insufficient to finance
a

competitive campaign, contributions undoubtedly were welcomed by those candidates who received them.

More than one-

half of the House campaigns in 1970 cost less than $2,000
(see Table

8

in Chapter II), and a contribution of that size

was obviously helpful.

Although the committee had about $115,000 at its
disposal to disburse to candidates it incurred considerable
42interview with Edward T. Downey, Jr., then Counsel
to the House Majority Whip, Boston, 3 July 1973.

U9

expense, thereby greatly
reducing the amount available
for
campaign contributions. Among
Its larger expenditures
were
disbursements for the following
purposes:43

^^000

Al^rtL^eSfntf^^'
Political Meetings
Printing
Rental of the Circle Theater
Telephone
Stationery
Postage
Photography
Total

j#J^o

I'lH
11

^^7
^79
^20,844
,

The committee Incurred other
expenses, but not as large as
the above disbursements.
Bartley's committee was certainly
not frugal, and It clearly did
not finance the campaigns of
Democratic House candidates as much
as It might have,
its
contributions to candidates ($76,150) and
the above large
disbursements totaled less than $100,000.
The committee's
total disbursements, as set forth In
Its thirty-five page
typewritten report, amounted to $109,505,
which Indicates
there were numerous lesser expenses.
In terms of the amount of money raised, and
to the

extent there Is a connection between Its campaign
contributions and Democratic victories at the polls, the
Committee
to Re-elect a Democratic House In 1970 was
successful.

The

voters elected 178 Democrats and sixty-two Republicans
to
43 Report

filed by The Committee to Re-elect a Democratic House In 1970 with the Secretary of State's Division
of Public Records.
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the 1971-72 legislature. Increasing
the Democrats' margin by
five seats. Because the Democratic
State Committee has provided little financial support to
legislative candidates in
recent years-it provided none in
1970, a fact which will be
discussed later in this chapter-Democratic
candidates for
the House of Representatives look
to Bartley's committee
as

one of their sources for campaign
contributions.

Hartley

established a similar committee, for the
same purpose, in
1972.44 Tjj^ Speaker is a powerful
person for a number of
reasons. He is the one who makes the
decisions about
the

disbursement of committee funds to candidates; 45
this affords
him one additional means to exercise scane
control
over his

fellow Democrats.
44

Committee to Re-elect a Democratic House in
1972 copied the successful performance of the 1970 committee.
It staged a premiere of the motion picture, Nicholas
and Alexandra > at the Circle Theater in Brookline on
March 7, 1972. The Committee raised a total of $107,098
and disbursed $104,915. As in 1970, a program book was
published.
It was even more successful; 109 advertisements,
ranging in cost from $100 to $1,000, were purchased for a
total of approximately $25,000. As in 1970, a large portion
of the Committee's income came from substantial contributions.
Sixteen thousand dollars was reported given by sixteen individuals. Most of the money raised was disbursed
during the primary campaign. In his committee's report
dated August 6, 1972, Hartley reported expenditures of
$14,142.
In the October 28, 1972 report an additional
$88,455 was reported spent; and in the third and final
report dated November 15, 1972, he reported expenditures of
$2,318 to the Secretary of State's Division of Public
Records
45
"'Interview with Downey, 3 July 1973.
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The success of Speaker Hartley 's
effort to fund the
campaigns of Democratic state legislators
in 1970 stands in
marked contrast to the virtual absence of
any such activity
by the Republican House leadership, a
situation which can
be explained partially by the substantial
financial support
which the Republican State Committee provided
in previous
elections. 4^ There was a committee established in
1970 by

Representative Sidney Q. Curtiss (Republican-Sheffield),
then the Republican floor leader, to assist in the
financing
of Republican campaigns for House seats, but the
Committee
to Elect Republican Representatives reported contributions

of only $1,770, and expenditures of $1,700, in 1970.^^

Obviously, it was of little consequence.

When Representa-

tive Francis W. Hatch, Jr. of Beverly, now the Republican

floor leader, defeated Curtiss for the minority party's
top post in 1971, he exercised the leadership Curtiss had
not.

He organized a committee, SAVE (Sustain a Veto)

,

to

help recruit, finance, and otherwise aid Republican candi-

dates running for House seats.
1972 SAVE raised $86,095.

It was very successful;

in

It disbursed $85,936, $52,510

^^In both 1966 and 1968 the State Committee contributed more than $100,000 to various Republican candidates, but in 1970 its total contributions amounted to
only $11,557. These points are elaborated upon later in
this chapter.
^ ^Report

filed by Committee to Elect Republican
Representatives with the Secretary of State's Division of
Public Records, 1970.
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of that sum in campaign contributions
to seventy-three

Republican House candidates.

Advertisements on behalf of

candidates accounted for most of the
balance.
The Committee to Elect a Republican
State Senate in

Although there was no Republican activity
of any
consequence in the House in 1970, this was not
1970.

the case in

the Senate.

In that year, Senator John F. Parker

(Republican-Taunton) established the Committee to
Elect a
Republican State Senate. Parker, the Senate's
Republican

floor leader, had previously been successful as a
fund

raiser during his part-time stint as Chairman of the
Republican State Committee in 1966, a year in which the Republi-

can State Committee made substantial contributions to
Republican legislative candidates.

In 1970 the committee's

financial difficulties did not allow this.

It was not

Parker's intention that the committee he established in 1970

would fully finance the campaigns of Republican candidates
for the Senate, but it was his expectation that the funds

raised would offset some of the costs incurred by incumbent

Republicans as well as by other Republican candidates.
In fact, the Committee to Elect a Republican State

Senate in 1970 was a connmittee of one

— namely,

Parker.

For

^^Report filed by SAVE with the Secretary of State's
Division of Public Records, 1972.

^^Interview with Senator John F. Parker, Boston,
12 July 1972.
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a one-man effort,

the "committee" was quite successful,

m

September and October of 1970, after the
primary races had
been decided. Senator Parker personally
raised $25,119 with
a low-budget telephone and mail campaign. 50
The committee
received 205 contributions, of which
eighty-three were $100
or more. They accounted for most of the money
raised by
the committee ($21,814). Ten of these
contributions were
$500 or more, the largest being the $5,914 contribution
by

the Republican Club of Massachusetts. 51

Sixteen Senate candidates received a total of
$17,500 from the committee's funds. 52

por some unknown

reason about one-fourth of the money raised was not distributed to candidates, a surprising fact because several

candidates could have used it. 53

Parker, who made the deci-

sions, disbursed the money carefully, usually in amounts of

$300 or $400 at a time.

No candidate received more than

$2,200, and the candidate least generously supported received
$250.

The average candidate received approximately $1,000.

Most of the money disbursed by Parker went to ten incumbent
Republican Senators.

Only two of the candidates who were

50Report filed by the Committee to Elect a Republican State Senate in 1970 with the Secretary of State's
Division of Public Records.
51lbid.

52i]j,ijj^

53ibid.
Parker's expenses in raising the money
cunounted to a bit less than $1,000, and the committee's
treasury had an unexpended balance of $6,646 after all
contributions to candidates had been made.
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not incumbents received large
contributions,

in a few

cases, the contributions made by
Parker's committee exceeded
the actual costs of the campaigns of
some candidates. In
some others, they defrayed a substantial
part of the cost of
campaigning. Several candidates, however,
had to rely

essentially upon themselves for raising the
necessary funds.
Although the amount of money disbursed by the
Committee to
Elect a Republican State Senate in 1970
constituted but a
fraction of the total cost of the campaigns waged
by most
Republican candidates for the Senate in that year, the
money
given these candidates by Senator Parker was helpful to
them, and undoubtedly was gladly received.

Table 15 lists

the sixteen candidates who received contributions and indi-

cates their success in the November election.

Nine of the

ten incumbents were reelected, but only one of the six non-

incumbents was successful.

Four of the non-incumbents

received less than $1,000 from Parker, and one cannot help

but speculate why they were not supported more generously.
The financial difficulties which prevented the

Republican State Committee from supporting legislative can-

didates in 1970 continued after the 1970 election.

Senator

Parker established a similar committee in 1972 to help

finance the campaigns of Republican candidates for the
Senate.

On the whole, it was eibout as successful as the

1970 committee.

It reported receipts of $20,810 and
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expenditures of $19,044 during
the 1972 campaign.54
Electorally, the Republicans
fared more poorly in the
1972
election than in 1970, as only
seven Republican senators
were elected, a loss of three
seats.
Parker's effort in 1970 was not
matched by the
Democrats. The Democratic leadership
did not establish a
committee in the Senate in 1970 to
raise and disburse money
to finance the campaigns of
Democratic candidates.

Maurice A. Donahue of Holyoke, the
Senate President, was
immersed in a campaign to win the
Democratic

nomination for

governor.

Donahue had, however, previously organized
such
a committee.
In 1968, his Committee to Retain a
Democratic
Senate supported twenty-six candidates
with $44,250 in campaign contributions, an average of $1,702
per candidate. ^5
Four years later, in 1972, Donahue's successor.
Senate

Report filed by the Committee to Elect a Republican State Senate in 1972 with the Secretary of
State's
Division of Public Records. Again, most of the money
raised
Dy Parker s ccxnmittee came from large contributors,
some of
them the same as in 1970. Almost 50 per cent of the
total
received, $9,700, came from twelve contributors. Among
those contributions were some party money, some money given
directly by lobbyists, and other special interest money.
The Republican Club of Massachusetts and The Sargent Committee each contributed; lobbyists Bruce D. Kinlin,
Robert G. Hennemuth, Robert A. Chadbourne, and William F.
Malloy made contributions; the GE Committee, Massachusetts
REPEC, the Massachusetts Public Employees Council, and the
Massachusetts Nursing and Rest Homes Political Action Committee were also among the larger contributors.
5 ^Report

filed by The Committee to Retain a Democratic Senate with the Secretary of State's Division of
Public Records, 1968.
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President Kevin B. Harrington
of Salem, reactivated
the
committee and was equally
successful. The Committee
to
Retain a Democratic Senate
in 1972 disbursed
$43,300 to
twenty.five candidates, an average
of $1,732 per candidate. ^6 This kind of effort,
had it occurred in 1970,
would
have offset almost 15 per cent
of the campaign expenses
of

the Democratic candidates who
ran for the Senate in that
year.
In addition to the fund-raising
efforts by legislative leaders, the state and local
committees of each party

helped finance the campaigns of some
candidates in 1970.
We now focus upon their activities.
State and Local Party Committees .

Indeed, 1970 was

a bleak year for the Republican
State Committee.

The com-

mittee budgeted $90,000 for the support of
all Republican
candidates and $10,000 for the general promotion
of the

Republican Party and its candidates in Massachusetts,
but
it failed to raise the necessary funds. Rather
than

spend-

ing $100,000 as planned, it contributed only
$11,557 to its

candidates, and promoted their cause with an additional

expenditure of $2,702, a total of $14,259.^7

Richard F.

Treadway was the interim chairman of the Republican State
56Report filed by The Committee to Retain a Democratic Senate with the Secretary of State's Division of
Public Records, 1972.
57

-"Republican State Committee of Massachusetts,
"Monthly Operating Statement," December 31, 1970.
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Coimaittee at this time.

His strategy was to support a
small

number of candidates running for House
and Senate seats on
Beacon Hill (those thought to have good
prospects for
winning) with the limited money available
to the committee.
Ironically, 1970 was the year in which the
party's gubernatorial candidate, Sargent, successfully
won his election,
spending in excess of $2 million.

The major, and obvious,

conclusion which can be drawn about the Republican
State
Committee is that it was of little consequence
financially
in the 1970 election.

Although of little importance in 1970, the Republican State Committee had given substantial financial
sup-

port to Republican candidates, especially legislative
candidates, as recently as 1966 and 1968.

For example, in

1966, the first year in which statewide candidates ran for

four-year terms. Senator John F. Parker, serving as an

interim chairman, disbursed $144,766 of the committee's
funds.

Of the $100,249 given directly to candidates, all

but $8,000 went to candidates for statewide office, the
state legislature, and the Governor's Council (some candi-

dates for the U.S. Congress received contributions)

.

State

legislative candidates received $59,925; candidates for
statewide office received $23,500; and candidates for the

Governor's Council received $8,824.

In addition, $44,517

129

was spent on opinion research
by Parker's committee. 58
In 1968, Josiah A. Spaulding,
elected chairman of
the Republican State Committee
early in 1967, led a vigorous but unsuccessful effort to
improve the statewide
performance of the Republican Party.
The budget
for the

1968 campaign was $565,000, of which
$500,000 was earmarked
for direct contributions to
candidates. Spaulding 's com-

mittee failed to reach its ambitious
goals, disbursing a
total of only $180,899, of which
$117,149 was given directly
to candidates. The committee spent
an additional
$55,750

to promote the Republican Party and
its candidates, and

$8,000 on opinion research. 59

Most of the money given

directly to candidates went, as in 1966, to
state legislative candidates. 60 A comparison of the
disbursements

of the

Republican State Committee in 1966, 1968, and 1970 is
presented in Table 16. Under Spaulding 's leadership,
the

com-

mittee incurred a deficit in 1968 of approximately
$83,000,
whereas after the 1966 election a surplus of more than
$90,000 remained in its treasury.

Spaulding resigned in

December, 1969 to oppose incumbent Democratic U.S. Senator
5 8 Interview

with Parker, 12 July 1972.

59Republican State Committee of Massachusetts,
"Monthly Operating Statement," November 30, 1968.

^^Interview with Margaret Kelly, long-time secretary
to chairmen of the Republican State Committee, Boston, 30
July 1973. Kelly did not reveal, however, the amount state
legislative candidates received.
^^Ibid.
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Edward M. Kennedy in the 1970 election.

A partial explanation of the
Republican State Committee's inability to help finance the
campaigns

of Repub-

lican candidates in 1970 is that it
had other demands upon
its limited resources, among them
the cost of maintaining
a year-round headquarters nearby
the State House. It also
had to retire the substantial debt
incurred in the
1968

campaign.

Its financial difficulties can be
more fully

explained by other factors, however, among
them the preference of contributors for supporting individual
candidates
as opposed to a party.
This candidate-orientation of contributors is best illustrated by the above comparison
of

campaign funds available in 1970 to the party's leader.
Governor Sargent, and the Republican State Committee.
Nonetheless, the committee was able to sustain its fulltime operation with funds raised on its behalf by town and

ward committees, and from large contributions by members
of its Key Committee.

Local fund-raising efforts, the

Republican State Committee's largest single source of
income, accounted for $99,421 of its receipts in 1970.

Membership in the Key Committee, which affords an opportunity to meet prominent figures in the party, is limited
to contributors of $500 or more.

In 1970 $40,500 was given

^^Republican State Committee of Massachusetts,
"Statement of Income, Expenses, and Deficit," December 31,
1970.
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by slxty-eight members. ^3

The financial difficulties
of the

committee can be traced, too, to
a rift between Governor
Sargent and his party about
patronage and other matters.
This, in turn, has resulted
in a succession of Republican
State committee chairmen since
Josiah A. Spaulding's tenure
ended in December, 1969. As of
September, 1974 there have
been five chairmen since Spaulding.
One of them, Robert C.
Hahn of Stoughton, a former state
representative and Sar-

gent's choice for chairman, mounted a
campaign in 1972 to
provide $200,000 in campaign support for
Republican candidates. ^4 Shortly thereafter, Kahn stepped
dovm as chairman
when his name was linked with an insurance
scandal which
caused embarrassment to the Republican Party
and to Governor
Sargent, who had urged Hahn's election by the
Republican

State Committee. 65

The major consequence of the inability

of the Republican State Committee in 1970 to
finance the

campaigns of candidates it had traditionally supported was
the formation of fund-raising committees by Republican

legislative leaders, such as Senator John F. Parker's Com-

mittee to Elect a Republican State Senate and Representative
^^Alexander and Fisher, CRF Listing .

^^Republican State Committee of Massachusetts, "A
Program for 1972 or Can You Spare a Quarter for Better
Government?", undated.
^^arnes Ayer, "Hahn Out as GOP Head," Boston Globe,
26 May 1972, p.

3.
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Francis W. Hatch's committee,
SAVE.^^
If the financial health of
the Republican State

committee was poor, the condition
of the Democratic State
committee was even worse. Table
17 compares the receipts
and expenditures of each committee
during 1970, and it is
apparent that the Republican State
Committee was the more
active of the two. Its expenditures
totaled
$157,502,

whereas the Democrats spent only
$19,091 during all of 1970,
about one-half of that sum going to defray
expenses connected with the party's pre-primary
convention held in June
at the state university in Amherst. 67
Although
the Repub-

licans managed to disburse a very modest
$11,557 to candidates during the year, the Democratic State
Committee made
no campaign contributions whatsoever . ^8 The
committee's

chairman at the time was state Representative David
E.

Harrison of Gloucester, who was defeated for reelection
to
the House in November.
It is interesting to note that in
the following year, in 1971, the Democratic State Committee

conducted a fund-raising drive which was far more successful
°^In raid-1974, the Republican State Comraittee had
virtually eliminated a deficit of almost $100,000 and had
$20,000 available for the support of legislative candidates
in the 1974 election, according to "Sargent/Dwight G.O.P.
Newsletter," July, 1974, p. 2.
^"^Report filed by the Democratic State Committee
with the Secretary of State's Division of Public Records,

1970.
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than their efforts during the election
year.

In July alone,

they reported receipts totaling almost
$40,000.
committee's disbursements of about $30,000
in

Among the

that month

were a $10,000 "legal fee" to Harrison, a
salary payment of
$3,390 to the committee's secretary, and a $5,000
payment
for a telephone bill. 69
short, although the committee

m

rendered no direct support to candidates in 1970, it
did
finance the party's state convention, and one year
later,

mounted a successful fund-raising drive which left about
$10,000 on hand to meet its operating expenses.

No doubt,

the lopsided Democratic majorities in both houses of the

legislature and the success of Speaker Hartley's committee,

which assisted House candidates in 1970, are factors which
help explain the inactivity of the Democratic State Com-

mittee during an election year.

Whereas there are only two state committees there
are hundreds of Democratic and Republican committees in the

Commonwealth's 351 cities and towns.

Many of these elected

town and ward committees seldom meet, except during the

months immediately preceding an election.

When questioned

recently about the "health" of the local Republican committees. Senator John F. Peurker replied that it could best be
6 ^Report

filed by the Democratic State Committee
with the Secretary of State's Division of Public Records,
1971.
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described as a near "terminal illness, "70
a condition that
apparently afflicts the Democrats as
well,

m

Boston, for

example, the committees in eight of
the city's twenty-two
wards reported no financial activity
whatsoever in 1970
during the primary and election; in six
other wards, the
incomplete reports filed by their committees
indicated the
same; the remaining eight ward committees
filed no reports. ^1

A similar pattern prevailed for many other local
committees
of both parties.

The lack of vigor in the local committees

of both parties is apparent in the comparison of
their

financial activity in 1970, which is presented in Table
17.

During the primary, for example, all local committees

reported spending only $17,525.

During the election, how-

ever, they spent considerably more, $74,310.

In both the

primary and the election the Republican committees were more
active than the Democrats, outspending them $57,854 to

Not all of this money, however, went directly to

$33,981.

candidates.

For example, one of the more active Republican

committees, the town committee in Arlington, divided its

resources between a csunpaign headquaurters and campaign contributions.

Of the $1,090 it disbursed in 1970, a total of

70p2u:ker made this remark during a meeting of the
Bridgewater Republican Town Committee in mid-1974.

7lReports filed by Boston's Democratic ward committees with the Secretary of State's Division of Public
Records.
7^ Election Statistics, 1970 (Public Document 43)
p.

6.
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$500 was given to one statewide and
three local candidates,
most of the balance was used to
offset expenses connected
with its headquarters. 73
Wellesley, of §755 spent by the
town's Republican committee, none
went directly to candidates. The committee spent
virtually all of its funds for
printing and mailing a "slate card,"
thus supporting several
candidates. 74
sum, many local committees were
inactive
In 1970. Of those which raised and
spent money, some aided
candidates directly, whereas others chose
to promote the
party and its candidates more generally.
Finally, it should
be recalled that there are hundreds of
local committees

m

m

whose combined disbursements in 1970, totaling
only $91,835,
indicate that their financial impact upon the
1970 election
was, on the whole, of minor consequence.

The fund-raising efforts by the parties in the
legislature, and by state and local party committees, nonetheless, were more important than the efforts by interest

groups to finance campaigns in 1970.

Their activities are

examined next.
73Report filed by the Arlington Republican Town
Committee with the Secretary of State's Division of Public
Records.

74Report filed by the Wellesley Republican Town
Committee with the Secretary of State's Division of Public
Records
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Funding C ampaigns;

Interest Group

With one major exception, there was
no evidence in
the public record that associations
representing

the state's

bankers, manufacturers, teachers, road
contractors, doctors,
realtors, race track owners, police,
veterans, or any of the
scores of organized interests which lobby
public officials
on Beacon Hill made campaign contributions
to candidates in
1970.

Such groups have an obvious concern about
the deci-

sions public officials make, and this concern
properly

extends to the election of these officials.

Why, then, was

there no evidence of campaign contributions in the
names of

these groups?

The answer does not lie in any prohibition

against such giving by the campaign finance statute in
effect in 1970.

It allowed campaign contributions by asso-

ciations and simply required that any candidate (or candi-

date committee) receiving a contribution report the name of
the association, the names and addresses of its principal

officers, and the amount and date of the contribution to
the secretary of state.

There was also no limitation upon

how much money an association could give in a calendar year
to any candidate or committee organized on his behalf to

receive contributions (individuals were subject to a $3,000
75
limitation) .'^

The most plausible explanation is that

^

General Laws
Acts of 1962.

,

c.

55, as amended by c. 444 of the
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groups did not fund campaigns
in their na.es because
persons
connected with them in some
way-their members, group officials, and lobbyists-did
so.
They were the ones who made
contrli>utions to candidates,
with or without the advice
of
the organization, whom they
believed would best represent
the interests of the group.
The public record does provide
some evidence that substantiates
this explanation. For
example, several of the state's
bankers did, in fact, help
finance the reelection of state
Treasurer Robert Q. Crane
in 1970, although no banking
association was reported
as a

campaign contributor.

Lobbyist William P. Malloy did, in

fact, make numerous contributions
in 1970 to legislators

whose committee assignments gave them
an influential voice
in legislative decisions of concern
to the groups he represented.

Each of these cases is elaborated upon
in the next
chapter. There was, then, no apparent
necessity in 1970
for most groups to solicit their membership
for campaign
funds, thereafter to be given—in the name
of
the

to candidates deemed worthy of support.

group-

There were some

indications, however, that certain groups were
beginning to
do this in 1972.
Political action committees representing
some of the state's teachers, realtors, insurance
brokers,

physicians, and certain employees of the General Electric

Company in Massachusetts were among those organized to

raise and disburse campaign funds in the 1972 election.

Soee of them reported
their activities, and
others did
not.

The Committee on Politic. i
Education (rnr>.^
^he
C«nmittee on Political Education
(COPE, of the Massachusetts
State Labor Council (APL-CIO)
was the major exception to
the
pattern of a lack of participation
by interest groups in the
financing of electoral campaigns
in the Bay state in 1970.^7
For many years, COPE has
been the vehicle whereby the
MassaChusetts State Labor Council has
educated its membership
politically, and consistent with
the advice offered by
Samuel Gompers, rewarded its
friends and punished its
enemies by making campaign
contributions to candidates with
good labor records. Although the
Massachusetts campaign
finance statute specifically prohibits
corporate contributions, it imposes no such obstacle
to organized labor. The
law specifically allbws political
committees, and COPE is
one, to raise and disburse funds for
electoral purposes.
Occasionally, petitions have been introduced
in the state
legislature which, if enacted into law, would
deprive organized labor of the right it presently enjoys.
White, "State Piling Law Ignored by Most
Groups: ^fS^V?''?
-Political Committees' Aided Candidates," Boston
Globe , 28 December 1972, p. 16.

^

J^A similar finding, limited to 1968 Senate campaigns, is found in Mileur and Sulzner,
pp. 100-101.

In 1970 COPE raised $62,628
from three sources:
$48,018 came from payroll deductions
from the wages of each
participating APL-CIO member in
Massachusetts; the national
office of APL-CIO in Washington,
D.C. contributed $11,000;
and a banquet honoring Samuel
Gompers and Philip Murray,
sponsored biennially by the
Massachusetts State Labor Council, netted $3,610.78 ^11 of
the funds raised by COPE in
1970 were spent.79
presented in Table 18, candidates for
statewide office received campaign
contributions totaling

$12,375, and state legislative candidates
received a total
of $13,132. No contributions were
made to candidates for

the Governor's Council.

In addition, more than $19,000 was

disbursed to finance a direct-mail campaign to
encourage
members of organized labor in Massachusetts to
register to
vote, and to cast their ballots for candidates
endorsed by

the state AFL-CIO.

The balance of their funds were used

for campaign contributions to candidates for the U.S.
Congress, and for other purposes with which this discussion
is

not concerned.

In brief, most of the funds disbursed in

1970, according to the Director of COPE, were intended to

elect candidates running for Massachusetts offices who were
^^Report filed by the Committee on Political Education (COPE) of the Massachusetts State Labor Council (AFLCIO) with the Secretary of State's Division of Public
Records.
79
'Ibid.

All subsequent references to expenditures
by COPE are based upon this source.
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perceived as friendly to organized labor
by officials of the
Massachusetts State Labor Council (AFL-CIO) .^^
TABLE 18

CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE COMMITTEE
EDUCATION (COPE) OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
COUNCIL (AFL-CIO) TO CANDIDATES FOR
OFFICE, AND THE STATE LEGISLATURE

ON POLITICAL
STATE LABOR
STATEWIDE
IN 1970

Candidates

^^^^^

Statewide
Donahue For Governor Committee
Maurice A. Donahue Campaign Committee
Kevin H. White Committee
Attorney General Robert H. Quinn Reception
Committee
Secretary of State John F. X. Davoren
Auditor Thaddeus Buczko
.

.

.

.

.

.

To^l

State Legislature
21 Senate Candidates
75 House of Representatives Candidates
Total

Total

$

5,000
l!ooO
5,000

1^000
125
250
$12,375
3,675
9,4 57

$13,132

$25,507

SOURCE:
Report filed by COPE with the Secretary
of State's Division of Public Records.

Of the $12,375 contributed directly to five state-

wide candidates, virtually all of it went to the two major
contenders for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination.

State Senate President Maurice A. Donahue of Holyoke was an
''"Interview with John A. Callahan, Boston, 18 July
1972.
The decisions adaout campaign contributions, according
to Callahan, are usually made by the four officers of the
Massachusetts State Labor Council, but in some instances
the thirty-five members of the Council participate.

early choice of the Massachusetts
State Labor Council and
received $6,000 from COPE for
his campaign prior to
the
September primary. Although
Donahue won his party's
endorsement at the pre-primary
convention, Mayor Kevin H.
White of Boston narrowly defeated
Donahue in the primary.
COPE then supported White as the
Democrats' nominee with a
$5,000 contribution. Lesser contributions
were made to
three statewide incumbents: Attorney
General Quinn, Secretary of state Davoren, and Auditor
Buczko, all Democrats.
Of the $13,132 contributed by COPE
to ninety-six
state legislative candidates, seventy-five
candidates for
the House of Representatives received
a total
of $9,457,

and $3,675 was divided among twenty-one
candidates for the
Senate. The average campaign contribution
to a candidate
for the lower house was $130, whereas
the average contribution to a candidate for the Senate was a bit
more, $175.

No legislative candidate received more than $300.

COPE's

contributions to legislative candidates are shown in Table
19.

No effort was made to determine the partisanship of

the legislative candidates supported by AFL-CIO in
1970,

but it is a quite safe assumption that the overwhelming

majority of them, if not all, were Democrats.
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In addition to the
$25,507 disbursed directly
to
statewide and legislative
candidates as campaign contributions, COPE spent at least
$19,411 for printing and
postage
on a direct-mail campaign.
Collaborating with them in this
effort, in part, was the
nonpartisan League of Women
Voters
Of Massachusetts. The
women wrote some of the
literature
urging the workers to register
and vote, and the AFL-CIO
defrayed the cost of printing
and mailing it to their membership, in its direct-mail
effort, COPE also encouraged
support at the polls for
AFL-CIO-endorsed candidates.
It
Is not known exactly what
candidates were promoted in COPE's
mailings, nor to what extent, but
because approximately 80
per cent of COPE's campaign contributions
in 1970 went to
candidates running for statewide offices
or the state legislature, about $15,000 of the cost of
the mailing can reasonably be allocated to their campaign
support. The total
assistance rendered them, therefore, was
approximately
$40,000, roughly two-thirds of COPE's total
disbursements

in 1970.
Summairy and Conclusions

From the preceding discussion of the fund-raising

activities of candidates and their committees, political
parties, and interest groups, it is apparent Uiat most of
^^Ibid.
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the funds raised to finance the
campaigns of candidates for
statewide office, the Governor's
Council, and the state
legislature in 1970 were raised by
committees established on
behalf of candidates. A substantial
sum was raised, however, by candidates without the
benefit of committees. There
was very little evidence that candidates
financed their campaigns with contributions and loans from
their personal
funds.
The fund-raising efforts of the political
parties
were decidedly less important, and with
one exception, there
was virtually no fund raising by organized
interest groups.
The fact that almost all of the money raised
in 1970 was the
result of the efforts of candidates and their
committees

reflects a marked tendency on the part of contributors
to
give directly to candidates whom they favored, as
opposed to
contributing to any centralized party or group fund-raising
effort.

Although the burden for raising funds fell princi-

pally upon the candidates, each political party did make
some effort in 1970 to assist their candidates, most of this

assistance going to legislative candidates.

In the House of

Representatives, Speaker David M. Hartley established the

Committee to Re-elect a Democratic House, and in the Senate,

Minority Leader John F. Parker established the Committee to
Elect a Republican State Senate.

Although the Republicans

established a committee in the House similar to Hartley's,
it raised virtually nothing.

In the Senate, no committee
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similar to Parker's was established
by the Democrats. The
fund-raising activities by the parties'
elected state committees were less important than those
of the committees
established by the legislative leadership.
The Republican
State committee made more of an effort,
although it hardly
was successful, than the Democratic
State Committee. On the
local level, the elected town and ward
committees of both
the Democratic and Republican parties were
of some consequence. Here, too, the Republican effort
was greater. The
only significant fund-raising activity by
any interest group
in 1970 was the effort by the Committee on
Political Education (COPE) of the Massachusetts State Labor Council
(AFL-

CIO)

.

self.

In sum, the typical candidate had to rely upon him-

He received little direct financial assistance from

either his political party or interest groups in his campaign.
It is reasonable to assume that a candidate, at the
least, will have a tendency to favor those who assisted him

in any substantial way with his campaign.

For a candidate

not to feel some sense of obligation toward his campaign
workers and financial benefactors seems quite unlikely.

If

a candidate, however, received no more than token support

from his political party, it can be argued that there is
little basis for such a feeling of obligation.

Moreover,

it might be asked, what influence can that party expect to
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exert upon his behavior once he assumes
office?

In similar

fashion, if organized groups contributed
little, or nothing,
to his campaign's success, would not they,
too, have less

leverage with the candidate, once in office?

Could not the

candidate conduct himself with greater independence
toward
them, while not neglecting their interests that
he per-

ceived as legitimate?

To whom, it then follows, is the

candidate "indebted"?

Obviously, those who helped him get

elected, including his campaign contributors.

something for them, he will,

If he can do

with this in mind, we now turn

to the subject of rewards for campaign contributions.

CHAPTER

IV

REWARDS FOR CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS

Only a small minority of
the electorate make
campaign contributions.! a
fascinating question, but one
Which is difficult to answer,
is why do they give? Most
people are not parted from
their money easily for any
reason, and when they are,
they expect something
for it.

This motivation seems to be
present, also, in politics.
The conventional wisdom holds
that a campaign contribution
for many people is a self-serving
action, one for which a
reward for oneself, or a friend,
relative, or acquaintance
is expected. A campaign
contribution is looked upon by
many as an "investment," and a return
on that investment is
hoped for, if not expected, it is
not inferred, incidentally, that what most contributors
want is necessarily
illegal or improper in any way, although
one of the lessons
of Watergate is that, for some, this
is so.

Public officials in the Bay State are in a
position
to dispense a variety of rewards, and one
obvious way to
!^68, for example, 8,700,000 persons (8 per cent
of the adult population of the United States)
said they
contributions to campaigns at some level of government. made
At
no time during the past twenty years did more
than 12 per
population give. See Herbert E. Alexander, Money
? «
(Washington, D.C.:
Public Affairs Press, 1972)7
p. 281.

149

150

come to their attention and
possibly win their favor, is
to
support their candidacies with
money. At some future date
financial contributors may be
recognized and rewarded. Some
officials can reward contributors
with jobs

in the executive,

legislative, or judicial branches
of state government.
These jobs might be permanent or
temporary, full-time or

part-time, well paying or parsimonious,
important or prosaic.
Some officials can reward contributors
with contracts, in
Massachusetts, the state government
purchases all kinds of
goods and services, many of them connected
with the design,
construction, and maintenance of roads,
schools, office
buildings, hospitals, and recreational
facilities,
it awards
numerous architectural, engineering, construction,
and maintenance contracts in the process. There are
literally thousands of vendors with whom the state enters
into contracts
for equipment, supplies, and services. In
addition to making

decisions about jobs and contracts, some officials can
reward

contributors with other administrative actions.

bilities here are numerous.

The possi-

Two examples will suffice.

A

favorable ruling by a rate-setting agency such as the Depart-

ment of Public Utilities within the Office of Consumer
Affairs can have a tremendous impact upon the economic health
of an enterprise such as an electric utility.

The vigor with

which the Office of Environmental Affairs administers state
statutes dealing with air and water pollution can have a
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similar effect upon the profitability
of various enterprises.
Officials can also reward contributors
with legislative
decisions. Efforts by elected officials
to enact legislation which will protect or advance the
interests of campaign contributors, or to defeat or modify
proposed legislation which will adversely affect their
interests, can be
the guid gro guo for contributions.
Finally, lawmakers and
administrators can grant access to their campaign
contributors.

Public officials can punish as well as reward.

A

person with a stake in public decisions does not want
his
interests ignored, or responded to with less than dispatch.

Although he may have no particular job, contract, or legislation in mind, he may give because he fears being left out,
or punished, if a contribution is not made.
Certainly, it should be made clear that other less

self-serving reasons exist for supporting candidates financially.

Many, such as programmatic agreement, integrity of

the candidate, party loyalty, and family ties are often

cited when persons explain their motivations for contributing.

This study, however, focuses upon some of the more

tangible benefits previously mentioned.

They are inher-

ently more interesting to examine, and, especially in Massachusetts, have become part of the mythology about how state

government is conducted.
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Difficulties arise, however,
when any attempt is
made to link campaign
contributions with rewards.
To know
that a particular person made
a campaign contribution
to a

candidate is one thing; to
determine why the contribution
was, made, or what reward-if
any-was received by the contributor is quite another matter.
The contributor is the
person who knows best of all why
he gave, and the public
official who made an appointment,
awarded a
contract, or

granted access to a contributor
best knows the reasons for
his decision. Neither is particularly
willing to explain
his actions fully. To get to the
bottom of the matter of
"giving and getting" is extremely
difficult,
it would be
an error in many cases to conclude
that a particular

appointment was made, or a specific contract
awarded, in
exchange for a campaign contribution. In
one case, an

appointment may have been made solely because
a contribution was given to the appointing official.
In a second
situation, the principal consideration in the
decision may
have been the public official's previous friendship
or

working relationship with the appointee.

In a third

instance, a number of factors might have weighed equally
in

the decision— the campaign contribution, friendship, pressure from the party organization, and the impressive quali-

fications of the contributor for the position.

The diffi-

culty in conclusively linking campaign contributions with
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rewards is apparent.
be inferred.

At best, such relationships
can only
No claim is being presented
that

associations
will be established conclusively
in this thesis.
Originally it was intended to explore
the relation
between campaign contributions and
jobs, legislation, contracts, other administrative action,
and access. Next to
jobs, the area of contracts was
thought particularly exciting and promising. The author
recalled the embarrassment
of the Volpe administration caused
by revelations that many

architects who had made contributions to
Volpe* s 1962 campaign were thereafter awarded state
contracts; for five
weeks in 1966 the state Senate held hearings,
investigating
the selection of architects for the state
university's new
medical school. 2 One architect who testified
stated:

I found that the system called for
anyone who
wanted anything like a contract to contribute
to the campaign. This is the systan.3

After some preliminary efforts to develop a method and
deter-

mine sources of information, which met with little success,
''Governor Volpe was upset by revelations by Representative Michael S. Dukakis (Democrat-Brookline) that "11
architects who contributed to the unsuccessful gubernatorial
campaign of 1962 were awarded 15 architectural contracts
before the Governor left office at the end of that year,
according to an editorial, "Quality Is the Issue," Boston
Globe, 4 May 1966. Regarding the Senate investigation, see
John C. Thomas and Jeremiah V. Murphy, "Governor's Brother
Denied Getting Campaign Cash," Boston
Globe , 21 May 1966,
~~
p. 1.

^David Shields, quoted in "Other Architects Ready to
Talk, but Kelly Opposes Calling Them," Boston Globe, 25 May
1966, p. 1.
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the author wrote Michael S.
Dukakis, hopeful that he might
suggest a method or sources of
information which had been
overlooked. Dukakis, critical of the
Volpe administration
in the 1960's, and later of
Governor Sargenfs, replied:
^^^""^
^'^y
about the fact
Jhf?
with the State are
^?
traditionally solicited for contributions
by Governors and State Officials of both
parties. We
managed to stop that racket in connection
with
the award of architectural contracts
back in 1966
by setting up a designers selection
board
has fairly effectively taken architecturalwhich
tracts out of the political grab bag. My cononly
suggestion with respect to the particular
problem
you raise in your letter is to do the rather
laborious and painful job of checking out the
backgrounds of a candidate's contributors in
determining whether or not they have an interest
in State contracts.
I know of no easily accessible source for such information . . .4

The author had already done some "laborious and painful," and very time-consuming, investigating of campaign
con-

tributions, largely in connection with appointments as a

reward to contributors, and concluded that it was simply not
feasible to explore the area of contracts, given the time and

resources available to him.

Although the problems were dif-

ferent, the same conclusion was reached about two other

rewards, legislation and other administrative action.

It was

decided, therefore, to limit the inquiry about rewards to two
areas, jobs and access.

Letter from Michael

S.

Dukakis, September

6,

1973
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Rewards for C ontrlbutlona

i

Jobs

Jobs will be the first reward
discussed, beginning
with the judicial appointments
of Governor Francis W. Sargent, some of Sargent's other
appointments, and the patronage available to other elected
statewide executives, especially to the attorney general, will
be treated
next.

Judicial Appointments by Governor

s^Tc^ ^r.*-

m

an

article dealing with no-bid contracts
for the city of Boston,
Peter Lucas wrote:

White is not the originator of the practice
of
rewarding political friends. People give
presidents money and become ambassadors; people
give
governors money and become judges; people give
mayors money and get jobs or contracts. The
practice is as old as government ... in politics
hand washes the other. Political writers know one
it.
White knows it. The public has the right to
know
it.

And in an article written a few months before that,
another

State House reporter, Stephen A. Cohen, maintained that
Governor Sargent followed his campaign contributions book
rather

closely in making appointments to the Massachusetts judiciary.^

To some extent Lucas and Cohen are correct in their

assertions about judicial patronage, but the evidence is not
overwhelming

Globe ,

9

^Peter Lucas, "Mayor Clouds No-Bid Issue,
October 1972, p. 45.

"

Boston

^Stephen A. Cohen, "Sargent Follows Book on Appointments," Boston Globe , 4 April 1972, p. 14.
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Since Francis W. Sargent
became governor on
January 22, 1969 he has had
an enormous impact on
the
judicial branch of state
government. As of

August, 1974
he had made more than 175
appointments to the judiciary,
an unprecedented number of
appointments in the history of
Massachusetts politics. ^ The
discussion which follows,
however, treats Sargent's first
150 appointments, which
were confirmed by mid.1973. By
that time. Governor Sargent
had named six justices to the
Supreme Judicial Court, the
state's highest court. Sargent
also had named all six justices to the Appeals Court, established
by the legislature
in 1972 to relieve the Supreme
Judicial Court of much of
its appellate work. He had appointed
twenty-five

justices-

more than one-half of the bench-to the
Superior Court, the
state's trial court, and named ninety-three
justices
to the

District Courts, the state's lowest level courts
where most
cases are decided. In addition, Sargent had
appointed fourteen Probate Court justices, three Juvenile Court
justices,
two Land Court justices, and one justice of the
Boston Housing Court.

More than one-third of his judicial appointments

were made in 1973, most of these related to an amendment to
the Massachusetts Constitution approved by the voters in

^Joseph Rosenbloom, "With Little Fanfare, Sargent
Has Filled the State Bench," Boston Globe 29 July 1973, p.
See also, Rachelle Patterson, "Sargent Names Friend of
20.
White to the Bench," Boston Globe , 24 August 1974, p. 1.
,
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November, 1972 which provides
for the mandatory
retirement
of all justices upon their
reaching the age of seventy.

Thirty-eight of Sargent's
fifty^seven appointments in
1973
were made to comply with
that amendment. The Governor
had
not only named more than
one-half of the entire

state bench,

but he had also appointed the
Chief Justices of the Supreme
Judicial court, the Appeals Court,
the Superior Court, the
District Courts, and the Probate
Courts.
The Massachusetts Constitution
provides that all
judges "shall be nominated and
appointed by the

governor,

by and with the advice and consent
of the council. "8

During

his tenure, however, Sargent has
dominated the process of
appointing judges. His nominations have
been approved by
the eight-member Governor's Council with
only three exceptions. These were his nominations of
Walter Skinner to the
Superior Court and William Garbose to the
Gardner District
Court in 1969, and Paula Gold to the Dorchester
District

Court in 1973.

The Democratic -dominated Council's voice,

during Sargent's administration, has been heard
essentially

during the confirmation hearings, according to one of
Sargent's advisers.^

IX

They can, and have, suggested nominees

^Massachusetts, Constitution , c. II, sec.

I,

art.

^Telephone interview with William G. Young, Chief
Counsel to the Governor, 3 September 1974.
Young had then
served in that capacity for about two years and did not
claim to speak for his predecessor.
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to the governor, but they
have not been consulted
in advance
of the naming of his nominees,
fact, councillors now
only learn of them twenty-four
hours in advance of their
names being revealed to the
public. This is a far different
situation than what prevailed
but a few years ago when the
council was known for its "wheeling
and dealing." a partial
explanation is that the Governor's
Council now enjoys less
political clout and prestige. About
a decade ago, most of
its statutory powers were taken
from it by an initiative
petition approved by the voters. Its
prestige suffered from
revelations of corruption, involving some
councillors,
unearthed by the Massachusetts Crime
Comir.ission in the mid1960' s.
In addition, the quality of Sargent's
nominees has
been advanced as an explanation. The
Council has been hard
put to find fault with thera.^^

m

Although the Governor and the Council possess the
formal authority for appointment, there are a
number of

participants who influence these appointments.

According to

William G. Young, Chief Counsel to the Governor since
1972,
all nominations by the Governor to the Council are first

discussed by the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, his Chief
Secretary, Chief Counsel, and other members of his staff

before the Governor's decisions are referred to the Joint
Bar Committee on Judicial Appointments of the Massachusetts
lOlbid.
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and Boston Bar Associations.il

m

the case of the thirty-

eight appointments made by the
Governor to fin the vacancies created by the constitutional
amendment mandating
retirement at age seventy, he
employed
the services of a

committee to assist him.

m

August, 1972 the Governor

appointed an ad hoc Advisory Coimnittee
on Judicial Appointments, a twelve-member committee
comprised equally of lawyers and lay members, and charged
it with seeking out and
recommending potential appointees to
him.
The Governor's
Chief Counsel served as secretary
of this committee,
and

the activities of the committee
were given considerable
publicity. Individuals who aspired to
the Massachusetts
bench, and others who were in a position
to recommend potential jurists, were invited to submit their
names to the
committee. Over a period of several weeks the
committee

traveled to various parts of the state and held
public
hearings at which citizens were invited to express
their

views concerning the qualities they believed were most
important in persons who might be appointed to the bench.

The committee used an elaborate questionnaire which was
distributed to approximately 1,100 potential candidates.

About 600 questionnaires were returned, and 550 of those
individuals who returned questionnaires were interviewed

^Interview with William G. Young, Boston, 30 July
1973.
The description of the selection process that follows
is based upon this interview.
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by the committee.

The Governor's Chief Counsel
coordinated
this effort and made recommendations
to the Governor independent of the recomiuendations of the
committee. Governor
Sargent reviewed the credentials of
the recommended candidates with members of his staff, after
whicn he invited the
recommendations of the Joint Bar Coimnittee
on Judicial

Appointments of the Massachusetts and Boston
Bar Associations.

It was only then, on January 4, 1973,
that he com-

menced submitting the names of his nominees to
the Governor's Council for confirmation. By March
7, approximately
eight weeks later, he had filled the thirty-eight
vacancies
created by the constitutional amendment.
Cohen maintains that campaign contributions to the

Governor played an important part in his decisions:
Governor Sargent's track record on judicial
appointments since the beginning of his current
term show he's stuck pretty close to the book
a blue binder in the Secretary of State's office
which contains more than 500 pages of contributions to his 1970 campaign. 12

—

The evidence indicates, however, that while campaign contributions were probably a factor of consequence in some of

Sargent's first 150 appointments, most of them have to be
explained in some other way.

First, most appointees did not

make campaign contributions.

Only thirty-five appointees

and/or their wives made contributions of $100 or more (most
appointees who made contributions gave the money in their
l^cohen, "Sargent Follows Book," p. 14.
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names, although in six cases,
contributions were made by the
wives of appointees, a not uncommon
practice involving

appointees other than prospective judges) .^^

thirty-five

contributions ranged in size from $100
to $2,625 and were
"'^
distributed as follows:
$

100- 499
500- 999
1/000-1,499
1,500-1,999
2,000-2,499
2,500-2,999

13
11
8

1
1
1

35

Second, a number of appointees made nominal
contributions.

The author agrees with Sargent's oft-repeated
response to
his critics that:
If someone buys a couple of tickets to a
political dinner, that shouldn't preclude
him from receiving an appointment any more
than it should entitle him to receiving
such an appointment. 15

Christopher J. Armstrong's appointment as an associate justice of the new Appeals Court provides an example of a person

l^Report filed by The Sargent Committee with the Secretary of State's Division of Public Records. There probably
were more than thirty-five contributors who later became
judges, as well as an unknown number of contributions from
judicial hopefuls who were not appointed. Apart from information in articles in the Boston press, the method employed
to determine contributors, tedious and likely to invite
error, was to scan the 500 page report of The Sargent Committee, searching for the names of the 150 appointees.
^4ibid.
-^^"Sarge to Critics:
Nothing to Hide," Record
6 April 1972, p. 1.
,

American (Boston)

Who was Clearly rewarded for
prior service to the governor.
Prior to his appointaaent,
Armstrong served as Governor
Sargent's legal counsel. His
§200 contribution was obviously
uniiaportant.
One of Sargenfs most recent
appointees,

Rudolph A. Sacco, named a special
justice of the Hampshire
county Probate Court, helped manage
Sargent's campaign in
1970 in Berkshire County. Sacco
contributed only $100 to
Sargent's campaign, but he was
instrumental in raising an
additional $10,000 to $15,000. In
this case, his campaign
assistance, particularly his fund-raising
efforts, was
probably quite important.

Although some appointees gave only nominally,
like
Armstrong and Sacco, several made substantial

contributions.

Twenty-two contributors gave $500 or more, eleven
of them
giving $1,000 or more. Cohen's charge that
appointments

were influenced by campaign contributions has more
validity
in these cases. The twenty-two appointments in
which contributions of $500 or more were involved are presented in

Table 20.
Prominent among the large contributors were persons

^%oseph Rosenbloom, "Sargent Names R. A. Sacco a
Judge," Boston Globe , 19 July 1973, p. 13.
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later appointed special
justices in the District
Courts."
Fifty of Sargent's first X50
appointees to the bench ware
named special justices.
Fifteen of them made contributions
to his campaign, eleven of
them giving $500 or more.
The
frequency of giving by these
special Justices, and the size
of their contributions, stands
in marked contrast to the
pattern of giving by Sargent's
other judicial appointees.
Of his other 100 appointees,
only twenty made contributions,
eleven of them giving $500 or
more. As a rule, individuals

Who were appointed to the higher
courts did not make contributions, a situation for which there
is no simple
explana-

tion. 18

None of Governor Sargent's six appointees
to the
Supreme Judicial Court made a campaign
contribution; only
justices are generally assigned to each
of the district courts throughout the
state.
part-time as the workloads of these particular They work
courts
are compensated on a per diem basis, and
are permitted to maintain private law practices while
they
serve
as judges.
They often are later nominated to be the presiding 3ustices of the courts they served
as special justices. Governor Sargent has supported
legislation which
would create a number of positions for full-time
special
justices to reduce the need for part-time special
Justices appointed would serve a number of districtjustices.
as their workloads dictate. According to Sargent's courts
Chief
Counsel, the legislature's Committee on the Judiciary
approved the legislation twice, but on both occasions it died
in the House Ways and Means Committee. Telephone
interview
with William G. Young, 3 September 1974.
^^Ibid. One explanation offered by the Chief Counsel
to Governor Sargent, which is less than satisfying to the
author, is that it is generally understood by members of the
Massachusetts bar that these important and prestigious positions are not sought; rather, "the job seeks the man." Why,
then, did the Supreme Judicial Court, on January 1, 1973,
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one of his six appointees
to the recently created
Appeals
court, and but two of his
twenty-five appointees to the
superior Court, made contributions.
Contributions were
uncommon, too, by appointees to
the Probate Courts; only
three of fourteen appointees
gave.
Campaign contributions
were more frequent, however, by
appointees to the state's
lower courts. Twenty-nine of
Sargent's thirty-five campaign
contributions from judicial appointees
came from appointees
to the District, Municipal, and
Juvenile Courts. Among the
twenty-nine were the fifteen contributions
by special justice appointees.
The evidence also demonstrates that
campaign contributions by prospective judges were far less
frequent when
Governor Sargent's ad hoc committee assisted him
in recruiting and screening candidates for the bench,
something which
invites speculation, but about which only Sargent
and his

confidants know the complete story. 19

In 1973 Sargent made

announce a prohibition against campaign contributions by
sitting judges? The vast majority of Sargent's appointees
to the higher courts, moreover, were not sitting judges.
It would seem that if it were thought necessary to restrain
sitting judges that there would be at least as great a need
to impose the same restraint upon all members of the bar.
No similar standard applies.
l^Sargent's use of the ad hoc committee certainly
expanded the opportunity for participation in the judicial
selection process, and in the author's judgment, tended to
make it less political. At the same time it did not deprive
Sargent of the opportunity to reward qualified lawyers who
had supported him politically.
The Boston press has been increasingly active in
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fifty-seven appointments,
including the thirty-eight
appointments which filled the
vacancies created by the
constitutional amendment mandating
the retirement of all
judges when they reached the
age of seventy, of the fiftyseven justices appointed in
1973, only six of

them-less

than one in nine-are known
to have made campaign contributions. During the previous
four years of Sargent's
administration (1969-72), however,
when ninety-three appointments to the bench were made,
twenty-nine of them-about one
in three-were reported as
campaign contributors. Contributions were about three times more
frequent during those
years than when the ad hoc committee
functioned (after Sargent filled the thirty-eight vacancies
in March, 1973 he
dispensed with the services of the committee)
In conclusion, it is obviously false
to generalize

that Governor Sargent's appointees to the
bench became
judges because they made contributions to
his 1970 campaign.
Only thirty-five of his first 150 appointees-less than 25
per cent— did so, and several of them gave
nominally. It
is likely, however, that large contributions
were a factor
of some importance in some appointments.

speculate.

Observers can only

Only Sargent and his advisers really know, and

reporting about campaign contributions, and Sargent's opportunities to make numerous appointments attracted great
attention. It is possible that this publicity reduced the
number of appointments of contributors as much as any other
factor.
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they deny the charge.

Despite the denial, they
are
politicians, ana as Lucas
stated, "in politics,
cne hand
washes the other." The charge
has some truth, but has
been
overstated. Finally, one
cannot help but wonder how
many
aspirants to the Massachusetts
judiciary made campaign contributions to Governor Sargent
in 1970 but were not
appointed
judges.

Other Appointments by Gove rnor
Saraent . a governor
in Massaohusetts has vast
appointive authority,
addition
to his appointment of judges,
he has the authority to make
other appointments to the judicial
branch;

m

for example, he

appoints the clerks of the District
Courts. He also appoints
all of the state's medical examiners,
notaries public, public
administrators, justices of the peace,
and masters in chancery. Within the executive branch,
there are a great many
appointments at his command. On his authority
alone, the

governor names his cabinet secretaries, and
presumably has
a voice in the appointments of their
staffs. Moreover, there
are a number of middle-management positions
which are noncivil service jobs; some of these political
appointments
are

made by the governor.

There are also numerous boards and

commissions, such as the Alcoholic Beverages Commission,
to

which he makes appointments.

He names the trustees of all

institutions of higher education in the Commonwealth, and
he appoints the trustees of other state institutions such

as state hospitals.

In addition, he appoints
the members of
various public authorities such
as the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority and the
Massachusetts Port Authority,
sum, there are literally
hundreds of appointments of all
types at his command. According
to Evans and Novak, Governor Francis W. Sargent had made
4,200 appointments by mid1974 (he assumed office in January,
1969) . Two thousand of
these went to Republicans, the
remaining 2,200 to Democrats
and Independents. 2^

m

Helping to fill many of these positions
today is
Robert C. Dumont, a personnel vice
president on a two-year
leave of absence from the New England
Mutual Life Insurance
Company. Prior to Dumonfs assuming
direction of the Governor's State Service Office in March,
1973, Sargent's patronage chief for more than three years was
Harold
J. Greene,

who later became head of the Excise Bureau in
the Department
of Corporations and Taxation. Greene had
been Sargent's

administrative assistant when Sargent was a commissioner
in
the Department of Natural Resources, and was recruited
by

Sargent soon after he became governor.

Dumont explained

that his responsibility includes helping to fill the periodic

vacancies on the many boards and commissions which advise
Governor Sargent, some top echelon jobs, and some 30- and
90-day appointments.

He emphasized that his office does not

20Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "GOP Split
Endangers Gov. Sargent," Boston Globe , 21 June 1974, p. 19.
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handle all non-civil service jobs,
something which Greene
attempted to do.^l Greene said he
had tried to centralize
patronage, but was unsuccessful in
persuading all state

agencies to advise his office of all
non-civil service
openings, as well as civil service
openings for which there
was no eligible list. Many agencies
did not
cooperate,

some advising legislators about job
openings instead, thereby
giving them a share in the patronage. 22
Most of Greene's
time was spent with advisory board appointments,
although

like Dumont, he helped recruit some persons for
several

full-time paying positions.

One of Greene's assistants for two years was

Patricia R. Wales, later appointed an assistant commissioner
in the Department of Commerce and Development, who entered

politics as a Sargent staffer during his 1966 campaign for
lieutenant governor.

Wales strongly objected to the term

patronage, claiming that the Governor's State Service Office

stressed qualifications, a point emphasized also by both

Greene and Dumont. 23

Greene maintained that Sargent had

told him, "I don't care if they're Republicans or Democrats

21interview with Robert C. Dumont, Boston, 28 August
1973.
2 2 Interview

with Harold J. Greene, Boston,

4

October

1973.

23interview with Patricia R. Wales, Boston, 4 October
1973. The balance of the discussion about the Governor's
State Service Office is based upon the interviews with Wales,
Greene, and Dumont.

as long as they're qualified."

Dumont stated that Sargent

had frequently told him that
"good appointments is good
politics." Political considerations,
however, did enter
into many decisions about
appointments. Wales checked the
suitability of candidates with local
Sargent campaign coordinators. Greene, without explaining
further, said he kept
a "score card" on legislators and
rewarded them accordingly.
The Governor's chief secretary often
sat in on patronage
decisions, according to Greene, and some
applicants were
referred to Greene's office by Victor F.
Zuchero, Sargent's
full-time fund raiser. Dumont indicated
he was often aware
of the partisanship of many prospective
appointees because
this was essential in complying with the laws
regulating
many advisory board appointments. He admitted
that political considerations were involved in filling some 30and

90-day appointments.

Dumont made a conscious effort to deal

with the Republican State Committee, whereas Greene had
ignored it, a decision which eventually created great diffi-

culty for Sargent with his own party in the 1974 election.

Although Greene, Dumont, and Wales all knew of the
author's interest in linking campaign contributions with
appointments, there was no acknowledgment by them that any
such relationship existed.

Dumont admitted knowing of cam-

paign contributions in some instances, and Greene recalled
several complaints by persons who had made contributions and
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argued that they deserved jobs.

Each stressed, however, that

the principal standard applied in
selecting appointees was
their qualifications for the job.
it should be noted that
it is possible that qualified persons
can also be campaign
contributors.
In 1970 Governor Sargent received
737 campaign con-

tributions of $500 or more, and thereafter
made hundreds of
appointments. This inquiry is confined, however,
to the

fifty individuals who gave the most money
to Sargent's campaign. There were two reasons for this.
First, it was
assumed that those individuals who made the larger
contributions were more likely to want something from him,
and were

more likely to get it.

Second, the inquiry was confined to

the fifty top contributors to insure it would be manageable.
Some brief additional comments about the method of analysis
are
in order.

Governor Sargent's campaign finance report for 1970

was not directly consulted because a privately published
report of all contributors of $500 or more in 1970 was made

available to the author by Common Cause/Massachusetts.

It

greatly facilitated the task of identifying the top fifty
contributors to Governor Sargent. 24

^

alphabetized card

file of Governor Sargent's appointments, maintained by the
2^The campaign finance report filed by The Sargent
Committee for 1970 contains more than 500 typed pages of
the names and addresses of contributors of $25 or more.
The amounts and dates of their contributions are also
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Secretary of state's Commissions
Division, was then
consulted to determine which of
the fifty contributors
received appointments.

At least twelve of the top fifty
contributors to
Sargenfs campaign in 1970 received
appointments.

These
twelve individuals made contributions
ranging from $1,650
to $3,000. Eleven of them gave
$2,000 or more, two of them
giving $3,000, the maximum allowable
contribution under
the

law by an individual to a candidate
or his committees during
a calendar year,
six of these persons were rewarded
by
Governor Sargent with full-time appointments.
Three became
judges. The other three full-time
appointments went to Aldo
Eramo, who was named an assistant clerk of
the state's

Appellate Tax Board; to Norman Brisson, who was
appointed a
clerk of the Central District Court of Northern Essex;
and

to Albert G. Diehl, who was named an inspector
in the Gover-

nor's Highway Safety Bureau.

Sargent appointed the other

six large contributors to positions which are part-time,
and

for which there is little or no compensation.

Francis D.

Adoraaitis was appointed a member of the Massachusetts Aero-

nautics Commission; William Foley was appointed to the Board
of Registration of Chiropractors; Leonard Florence was

included. The nauaes, however, are in no particular order.
Fortunately, the names of the 737 contributors of $500 or
more to Governor Sargent in 1970 are listed— alphabetically—
in Alexander and Fisher, CRF Listing . This source was prepared by CRF by consulting Sargent's 1970 report.

174

reappointed as a trustee of the Soldiers'
Home in
Massachusetts; Selwyn Cain was appointed
as a member of
the Massachusetts Educational Communications

Commission;

George Karelitz was reappointed as a
public administrator
in Essex County; and Wallace Yaffee was
reappointed
as a

member of the Advisory Council on the Licensing
of Hospitals, Hospital Surveys, and Construction
Planning.

Table 21

lists the twelve appointees, the positions to which
they

were appointed, the dates of their appointments,
and the
amount which they contributed to Sargent's 1970 campaign.

The fact that twelve of Sargent's largest contributors later received appointments is insufficient information, by itself, to permit any valid conclusion about these

appointments.

To learn more, a few of the donors were

interviewed directly, or by telephone; persons who knew

about these contributors, including members of the press,
were also interviewed; and street lists, city directories.

Who's Who in the East , and similar publications were consulted. 25

Some of the findings will now be briefly related.

25campaign finance reports in Massachusetts state
only the name and address of a contributor, the size of the
contribution, and the date it was made. No occupational
information about the contributor is reported. A sixty-one
page booklet. The Common Cause Manual on Money and Politics
(Washington, O.C.
Common Cause, 1972} suggests some methods
for analyzing campaign finance reports, and discusses several
publications which are useful in further identifying contributors.
t
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The inquiry into Leonard
Florence's contribution
demonstrates how involved a
particular case can be, and
illustrates the difficulty, if
not the impossibility, of
acquiring information directly
from a contributor. Florence, a successful businessman
and former resident of
Chelsea, Massachusetts, has
been a trustee of the Soldiers'
Home in Massachusetts (in
Chelsea) since his appointment
by
Governor Volpe in 1967. His
reappointment by Governor Sargent occurred almost four years
after he gave $2,500 to
Sargent's 1970 campaign. Florence
is friendly with the
Commandant of the Soldiers' Home, who
is the son of a former
mayor of Chelsea. Leonard silver
International, Inc., which
Florence owns, employs about 300 people,
and Florence leases
a building located at Logan Airport,
in East Boston, from
the Massachusetts Port Authority. This
is convenient since
the company's business involves importing
silver. On
June 11, 1974, Florence, long friendly with
U.S. Representative Thomas P.

(Tip) O'Neill,

served as the chairman of a

fund raiser for Democratic House candidates in
Potomac,
Maryland.

The affair raised $52,550, of which $1,000 was

given by Florence.

Among the people from Boston who attended

were Edward J. King, the Executive Director of the Massachusetts Port Authority. 2^

Why Florence gave Sargent such a

2^See David Nyhan, "O'Neill Names Donors to Fund for
DOTiocrats," Boston Globe , 14 June 1974, p. 20.
See also,
David Farrell, "Republicans Zero in on O'Neill Fundraiser,"
Boston Globe , 18 June 1974, p. 23.
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large contribution in 1970, why
he wanted to be reappointed,
and just What Florence's relationship
with the Massachusettl
Port Authority is, are unknown.
Florence, when contacted by
telephone, gave the author the "brush
off," claiming he was
too busy to discuss his contributions
and appointment. 27
What is clearer, after this investigation,
is that Florence 8 interests are affected by both
the federal and state
governments, and that his bipartisan campaign
contributions
are very likely one way he attempts to
protect and advance
those interests. Even so, the information
known is still
insufficient to make a conclusive judgment, insofar
as his
•

appointment is concerned, about the significance of
his
$2,500 contribution to Sargent in 1970.

Not all contributors who were approached were as
uncooperative as Florence.

Aldo Eramo, for example,

explained that not all of the $2,825 contributed in his
name ($825 in February and $2,000 in September, 1970) was
his money; some had been raised by him from others, although
he had received credit for the entire contribution.

not say how much he had personally given.
27

He did

Eramo, appointed

Telephone interview with Leonard Florence, 19 June

1974.

^^Interview with Aldo Eramo, Boston, Summer, 1973.
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an Assistant Clerk of the
Appellate Tax Board29 in March,
1970, has been involved in Republican
gubernatorial politics
since the early 1960»s. Albert
G. Diehl's case affords
another example. Diehl, a long-service
state employee, has
worked for most of his career in
a non-civil service position for the Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority. Almost two
years lapsed after his $2,500
contribution was made before
his appointment as an inspector in
the Governor's Highway
Safety Bureau.

His new position is also a non-civil
service

job.

The Bureau is a new agency, about five
years old,
which is entirely financed with federal funds.
When asked
why he made such a large contribution, Diehl
replied that
some of Sargent's people told him the
Governor needed money
for his campaign. 30 With no further infomation
available,

Diehl and Eramo's cases suggest the plausible
explanation
that these men thought their campaign contributions
would
come to the attention of persons with the authority to

decide whether they would receive appointments.
In some cases there was no direct contact with con-

tributors, and the connection between their contributions

and appointments is even more speculative.

It is unlikely

29The governor appoints the chairman and the five
commissioners of the Appellate Tax Board. He also appoints
a chief clerk and five assistant clerks.
The function of
the Board is to hear appeals of property owners throughout
Massachusetts who believe their property has been unfairly
assessed by local officials.

^^Interview with Albert G. Diehl, Boston, 11 June
1974.
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that William Foley, a Boston
schoolteacher, contributed
$3,000 to Sargent's campaign to be
appointed a member of
the Board of Registration of
Chiropractors, a position he
soon thereafter resigned to
accept a similar
appointiaent

with another board of registration. 31

Neither position is

very important.

Efforts to contact Foley for an
explanation, however, were unsuccessful.
It is also unlikely that
George Karelitz, first appointed
Public Administrator
for

Essex County by Governor Volpe in
1966, gave $2,000 in 1970
to insure his reappointment one
year later by Governor Sargent.
This position is also of little importance,
one about
which few citizens, including some lawyers,
know ar.ything.32
A bit more was learned about Karelitz, however,
than Foley.
In 1970 Karelitz was a law partner of Norman
Brisson, who
also gave Sargent $2,000. Brisson was
thereafter appointed
Clerk of the Central District Court of Northern
Essex, a

position attractive to many attorneys.

Moreover, each had

been active in Republican politics, Karelitz as a member of
the Republican State Committee, and Brisson as chairman of

31within Massachusetts state government, there «ire
twenty-seven such boards of registration whose essential
functions are to examine, license, and oversee the practice
of people engaged in a variety of occupations in which the
public has an interest. The typical position is part-time
and pays nominally.
•^^The 30b of a public administrator is to oversee
the execution of the estate of a person who dies without a
will and has no known relatives. For doing this, the Probate Court for the county, which assigns such cases, awards
him a percentage of the estate.
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the city conunittee in Haverhill.33

^ possibility is that

Karelitz's contribution was
related to Brisson's
appointment
(rather than his own), but this
is admittedly speculative.
When the great variety of
motivations for making
campaign contributions are recalled,
the fact that about one
in four of Sargent's top fifty
contributors to his 1970
cam-

paign thereafter received appointments
is put in better perspective. Some information about
the thirty-eight large
givers who did not receive appointments
is
helpful, too, in

providing this perspective.

Some of the thirty-eight non-

appointees were out-of-state residents,
most were Massachusetts businessmen, some were attorneys,
and a few were persons long active in Republican party affairs.
Among
the

seven persons who were residents of other
states was Laurance
(and Mary) Rockefeller of New York City.^^
sargent and

Rockefeller have been friendly for years and share a
deep
interest in the environment. Others were toy
manufacturer
Louis Marx, Jr., of New York City, and Cummins Engine
Com-

pany chief executive officer J. Irwin Miller of Columbus,
Indiana; each gave substantially, not only to Sargent, but
to several candidates in other states.

Particularly inter-

esting because their company "secretly funneled $100,000

33interview with Kelly, 30 July 1973.
^^The same approach was used in gathering information about the thirty-eight non-appointees as was used for
the twelve large contributors who received appointments.
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through dummy committees into the
1972 presidential campaign
of Representative Wilbur D. Mills
(D-Ark.)"35
^^^^^^
Meyerson and W. K. Gayden of Dallas,
executives employed by
a computer company, Electronic Data
Systems, within Massachusetts, among the prominent businessmen
who gave generously to Sargent was Stephen P. Mugar of
Belmont, a Star

Market (supermarket chain) executive.

Mugar had given

earlier to Maurice A. Donahue, who unsuccessfully
sought the
Democratic gubernatorial nomination. Banker
William W. Wolbach of Brookline, President of the Boston
Safe Deposit and
Trust Company also gave. Other Bay State businessmen
who

contributed substantially were chain retailer Saul Liebow
of Sharon, and Charles N. Atwood of Winchester, whose
wife

made an equally large contribution.

Atwood 's firm, the

Atwood and McManus Box Company, has done some business with
the state in recent years.

Two other generous givers were

Andrew J. Abdo of Beverly, a well-to-do owner of real estate
in several North Shore communities,-^^ and Morris Sibulkin,
Jr. of Framingham, a nursing home administrator who was

active in the leadership of the Massachusetts Federation of
•^^Brooks Jackson, "Firm Secretly Gave $100,000 to
Mills Presidential Campaign," Boston Globe 2 August 1974,
,

p. 1.

^^From vendor records made available by the state's
Comptroller, Arthur S. MacKinnon, August 15, 1973.
^^Real estate valuation list for Beverly, Massachusetts, circa 1973.
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Nursing Homes in the mid-1960's,
and who probably has a
financial interest in one or more
nursing homes. 38 sibulkin
gave substantially not only to
Sargent, but to Donald Dwight
(Sargent's running mate), the House
Republican campaign

committee, and Speaker Hartley's Committee
to Re-elect a Democratic House. 39 Among the lawyers
who gave was David B.

Kaplan of Boston, who had difficulty
recalling his $2,000
contribution to Sargent, but maintained that
he neither
wanted, nor got, anything in return. 40

Finally, Sargent's

large contributors included men active in
Republican party
affairs for several years, such as wealthy
Harcourt Wood of
Dedham and P. Loring Reed of Westwood, who together
ran a

very successful fund raiser in 1966 honoring Leverett
Sal tonstall upon his retirem.ent from the U.S. Senate. 41

a variety

of motivations for the giving by the persons just
discussed

suggest themselves.
In conclusion, it seems reasonable that the campaign

contributions made by Sargent's appointees were important.
^^Telephone interview with Or a De Jesus, part-owner,
Meadowville Nursing Home, Lakeville, Massachusetts, 17
August 1973.
39Report8 filed by the Committee to Elect Republican Representatives in 197 1 and the Committee to Re-elect a
Democratic House in 1970 with the Secretary of State's Division of Public Records.

^^Interview with David B. Kaplan, Kaplan, Latti, and
Flannery, Boston, 1 August 1974.

41lnterview with Kelly, 30 July 1973.
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It is not suggested that these
appointments were "bought."
How important the contributions were, and
in what cases, is
really only known by those who participated
in the appoint-

ment decisions.

Most likely, as with the judicial appoint-

ments discussed earlier, factors other than
campaign con-

tributions—but more than just the qualifications of the
appointees— affected those decisions. Prior service to
Sargent in his campaign is one factor which was cited

repeatedly by one writer who dealt with Sargent's patronage
in a recent article. 42

The author returns to his original

assumptions, mentioned earlier in the chapter, in buttressing

his conclusion:

people give because they want something, and

politicians are more likely to be responsive to large contributors.

The fact is, that twelve of Sargent's top fifty

contributors got appointments.

Much, admittedly, is not

known, and many questions remain for others to explore.

Among them is, what rewards

— if

any

—did

the hundreds of

other contributors of $500 or more in 1970 receive?
Patronage Available to Elected State Officials other
than the Governor .

Although the authority to make appoint-

ments in Massachusetts state government resides largely with
the governor, some legislators and other elected officials

within the executive branch have some patronage at their
command.

All of them must periodically finance their

^^Steven Kinzer, "Political Patronage," Metro:
Boston, October, 1971.

186

campaigns, and some of the
contributions they receive are
made by persons who hope for,
or anticipate, appointments
in return for their campaign
contributions, others, already
on the state payroll, give to help
insure that they retain
their jobs, the legality and
propriety of which has been
repeatedly questioned.43 Although
they do not possess the
formal authority to make appointments,
key

legislators-the

House speaker. Senate president, and
committee chairmen,
especially of important committees such
as the House Ways
and Means Committee-are in a strong
position to bargain
with the governor about patronage.
According to Governor
Sargent's former patronage chief, "if the
legislature passes
a bill calling for twenty jobs, you can
expect that
the

legislative leadership will ask for ten of them. "44
secretary of state, treasurer and receiver general,
and the

auditor have some jobs at their disposal, too.

Some brief

commentary about their capacity to reward their campaign
contributors is in order before discussing the financing of
^^The legal question was resolved, although unsatisfactorily to some, with a ruling in 1964 by Attorney General
Edward W. Brooke. He maintained that it was permissible for
a public employee to make a campaign contribution to a c€mdidate's committee, but that it was illegal to give money
directly, or through an intermediary, to the candidate himself.
See Kenneth D. Campbell, "Contribution Conundrums,"
Boston Globe , 14 February 1974, p. 15.

^^Harold J. Greene, quoted in Kinzer, "Political
Patronage .
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Attorney General Robert H. Quinn's
campaign in 1970, and its
connection with the patronage at his
disposal.

The secretary of state administers a
department
which today employs approximately 150
persons who perform
a variety of duties probably unknown
to most of the Commonwealth's citizens. Some of this work is vital,
such as that
done by the Elections Division, whereas other
tasks, such as
arranging State House tours, are relatively less
important. 45

According to Representative Paul H. Guzzi, about fifty
of
the department's employees are patronage appointees
who owe
their jobs to the incumbent Secretary of State, John P.
X.

Davoren, whom Guzzi challenged and defeated in the 1974

Democratic primary.

Since Davoren 's unexpected loss, some

of these persons have approached Guzzi because of their con-

cern about losing their jobs after Davoren steps down in
January, 197 5.

One of Davoren *s key appointees. Deputy

Secretary of State, Archie D. Dickerson, as evasive as Guzzi
was direct, maintained there was far less patronage than

Guzzi claimed.

Dickerson explained that Davoren 's principal

appointees were his five deputies and a few directors of
^^A twelve-page pamphlet, "The Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth: Directory of Services, " published
by Davoren 's office in 1974, provides a readable and up-todate statement of the responsibilities of his office.

46interview with Paul H. Guzzi, Boston,
1974.

27

September
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divisions within Davoren's department. 47

whatever the case,

it was not established how many of
Davoren's patronage
appointees made contributions to his
1970 reelection campaign, but it was determined, as
indicated in Table
11,

that he reported receiving only three
contributions of $500
or more. It is possible, of course,
that his appointees

made smaller contributions, but this is
not known.
The Treasurer and Receiver General of
Massachusetts,

whose campaign finance is discussed at length
later in this
chapter, administered a department in 1970 which
was author-

ized to employ ninety-three persons. 48

Although it is not

known how many of these persons were patronage appointees,
the evidence available about the financing of Treasurer

Crane's 1970 campaign suggests that it is quite unlikely
that more than a few of his ^nployees were large contribu-

tors to his reelection effort.

Crane reported receiving

only ten contributions of $500 or more in 1970, as shown in
Table 11, and seven of them came from members of the banking

47interview with Archie D. Dicker son, Boston, 27
September 1974.
^^Elwyn E. Mariner, This Is Your Massachusetts
Government 6th ed. (Arlington Heights, Mass.: Mariner
Books, 1970), p. 147. This source includes a valuable but
dated description, not only of the treasurer's department,
but of a multitude of other state agencies. See also. The
League of Women Voters of Massachusetts, Massachusetts
State Government , 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MasiTI Harvard University Press, 1970)
,
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con»unlty."

Jobs were by no means the
principal reward at
crane's disposal in 1970, something
which will be made much
Clearer shortly. ^0
The Commonwealth's auditor is
required by statute to
conduct an annual audit of every
agency in state government,
including all public authorities such
as the Massachusetts
Port Authority, as well as the numerous
local housing authorities scattered throughout Massachusetts,
in 1970 the auditor was authorized to employ ninety-seven
persons to accomplish this. 51 How many of them were patronage
appointees is
not known. Today his department employs
more than twice that
number. Of the approximately 220 persons under
his super-

vision, ninety are "temporary" personnel, most of
them

engaged in audits in the field.

Although when employed they

met professional selection criteria established by the
department, these persons are patronage appointees.

p•

The

^^United Press International, "State Bankers Happy,"
3

^^Since 1971, however, the treasurer has served as
chairman of the commission which administers the state lottery. Some of the scores of lottery employees are patronage
appointees, according to Marc Furcolo, Crane's opponent in
the 1974 Democratic primary. See "Democrats in Mass. Treasurer Race Differ on Banking Practices," Boston Sunday Globe
1 September 1974, Sec. A, p. 5.
Contributions irom them is
a possibility in future elections.
,

^^Mariner, p. 147.

^^interview with Bernard G. Murphy, Budget Officer,
Department of the State Auditor, Boston, 27 September 1974.
These "temporary" appointees work full-time, however.
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incumbent auditor, Thaddeus Buczko,
first elected in 1966,
reported spending only $16,257 in
winning a landslide victory in 1970,53 and as shown in Table
11, received no campaign contributions of $500 or more.
Although it is

possible that Buczko received some smaller
contributions
from some of his patronage appointees
in

1970, the small

sum of money required to finance his
campaign, and the

absence of any large contributions, provided
little incentive for the author to inquire further. In a
competitive

campaign in the future, however, the department's
patronage
appointees could be a potential source of contributions
for
the incumbent. Any inquiry about this will have to wait
until 1978 because the Republicans failed to nominate an

opponent for Buczko in 1974.

Campaign Contributions by Attorney General Quinn's

Appointees .

Next to the governor, the only elected state-

wide executive in Massachusetts who had substantial patronage
at his disposal in 1970 (although it was far less, by com-

parison) was Attorney General Robert H. Quinn.

Quinn, a

Democrat, ran for the office in 1970 after having been

elected to that position by the General Court early in 1969.

Republican Elliot L. Richardson, the incumbent, had resigned
to accept a position with the Nixon administration in

53Report filed by the Committee to Re-elect Thaddeus
Buczko State Auditor with the Secretary of State's Division
of Public Records.
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Washington.

Soon after Richardson resigned approximately

one-half of his staff resigned also.

Over the next several

months other Richardson appointees left the attorney
general's office and Quinn proceeded to replace them
with

his

own appointees.

By early 1970, when Quinn began to make

preparations for his campaign, the office of attorney general was largely staffed by his appointees. ^4

if Quinn

failed to be reelected, most of them would lose their jobs.
One way to retain their positions was to make campaign con-

tributions to Quinn.

Most of his professional staff did,

a point which will be elaborated upon shortly.

The attorney general's department employs approxi-

mately 200 individuals, only about 10 per cent of whom are
civil service personnel.

The most important employees in

the department are the assistant attorneys general, whom
the attorney general appoints.

In 1971 there were approxi-

mately seventy-five assistant attorneys general assigned to
the thirteen divisions within the department.

The typical

assistant attorney general works for but a few years in that
^^Interview with Shinberg, 10 August 1973. The
turnover of personnel was not quite so swift, however, as to
impair the department's effectiveness; almost one year after
Quinn succeeded Richardson, fifteen of Richardson's staff
were serving under Quinn, as Shinberg pointed out in a letter
to the author, September 14, 1974.
^^The organization of Quinn 's department after his
election in 1970, including the names of his assistant attorneys general, can be found in A Manual for the Use of the
General Court for 1971-72, pp. 546-548.
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capacity.

Many of them are young men, lawyers
who have yet
to establish substantial practices
or reputations.
The
position does not pay very well; the
compensation, for what
is essentially a full-time job,
is between $10,000-15,000,
less than that of the division chiefs
who are experienced
professionals. 56

According to the campaign finance reports filed
by
the two committees which raised funds for
Quinn's 1970 campaign, at least fifty of his key appointees—
about two out

of three—made campaign contributions.

^7

These contributions

ranged in size from $50 to $1,000, with the average
contri-

bution being approximately $275.

The most common amount

given was $100; there were seventeen such contributions.

Eleven of Quinn's appointees made large contributions, giving
$500 or more.

Table 22 identifies the fifty contributors,

who gave a total of $13,475, a substantial amount of money,
but hardly the amount required to finance his race for

^^Interview with Shinberg, 10 August 1973. The
author wonders how full-time the jobs are. The compensation seems low.
^^Reports filed in 1970 by the Quinn Committee and
The Attorney General Robert H. Quinn Reception Committee with
the Secretary of State's Division of Public Records. Fortyfive of the fifty contributions were given in the names of
the assistant attorneys general. The others, amounting to
$1,225, were given by women who are probably wives of other
assistant attorneys general.
The method employed to determine which assistant
attorneys general made contributions was to compile an alphabetical list of these seventy-odd appointees, memorize the
naunes, and then carefully review Quinn's campaign finance
reports.
Probably a few contributions were missed.
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TABLE 22

CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS TO ATTORNEY GENERAL
ROBERT H. QUINN
IN 1970 FROM HIS ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS
GENERAL AND
OTHER PROFESSIONAL MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF
Contributor

Residence

Amount

Assistants
Joseph J. Hurley
Aaron M. I. Shinberg

Pramingham
Brookline

Administrative Division
Edward L. Schwartzb
Thomas H. Brownell
Paul J. Kilgarriff
William E. Searson III
Dennis M. Sullivam
George Contalonis
Walter Howard Mayo III
Jaunes P. McCarthy
Henry F. O'Connell
Carter Lee
Charles K. Mone^

Weston
Quincy
West Roxbury
Brookline
Hopedale
Woburn
Cambridge
Milton
Winthrop
Quincy
North Easton

325
300
300
200
200
100
100
100
100
50
50

Civil Rights and
Liberties Division
Wayne A. Budd

Peabody

100

Consumer Protection Division
Daniel T. Brosnaham
Laurence R. Buxbaum
Charles M. MacPhee

Canton
Sharon
West Roxbury

500
300
200

Paul Good^^

Reading

100

Criminal Division
John J. Irwin, Jr.
Jolin P. Larkin^
Charles E. Chase
George Foley

Medford
Winchester
Medford
Dorchester

Drug Division
David Vigoda
Robert Y. Murray

Brighton
Boston

$

750
500

C ontracts Division~

1,000
200
100
100

200
100
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TABLE

22— Continued

Contributor

Residence

Amount

Eminent Domain Division
Richard R. Caples
Jaunes J. Haroules
Fred D. Vincent, Jr.
Thomas J. Burke
Samuel R. DeSimone
Herbert Shultz
David A. Leone
Paul E. Ryan
David S. Tobin
John H. O'Neil
Sidney Smookler^

Weston
Brighton
Ipswich
Lawrence
Worcester
Lawrence
Arlington
Rockland
Needham
Fall River
Newton

Employment Security Division
Joel M. Pressman*
Hartley C. Cutter

Chelsea
Chestnut Hill

700
500

Environmental
Protection
~
Pivi8ion
Arthur P. Loughlin
Gregor I. McGregor

Wakefield
Water town

200
100

Industrial Accidents Division
Peter MacDonald
John J. Ward

Quincy
Quincy

Public Charities Division
Eleanor Dwyer
James J. Kelleher

Newton
West Roxbury

200
200

Mansfield
New Bedford
Cambridge
North Andover
Hingham

200
200
100
100
100

600
600
400
300
300

$

2 00

loo
loo
100
50
50

l,

OOO
500

Torts, Claims and Collections

Division
Charles E. Inman
Robert L. Suprenant
W. Channing Beucler
George A. Stella
Christopher Worthington
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TABLE

22— Continued

Contributor
Springfield Office
Richard T. Dolan
Robert W. Coughlin

Residence

Amount

Springfield
Springfield

500
100

fil^d in 1970 by The Quinn Committee
General
Robert H. Quinn Reception Comittee
5?1
Division of Publi; Lco^s
Fofthfco^n?^^^^^
^^^'^"•^ department after
his election
nis
elLtion friQ7^^''^'^^n°"
in 1970, see Commonwealth of Massachusetts
A
and

I^T^IV

his wife!''^^''^^'"'
«
a

surname, probably

*

contribution

of $200 in his
^
wo!f^^«?^^\r'^^
woman with the same surname, probably his wife, own name;
gave $125.

attorney general.

Quinn' s 1970 campaign cost in excess of

$200,000, and the contributions from his professional staff

accounted for only about
expenditures.

6

per cent of his total reported

Nor was most of the money from his appointees

contributed early in his campaign; more Uian $9,000 of it
was received in October, 1970.^8

Although it is clear that

^<^Two $50-per-person affairs held in April and
October of 1970 helped to finance Quinn' s campaign. The
first took place at Anthony's Pier 4, the second at the Harvard Club. Each was attended by several hundred people.
Interview with Shinberg, 10 August 1973. The contributions
from most of Quinn 's appointees were received in either April
or October according to the reports filed by The Quinn Committee and The Attorney General Robert H. Quinn Reception
Committee with the Secretary of State's Division of Public
Records.
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one source of funds tapped by Quinn
to help finance his
campaign was his assistant attorneys
general, all of whom
serve at his pleasure, what is not
known is why they made
contributions, and to what extent their
contributions influenced Quinn -s decisions to retain them.
Quinn 's department
has undergone some turnover and
reorganization since the
1970 election, but about four out of five of
his appointees

who made contributions to his can^aign were
still working
for him three years later, including ten of
the eleven
appointees who gave $500 or more. 59 ^any of those
who did
not contribute were still with Quinn, too, which
is evidence
that a financial contribution in 1970 was not a
condition for

continued employment, although Quinn was probably aware of

who gave, and how much.

The most plausible explanation for

the contributions which were made is that Quinn 's appointees

wanted to retain their jobs; one way to insure this was to
help elect Quinn. ^0

There are, of course, other possibili-

ties.

^^The organization of Quinn 's department about three
years after the 1970 election is found in Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, i\ Manua l for the Use of the General Court for
1973-76 , pp. 556-358.

attempt was made to determine the amounts given
by the nonprof es3ional members of Quinn *s department, but it
is likely that scane of them made campaign contributions,
also, since the vast majority of them are non-civil service
personnel
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Rewards fo r Contributions: Acc ess
to
Legislators and AdminiatrafT^

The previous discussions about appointments
demonstrate that elected statewide executives
such as the attorney
general, but especially the governor, have
considerable
job

patronage at their disposal.

Although some key legislators

have an influential voice in dispensing some
jobs, the average lawmaker is not in a position to reward
campaign con-

tributors with appointments.
after by many.

His vote, however, is sought

To influence his vote, direct access to a

legislator or members of his staff is extremely helpful, if

not essential.

There are many voices clamoring for atten-

tion in the legislative arena, and one must be heard to be
heeded.

To accomplish this,

lobbyists are employed on Beacon

Hill by a great variety of interest groups.

Among the scores of interest groups employing lobbyists are the Savings Bank Association of Massachusetts,

which has retained the services of William F. Malloy for
several years, and the Massachusetts State Auto Dealers,

whose lobbyist in 1970 was Bruce

D.

Kinlin.

The campaign

contributions by these men in 1970 provide the basis for two
brief case studies in legislative access.

The author's

attention was first drawn to Malloy after he was singled out
by the Massachusetts branch of Common Cause when that organ-

ization mounted its campaign in 1972 to strengthen the
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state's law regulating the disclosure
of money spent by
lobbyists. Kinlin, less well known on
Beacon Hill than
Malloy, came to the author's attention
rather accidentally
at first. Kinlin '8 name, first noticed
on a list of campaign contributors of $500 or more in
1970, was later cited
by a State House reporter as a lobbyist,
like Malloy, who
had made numerous contributions to legislators
in
1972.

Although both Malloy and Kinlin, on occasion, have
reason
to deal with the executive branch, their work
involves them

primarily with legislators.

A third case study, dealing with campaign contributions by numerous bankers in Massachusetts to the state's
treasurer, Robert Q. Crane, was chosen to illustrate access
to administrators who, like legislators, have rewards to

dispense.

In Treasurer Crane's case, he has the authority

to decide in which banks state funds will be deposited.

The author is again indebted to State House newsmen, especi-

ally UPI reporter Walter F. Roche, Jr., whose inquiries disclosed that Crane's administration of state monies was con-

nected with campaign contributions received by him from
bankers.

Malloy will be discussed first, and then Kinlin,

to illustrate access to legislators.

Crane will be treated

last, to illustrate access to administrators.

^^Howard White, "Many Legislators Don't File: Funds
from Lobbyists Go Unreported," Boston Globe , 29 December
1972, p. 40.
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Access to Legislators;

Lob byist William F. Malloy .

Perhaps the best measure for evaluating
the effectiveness of
a lobbyist before the state
legislature is the compensation
which he receives from the clients whose
interests he represents.
To the extent this is true. Attorney
William
F.

Malloy, who has represented a variety of
clients for the

past twenty-three years on Beacon Hill, is
currently one of
the most effective lobbyists.
In a report filed with the
secretary of state in compliance with the statute
regulating
the activities of lobbyists, Malloy reported
receiving in

excess of $30,000 in 1971 from four clients in return
for
his efforts in protecting and advancing their interests.

Malloy reported receiving $10,763 from the Savings Bank
Association of Massachusetts, $16,000 from the Massachusetts
Port Authority, $2,000 from the Massachusetts State Police
Association, and $1,500 from the Massachusetts Fire Chiefs

Association.

Malloy has been registered for years at the State

House both as a legislative agent and legislative counsel.
^^Kenneth D. Campbell, "Citizens' Group Moves to
Curb Lobbyists; Cites Malloy 's Campaign Gifts; Malloy'
$1050 Aided Six on Bank Panel," Boston Globe 16 February
1972, p. 1. What follows relies heavily upon Campbell's
report about the findings by Common Cause/Massachusetts which
had made inquiries into Malloy 's campaign contributions.
,

^

-^Malloy no longer represents the Fire Chiefs but he
is still retained by the MPA, the State Police, and the
Savings Banks, clients he has served for several years. In
1973, he claimed, his compensation exceeded $40,000.
Interview with William F. Malloy, Boston, 11 June 1974.

As a legislative agent he was
entitled to represent his
clients to any of the 280

legislators individually; as a
legislative counsel he could
appear before legislative

coimaittees at public hearings
to testify on his clients'
behalf .64 Because Malloy has
multiple clients, his work

involves appearing before several
committees and dealing
individually with numerous legislators.
For example, as
the legislative counsel for the
Savings Bank Association

of

Massachusetts, he must deal with the
legislature's joint
Committee on Banks and Banking; when
he represents the
Massachusetts Port Authority, he must deal
with the legislature's joint Committee on Transportation;
and when he
represents the Massachusetts State Police
Association, he

must appear before the legislature's joint
Committee on
Public Safety. Malloy also has occasion to
appear before
the House Ways and Means Committee when any
legislation

is

under consideration that involves the expenditure
of state
funds.
In 1970 William F. Malloy made at least fourteen

campaign contributions totaling §2,900 (See Table 23).
^^Chapter 981 of the Acts of 1973 eliminated the dis
tinction between a legislative agent and counsel. Any regis
tered lobbyist today may deal with legislators individually
and testify before committees.

"^Malloy said he used his own money for the contributions, a plausible claim in view of his substantial compensation.
Interview with Malloy, 11 June 1974.
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These contributions ranged in size
from $50 to $500, the
most common contribution being $100.
Most of these contributions went to incumbent legislators
in the House of Representatives. Twelve lawmakers, ten
representatives
and two

senators, received contributions from
Malloy.

All but one,

Representative Theodore M. Herman (Democrat-Worcester)
reelected.

,

were

All but one of these men were Democrats, a
not

surprising fact since both houses of the
legislature were
under Democratic control. The eleven lawmakers
who were

successful in their reelection efforts were members of
either
the House Ways and Means Committee or one of the
following
joint legislative committees:

Banks and Banking, Transpor-

tation, Commerce and Labor, and Insurance.

ents were four committee chairmen:

Among the recipi-

the House and Senate

chairmen of the joint Committee on Banks and Banking, the

House chairman of the joint Committee on Commerce and Labor,
and the House chairman of the joint Committee on Insurance.
Malloy'

s

contributions to the four chairmen were with one

exception, larger than those made to rank-and-file legislators.

In addition to his contributions to lawmakers,

Malloy gave $500 toward the reelection campaign of incumbent
Attorney General Robert H. Quinn, a Democrat who had served
as House Speaker in the late 1960 's.

He also gave substan-

tially to Representative David A. Bartley's Committee to

Re-elect a Democratic House in 1970.

The funds of this
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committee are administered by Speaker
Hartley, the most
powerful man in the House of
Representatives.

Although Malloy made contributions to
members of
several legislative committees, the
most obvious fact is
that most of his contributions were
made to six members of
one of them— the joint Committee on Banks
and Banking. The
committee's House chairman. Representative
William A. Connell, Jr., received $500, and its Senate
chairman. Senator
Irving Fishraan, received $100. Senator Fred
Lamson, the

only Republican to receive a contribution from
Malloy, got
$200.

Representative Antone S. Aguiar, Jr. and Joseph J.

Semensi each received $100; and Representative Albert
L.

Nash got $50.
None of the contributions made by Malloy were in any
way illegal, although some observers have questioned their
propriety.

A Boston Globe editorial went so far as to

describe the relationship as "politically incestuous. "^^
There was no statute on the books in 1970 which prohibited
a lobbyist from making campaign contributions to any candi-

date for public office in Massachusetts; nor is there one
today.

In 1970 a lobbyist, like any other citizen, was

subject simply to the limitation that he could not give more
than $3,000 in any calendar year toward the campaign of any
^^"All Very Legal and Wrong," Boston Globe , Editorial, 17 February 1972, p. 24.
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one candidate.

Today that limitation is $1,000.^7

^or was

there any provision in the law in 1970
which applied to
state legislators, or any other elected
public officials,
which prohibited them from accepting campaign
contributions
from lobbyists.
In the early 1970 's, however, pressures
mounted to regulate the expenditure of money by
lobbyists.
In 1973, the campaign finance legislation
enacted included
a provision intended to eliminate any abuse of
the testi-

monial dinner.

Until this legislation became effective

in 1974, the money expended by lobbyists for the purchase
of testimonial dinner tickets did not have to be reported

by the recipient if, at that time, he was not a declared
candidate for political office.

In addition, legislation

was enacted in 1973 which requires all lobbyists to report

expenditures which exceed $35 in any day.^^
It is difficult to believe that contributions of

the size made by Malloy had a significant influence upon

the votes of most legislators who received them.

was $500.

The largest

These contributions were undoubtedly welcomed

^^Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973, effective
January 1, 1974, reduced the maximum contribution permissible.
^^Ibid.
Chapter V.

This provision is further discussed in

^Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves (1973),
Chapter 981 became effective on January 1, 1974.

c. 981.
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because they helped to meet the costs
of their campaigns.
It is interesting to note, however,
that tour

of the law-

makers to whom Malloy made campaign
contributions (Senator
Lamson, and Representatives Scalli,
Guilmette, and
Dever)

were unopposed in their 1970 election
campaigns.

At the

least, the contributions made by Malloy
helped to maintain

friendly relations and to facilitate access
to members of
the legislature with whom he must deal. It
seems likely
that a legislator would be more apt to give his
attention
to a friendly contributor than to the representative
of a

group who had made no contribution.

Access, therefore, is

the most plausible explanation for Malloy 's campaign contri-

butions .

Access for the Auto Dealers;
Kinlin .

Lobbyist Bruce D.

Not all of the interest groups on Beacon Hill which

require access to public officials are as ably represented
as those groups for which William Malloy serves as a legislative agent.

The Massachusetts State Auto Dealers, which

represents more than 90 per cent of those individuals who
have franchises to sell new cars in Massachusetts, is prob-

ably one association whose interests are as well represented.
This association is peurticularly affected by decisions made
by the legislature's Committee on Public Safety, the Consumer

Protection Division of the Attorney General's office, and
the Title Division of the Registry of Motor Vehicles.

The
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rule-making and enforcement decisions by these
public
officials in matters such as automobile financing

and auto-

mobile safety are of great concern to the membership
of the
"^0
association.
In 1970, two officials of the Massachusetts State

Auto Dealers, Bruce D. Kinlin and William D. Plunkett,
made
substantial campaign contributions to protect and advance
the interests of the membership of their association.
Kinlin, then the association's executive vice president

— who

also served as its legislative agent and counsel— gave
$7,800.

Plunkett, the association's president, gave $1,500.

A breakdown of their campaign contributions, which totaled
at least $9,300, follows:

Kinlin
Committee to Re-elect a Democratic House
in 1970 ($500 given in his wife's name)
Representative Fred F. Cain (Democrat-Wilmington)
Governor Francis W. Sargent
Attorney General Robert H. Quinn
Total
Plunkett

$3,500
2,800
1,000
500
$7,800

Governor Francis W. Sargent
Attorney General Robert H. Quinn

$1,000
500

Total

$1,500

^*^Interview with Bruce D. Kinlin, Executive Vice
President, Massachusetts State Auto Dealers, Boston,
23 August 1973.
•

^ ^Alexander

They may have
and Fisher, CRF Listing
given more to individual legislators, for example in
aunounts less than $500.

—

.

—
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Together, Kinlin and Plunkett gave
$6,300 to support
Democratic legislative candidates,
$2,000 toward Governor
Sargent's campaign, and $1,000 to
Attorney General Quinn.
The $3,500 contributed by Kinlin to
Speaker Bartley's Committee to Re-elect a Democratic
House was thereafter allocated to several legislative
candidates, whereas
the $2,800 given directly to Representative
Cain ($800 for
the primary and $2,000 for the November
election) was

intended specifically for his campaign.

These contributions

by Kinlin to Cain are particularly interesting
because it
was most uncommon in 1970 for a legislative candidate
to

receive so much money from one contributor.

provided an explanation. "'2

Kinlin readily

^^in is a past president of the

Massachusetts State Auto Dealers and owns an automobile
dealership in Wilmington, Massachusetts.

As a member of

the powerful House Ways and Means Committee in 1970 he was

in a position to be helpful to Kinlin.

Moreover, although

Kinlin could appear before legislative committees and
approach

ciny

representative or senator to represent his

group's position, as a lobbyist he was not allowed on the

House and Senate floors.
latxire,

Cain, Kinlin 's man in the legis-

could be particularly helpful at times because of

this.

Interview with Kinlin, 23 August 1973.
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Even though the campaign contributions
made by Kinlin
and Plunkett were reported in their
names, it is questionable
whether Kinlin used his personal funds.
Most auto dealerships in Massachusetts are incorporated,
and the campaign
finance statute, effective in 1970,
prohibited corporate
contributions. The owner or employees of an
automobile
dealer could give, and an association
could also give. Contributions, however, were supposed to be reported
in the name
of the true giver. Kinlin declined to say
whether the money
contributed in his name was his, but promised an
answer after
he consulted with his legal counsel. 73

One possibility is

that his contributions were from funds made available
to him

by the Massachusetts State Auto Dealers.

Whatever the case,

the fact is that two officials of an interest group clearly

affected by decisions of the legislature, the Registry of

Motor Vehicles, and the Attorney General's office made substantial contributions in 1970 to protect and advance their

association's interests.

The contributions made by Kinlin

were explicitly acknowledged by him as one way of facilitating access to these officials.

Lobbyists such as Kinlin are not the only persons,
of course, who seek access.

Nor are legislators, as Kinlin 's

activities remind us, the only public officials with rewards
73

Ibid.
Kinlin thereafter did not contact the
author, nor the reverse. Plunkett was not interviewed.

'^Ibid.

210

at their disposal for campaign contributors.

Access to

elected officials, in addition to the governor
and attorney
general, can be valuable, too. The following
discussion of
the financing of the 197 0 campaign of the
Commonwealth's

incumbent treasurer and receiver general, Robert
Q. Crane,
is a case in point.

Access to Administrators;
Crane

.

The Bankers and Treasurer

The office of treasurer and received general in

Massachusetts is considered one of the minor statewide
offices, and the incumbent is probably unknown to many of
the citizens in the Commonwealth.

The treasurer has author-

ity, however, over the placement of state monies, which is

the basis for considerable political influence and provides
a "natural" campaign finance constituency, the banking com-

munity.^^

"Deposits are the name of the game" and the halls

of the State House are, at times, "lined with bankers who
are looking for deposits," according to Deputy Treasurer

Donald P. Frary.^^

The treasurer is responsible for the

deposit of state funds in banks across the Commonwealth.

Most of this money is deposited in checking accounts, but
75

United Press International, "State Bankers Happy,"
"Crane Spreads State's $20M [$30M]
Among Friends' Banks," Boston Herald American 11 July 1973,
Two investigative reporters, Walter F. Roche, Jr. and
p. 3.
Richard M. Gaines, interviewed in Boston on July 25, 1973,
wrote these articles, which were relied upon heavily for
information subsequently presented.
p. 3.

See, also, UPI,

,

^^UPI,

"State Bankers Happy," p. 3.
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approximately $30 million of state
revenue is deposited in
short-term interest bearing accounts.
And recently, when
Massachusetts enacted a law establishing
a state lottery,
this activity was placed under
the general direction of the
treasurer, who now also oversees
deposits of lottery revenue
in non-interest bearing accounts
throughout the state. 77

In

addition to deciding which banks will
receive deposits of
state revenue and lottery funds, the
treasurer is a member
of the Board of Bank Incorporators.
It is within the authority of this three-man board, consisting
of the treasurer, tax
commissioner, and banking commissioner, to
decide whether new
banks will be incorporated to do business in
Massachusetts;
the board also approves the establishment of
branches of

existing banks within the state.

Bankers Happy," and "Crane Spreads
e*.
ll^^^'r/^^^^
State's
$20M
[$30M]," 11 July 1973, p. 3.
In mid-1973 the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts maintained checking accounts
which ranged from $25 to $100 million weekly in the following
five banks:
State Street Bank and Trust Company, First
National Bank of Boston, New England Merchants National Bank,
City Bank and Trust Company of Boston, and the Boston Five
Cent Savings Bank. A substantial portion of the $30 million
in state revenue which was deposited in interest bearing
accounts was held by nine banks across Massachusetts: The
Newton-Waltham Trust Company had $1.8 million; The Garden
City Trust Company of Newton had $746,000; The Century Bank
and Trust Company had $540,000; The First National Bank of
Maiden had $500,000, as did The Commonwealth Bank and Trust
Company of Boston and the Capitol Bank and Trust Company;
The Liberty Bank and Trust Company had $450,000; and the New
Boston Bank and Trust Company had $400,000. The four largest
lottery accounts were held by the Newton-Waltham Trust Company which had $166,272; The First National Bank of New Bedford had $102,530; The Valley Bank and Trust Company had
$187,000; and the First National Bank of Boston had $188,776.
4.

.
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The incumbent treasurer and receiver general,

Robert Q. Crane of Wellesley, was most recently
elected
for a four-year term in November, 1970.

state representative, first

beca-^ne

Crane, a former

treasurer in 1964, when

he was elected to that position by members of
the General
Court to fill a vacancy created by the appointment
of the
incumbent, John T. Driscoll, to the Massachusetts
Turnpike

Authority.

Crane was subsequently elected by the voters in

1966 for a four-year term, and reelected in 1970.

In 1971

he was chosen to serve briefly as chairman of the Democratic

State Committee, a post he resigned when he assumed respon-

sibility for the state lottery.
In Crane's most recent election in 1970 he was

opposed by an unknown Republican, Frederick D. Hannon of
Westwood, whom he defeated easily by better than a two- to-one
margin.

In that campaign, Crane reported spending $37,508,

of which only $17,631 was raised that year.

The balance came

from the proceeds of a 1966 testimonial, the Robert Q. Crane

Friendship Dinner, which was held to celebrate his fortieth
birthday.

At this $50-per-person affair, approximately

$70,000 was raised for Crane's campaign war chest.

During

the 1970 campaign, $41,330 was transferred from Crane's

testimonial dinner account, but less than one-half of this

was required for the campaign

.

His committee reported a

balance on hand after the election of $19,675.

Unfor-

tunately, Crane maintains he did not keep a record of those
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individuals who purchased tickets to
his 1966 friendship
dinner, a claim which is very hard
to believe.
Politicians
who expect to campaign again and again,
as Crane has done,
are most unlikely to be so careless
with such an important
record.
(Crane had no legal obligation to reveal
his contributors' names.)
Sources close to the banking community,
however, have stated that a number of bankers
received

tickets through the mail at their offices, and
many purchased
tickets to that affair. "^^
Of the $17,631 reported raised by Crane in 1970, more

than one-half came from officials of Massachusetts banks,
in

most cases banks in which state revenues are presently
deposited.

Thirty-eight campaign contributions, ranging in

size from $50 to $2,000 and amounting to $9,620, were

received from officials of banks which handle state funds. "^^
Five of the largest contributions came from officials of the

New Boston Bank and Trust Company, a small bank with
approximately $10 million in assets, which was allowed by
the Board of Bank Incorporators (of which Crane is a member)
to commence business on April

8,

1969.

Less than a year

later, on February 17, 1970, Treasurer Crane authorized a

deposit of $400, 000 in that bank.
"^^UPI,

79
"^Ibid.

In the 1970 campaign,

"State Bankers Happy," p. 3.

The names of these persons, their banks,
and the size of their contributions are listed in the
article.
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Crane received $4,400 in campaign
contributions from
officials of the New Boston Bank.^^
It would be erroneous to cite campaign
contributions

as the only explanation for Crane's decisions
regarding the
deposit of state funds, and his other actions as
treasurer.

Crane has a number of friends and political cronies
in the

banking business, and the banks with which they are con-

nected have prospered from Crane's decisions.

For example,

his predecessor as treasurer, John T. Driscoll, became a

director of the Newton -Walt ham Trust Company.

In mid-1973

the Newton-Waltham Trust Company had more than $2 million
in state revenue, and more than $166,000 in lottery funds,

on deposit.

Another example is the Century Bank and Trust

Company of Somerville, where former state Senator Philibert L. Pellegrini (Democrat-Arlington) is a director.
Pellegrini, a former chairman of the legislature's Committee

on Banks and Banking, serves also as a director of the Central Cooperative Bank of Somerville.

In mid-1973 the Century

Bank and Trust Company had $540,000 in state funds on deposit
in an interest bearing account, and the Central Cooperative

Bank,

$80,000.

°"Ibid. Michael Cyker, a bank director, contributed
Louis D. DiGiovanni, a director, $400; James S.
Hekimian, a director, $500; Allen Jacobs, a director and
former clerk of the bank, $2,000; and Louis G. Pollock, a
director and former president of the bank, $1,000.
$500;

"Crane Spreads State's $20M ($30]," p. 3. The
eurticle provides additional examples besides the ones subsequently discussed.
®^UPI,
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Crane's relationship with the Coolidge
Bank and
Trust company of Watertown has also
provoked considerable
criticism. 82 until he quit in mid-1973.
Crane was employed
part-time for many years as a sales
consultant by the Newton
Poods Company, one of many firms controlled
by Pood Enterprises, Inc. of Canton, Massachusetts.
The head of Pood
Enterprises is Eugene Merkert, a director of
the Coolidge
Bank, in which $260,000 in state revenue and
$65,000 in
lottery funds was then deposited.

What remains of the

$70,000 raised at Crane's 1966 friendship dinner is also

deposited in the Coolidge Bank.

Crane's connection with

Eugene Merkert and the Coolidge Bank is even more involved.

A co-director with Merkert at the Coolidge Bank is Bartholomew W. Cosentino, whose son, Ronald H. Cosentino, gave
$500 to Crane's 1970 campaign.

Another son, Kenneth, is a

director of the Century Bank and Trust Company of Somerville, previously mentioned.

Crane's critics have charged

that his employment with Newton Poods and his relationship

with the Coolidge Bank in his role as treasurer constituted
a conflict of interest.

Crane's resignation from Newton

Foods quieted his critics somewhat. 83
82ibid.
83

Ken 0. Botwright, "Pirm's Cslt Returned by Crane,"
Boston Globe 21 August 1973, p. 3. Crane stated that on
three occasions since 1964 he had been advised by the
attorney general's office that his association with Newton
Foods was "entirely legal and proper."
,
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In conclusion, it has been
shown that Crane's
decisions as treasurer, in some
instances, have very likely

been influenced by various
considerations-campaign contributions, political ties and
friendships, and his former
employment with Newton Poods. The
importance of campaign
contributions in most of his other
decisions,
however, is

less than clear.

Prom the perspective of a banker
inter-

ested in a deposit of state monies,
for example, a campaign
contribution is probably perceived as
one way of establishing or maintaining friendly relations,
thereby facilitating
access, what is quite clear is that
no matter who occupies
the office, the banking community is a
potential source of
contributions.
constituency.

It is, in fact, a "natural" campaign finance

Crane's 1966 testimonial dinner and the

financing of his 1970 reelection campaign
demonstrate this.
During his 1974 campaign, however. Crane announced
he would

accept no contributions from bankers or bank directors,
a

position no doubt taken because of the unfavorable publicity
he has received in recent years. ^4

challenged in the Demo-

cratic primary, he narrowly escaped defeat.

Summary and Conclusions

Because this chapter has necessarily been limited to
examining only two rewards for campaign contributions, jobs
®^ "Democrats

Globe, p. 5.

in Mass. Treasurer Race," Boston Sunday
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and access, the reader is reminded
that they represent only
some of the ways by which public
officials can be responsive
to their campaign contributors.
One vitally important
reward, contracts, was not explored
at all. Two others,
favorable legislative and administrative
decisions, were
touched upon only briefly, and somewhat
indirectly, when
access was examined. The reader is reminded,
too, of the
varied motivations contributors can have for
giving money,

other than seeking such tangible rewards as
jobs and contracts. And finally, he is reminded of the
difficulties
inherent in establishing any conclusive connection
between

campaign contributions and rewards.

Nonetheless, two

rewards, jobs and access, were discussed at some length

particularly patronage— and some final comments about each
are appropriate.

There is a lot of patronage in state government in

Massachusetts, and an incumbent governor controls most of it.

No other elected statewide executive, by comparison, has
much to dispense, although all of them have some.
the attorney general has the most.

Of them,

Key legislative leaders,

apart from appointing legislative employees (which was not
explored)

,

are in a position to bargain and share in some of

the patronage available to the elected executives, especially
the governor.

The patronage available to members of the

Governor's Council is slight, despite their legal authority
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to confirm judicial appointments
of the governor,

it was

not, however, always that way.

More specifically, it was established
that since
Governor Sargent assumed office in
1969 he has made a record
number of appointments to the state
judiciary, and that
twenty-two of his first 150 appointees
made substantial contributions to his 1970 campaign. Although
it is a matter of
judgment, based upon incomplete information,
the conclusion
reached was that in some of the cases
involving large contributions the appointment decisions were
probably influenced by these contributions.

The charge of some of Sar-

gent's critics, that many lawyers "bought" their
positions
on the bench, is rejected. His special justice
appointments
are somewhat more vulnerable, however, to this
charge. A
similar conclusion was reached about nine other
appointments
to the executive branch made by Sargent which involved
his

fifty largest campaign contributors in 1970 (twelve of them

received appointments, but three were named judges)

Because so few large contributions were given to

most other elected statewide officials, their patronage,
with the exception of the Attorney General's, was not
examined.

In Attorney General Quinn's case, it was estab-

lished that two out of three of his assistant attorneys

general made contributions to his campaign, eleven of them
giving substantially.

In these instances, it was concluded
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that they gave to help elect
Quinn, thereby insuring their
jobs, although their contributions
were probably a minor
factor in Quinn's decisions to
retain them. Much is simply
not known, however, which could
establish these claims more
conclusively. An additional comment
about the attorney
general, not previously mentioned, is
worthy of note. The
authority of his office is great, and
the incumbent, like
all law enforcement officials, is in a
position to be
selective about what laws he enforces, and
how vigorously
he enforces them. The chief reward which
an attorney general has at his disposal is not his patronage,
but the

selective exercise of his administrative discretion.
The three case studies discussed in the latter half
of the chapter were chosen to illustrate access
to legisla-

tors and administrators, and its connection with campaign

contributions.

In the first two, it was shown that lobby-

ists Malloy and Kinlin each made numerous contributions in

1970 to elected officials with whom they had reason to

maintain friendly relations, thereby facilitating access.
Kinlin explicitly acknowledged that access was his reason
for giving.

In Malloy' s case, his contributions were given

mostly to chairmen and members of legislative committees
who dealt with matters of concern to his clients.

Kinlin 's

contributions were larger than Malloy 's, and he chose to

make fewer, giving most of his money to House Speaker
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Hartley's campaign committee, and to
a representative who
was a former president of the Auto
Dealers. Each gave to
elected executives, also, suggesting the
concern of
their

clients with administrative actions as
well as legislative
decisions. The third case, involving campaign
contributions
by numerous bankers to the reelection campaign
of Treasurer
Crane, illustrates even more clearly the
importance of access
to administrators by persons whose interests
are affected by

administrative decisions.
or hurt bankers.

Crane has the authority to help

The conclusion reached in this case was

that campaign contributions did not "buy" favorable decisions

—although

be an exception

the case of the New Boston Bank appears to

—but

were perceived as useful by the con-

tributors in maintaining friendly relations, thus facilitating access.
In conclusion, enough evidence was advanced to sup-

port the judgment that "money talks" in Massachusetts politics.

Politicians are responsive to those who support their

ceunpaigns financially.

gain access.

Some contributors get jobs, others

Whatever the reward, an important question

which remains is:

Is the pxiblic good served?

Elected offi-

cials do incur some obligation to their contributors,

especially the larger givers, and when they have an opportunity, they reward those persons.

With these thoughts in

mind, we now are in a position to explore what the response
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has been i„ the Bay State to
this question since 1970,
and
to speculate about what the
imediate future holds for the
financing of political campaigns
in Massachusetts.

CHAPTER

V

THE BAY STATE RESPONDS:

CAMPAIGN

FINANCE REFORM SINCE 1970
In 1971 no legislation amending the state's campaign

finance law was enacted.

In 1972 a major bill, which would

have provided for fuller disclosure of contributions and

closed the testimonial dinner loophole, died in the Senate
after winning approval in the lower house (the "Truth in

Politics Act").

Just before the General Court prorogued in

that year, however, it gave its approval to other legisla-

tion which placed limits upon most media expenditures by
all candidates for state office (Chapter 810 of the Acts of
1972)

.

In 1973 the proponents of change prevailed again

when even more comprehensive legislation, promising not only
fuller disclosure but more effective enforcement, was enacted
(Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973)

.

The pressures for reform

continued, nonetheless, and on November

5,

1974, the elec-

torate enacted a substantial revision to the campaign finance
law when they approved an initiative petition which appeared

on the ballot as Question

5

(the Quinlan petition)

•

Earlier

in that same year, a public subsidy proposal was seriously

considered, but rejected, by both houses of the General Court
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(the Bartley-Guzzi bill)

Each of these five actions
merits
further attention and will now
be discussed, beginning with
the ill.fated legislation in
1972 which was intended to
insure fuller disclosure.
.

The "Truth in Politics Act"

On April 19, 1972 the legislature's
joint Conunittee
on State Administration, under
the leadership of Representative John J. McGlynn (Democrat-Medford)
and Senator George G.
Mendonca (Democrat-New Bedford), favorably
reported
5709^
H.

to the House of Representatives.

McGlynn maintained that

the strength of this campaign finance
legislation, which he
referred to as the "Truth in Politics Act, " was
its defini-

tions of "candidate" and "political contribution. "2

Under

these new statutory definitions any person holding
public

office was deemed a candidate, and any non-office
holding

citizen who was the beneficiary of a fund-raising
event

would automatically became a candidate unless he filed an
official disclaimer with the secretary of state within
thirty days after the fund-raising event.

Contributions

were defined to include cash contributions, loans, the

deposit of money, and the transfer of funds between political committees.

Contracts, promises, and agreements of

^For the text of H. 5709, see Massachusetts, Massachusetts Legislative Documents , House , 1972.

2press release by the Committee on State Administration, April 19, 1972.
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campaign support in money or
services (even if they were
verbal and not legally enforceable)
the granting of discounts or rebates beyond those
available to the general
public, the cancellation of
indebtedness, and the loan of
personnel were also considered
campaign contributions.
,

Insofar as the sale of tickets to
fund-raising events was
concerned, the legislation sponsored
by McGlynn's committee
required the reporting of the purchase
of any ticket costing
in excess of $10, as well as the
purchase of tickets which
exceeded $10 in the aggregate. It
also required the reporting of the purchase of any ticket
for goods or services when
the cost was disproportionate to
the value of the goods or
services received.^

...

McGlynn's bill was in his estimation "a tough
bill
but a workable bill." The bill assumed the
continued

use of testimonial dinners as a means of
raising campaign

funds and that alternate means of financing
campaigns, such
as state or federal subsidies, were most unlikely.
Because
of the proposed definitions of "candidate" and
"political

contribution," and the requirement of full disclosure of all

contributions received by every candidate in mandatory

reports to the secretary of state under penalty of a year's
imprisonment or a $1,000 fine, the bill's proponents

believed that all interested persons would be in a position
to know who gave what to whom.^

3lbid.

^Ibid.
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On the very day McGlynn's
bill was reported out of
coznmittee (April 19)
Governor Francis W. Sargent
,
responded
to a letter from Senator
Mendonca, who had earlier
invited
Sargent to appear before the
Committee on State Administration to present his ideas
concerning the reform of campaign
financing in Massachusetts. 5
his reply to Mendonca,
Sargent requested that the committee
schedule a public hearing at which time he would
willingly set forth his pro-

m

posals.

The hearing was never held, however,
because on
the very day he wrote Mendonca,
Sargent addressed the citizens of the commonwealth on
statewide radio and television,
expressing his concern about campaign
finance and presenting
his proposals to "allay" suspicion
and to restore "confidence" in government.
In his address the Governor suggested
that the state's campaign finance statute
should be modified
to accomplish the following purposes:
(1) to limit media
6

expenditures by statewide candidates,

(2)

to prohibit lobby-

ists and most public employees from making campaign
contributions,

(3)

to limit individual contributions to any candi-

date's campaign to $500 annually,

(4)

to provide for more

complete disclosure of contributions and expenditures, and
^Letter from Mendonca to Sargent, April
"Sargent Press Kit," April 19, 1972,

6,

1972,

^Letter from Sargent to Mendonca, April 19, 1972,
"Sargent Press Kit."
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(5) to establish a campaign finance
commission to enforce
the law more effectively.*^

One week after the Governor's
proposals, former
Representative Michael S. Dukakis appeared
before the joint
committee on State Administration and
reacted to them. On
the whole, Dukakis* response was
very critical. He maintained that the proposed limits on media
spending by statewide candidates were much too high.
He pointed out that the
Governor's proposal to prohibit state,
county, and municipal

employees— including judges and clerks— from
contributing to
political campaigns had been the law for over
eighty years.
He observed that the Governor had been conspicuously

silent

about the solicitation of contributions by state
officials
for political purposes (a major fund-raising event
was

planned for May 21, 1972 under the chairmanship of Albert
P.
"Toots" Manzi, a Sargent appointee to the Massachusetts

Turnpike Authority)

.

Finally, Dukakis faulted Sargent for

saying nothing about contributions by people who did business with the state, or by officials of enterprises regu-

lated by the state.

Dukakis made five suggestions to the Committee on
State Administration:

first, that lower limits be placed

^For the text of this address, see "Sargent Press

Kit/'
®Press release by Michael S. Dukakis, April 26,
1972.
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on expenditures in campaigns for
statewide offices than
those proposed by the Governor;
second, that existing state
law, which Dukakis argued
prohibited state employees from
making contributions, be observed by
candidates and enforced
by state prosecutors; third, that
the problem of contributions from individuals associated with
firms doing business
with, or regulated by the state, be
attacked; fourth, that
Sargent's expressed intent to broaden the
base of campaign
contributions be facilitated by allowing a taxpayer
to contribute $1 of his state income tax to the
political party of
his choice; and fifth, that the Governor cease
his "off
season" fund raising as being neither necessary
nor desirable. ^

Dukakis maintained that if Sargent was serious about

restoring "confidence" and allaying "suspicion," he should
cancel the major fund-raising event scheduled for May 21,
1972, wind up The Sargent Committee at the earliest possible
time, and distribute its remaining funds to an appropriate

charity.

Sargent heeded none of Dukakis' suggestions.

The "Truth in Politics Act" recommended by the Com-

mittee on State Administration was essentially concerned

with full disclosure, and did not address the other problems
mentioned by Sargent and Dukakis.

Although it was reported

out of committee on April 19, 1972, it was not approved by
the House of Representatives for about seven weeks.
^Ibid.

lOlbid.

The
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House finally passed the legislation
on June 27, 1972,11 but
the measure died in the Senate,
to which it had been referred
less than two weeks before the
General Court ended its 1972
session (an election year). 12
^fter the legislature had
prorogued, a bitter editorial writer
referred to the solemn
promises which legislative leaders in
both branches had made
at the end of the 1971 session to
enact campaign finance
legislation. He reminded his readers of
his earlier warning
that if the legislature failed to act
favorably upon the bill
it would:
reinforce the often accurate suspicion that the
process is a quagmire of fear and favor in which
venal pols sell out the public interest for
junkets, gifts, testimonial dinner tickets, campaign contributions, and other, more sophisticated forms of boodle. 13

The writer charged that the House passed the McGlynn
bill in
"perfect confidence that the Senate would find some way to
kill" it (it died in the Senate Ways and Means Committee)

and faulted Governor Sargent for making no effort in the

final hours before prorogation to use his influence.

President Kevin B. Harrington (Democrat-Salem)

,

Senate

depicted as

of the opinion that the House-passed legislation was

llpeter Lucas, "House-passed Bill Tightens Campaign
Fund Reporting," Boston Globe 28 June 1972, p. 6.
,

2

12"A Clear Case of Fraud," Boston Globe , Editorial,
August 1972, p. 22.
13 lb id.
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"unrealistically tough,

"

was also criticized for failing
to

make an effort to get agreement
on what he would have preferred and supported. 14
The legislation sponsored by McGlynn's
Committee on
State Administration had bipartisan
support in
the House,

and was pushed by the Massachusetts
branch of the citizens'
lobby. Common Cause, but it lacked
strong support in the
Senate,
in explaining why the bill reported
out by his committee failed in the Senate, McGlynn claimed
that any major
legislation must compete with other equally
important legislation for the attention of legislators, but he
had diffi-

culty citing the names of leading senators of either
party,
with the exception of David H. Locke (Republican-Wellesley)
whom he considered supporters of the measure. 1^

The absence

of any significant support by leaders in the Senate
appears

to provide a more complete explanation for the failure of

the "Truth in Politics Act" in 1972.

Despite its rejection

of that bill, the General Court did give its approval in

1972 to another proposal for amending the state's campaign

finance law.
14ibid.

l^Interview with former Representative John J.
McGlynn (Democrat-Medf ord) , Boston, 6 August 1973. McGlynn
won reelection in 1972, but resigned from the state legislature on April 23, 1973. On that day he was appointed by
Secretary of State John F. X. Davoren, a fellow Democrat, as
Supervisor of Public Records (with tenure) a position in
which McGlynn became responsible for the administration of
the c2UQpaign finance law.
,
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Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972
On July 20, 1972 Governor Francis
W. Sargent signed
into law Chapter 810 of the Acts
of
1972 which, in essence,

placed limits on the amount of money
candidates may spend
during the primary and election
for television and radio
time, and for magazine, newspaper,
billboard, and postage
expense. 16 Chapter 810 amends Section
17 of Chapter

55 of

the General Laws, and applies only
to candidates for statewide office, the Governor's Council,
and the state legislature. 17 Among the new law's provisions
is a requirement for
the periodic reporting of expenditures
for the above purposes on behalf of all candidates; another
requiring the

review of the reports filed to determine
compliance; and a
third imposing penalties for violations. This

statute, the

only campaign finance legislation enacted by the
1971-1972

General Court, became effective on January

1,

1974.

The major change effected by Chapter 810 is the
ceiling it imposes upon a candidate's television, radio,
newspaper, magazine, billboard, and postage expense during

both the primary and election.

The limits applicable to

candidates seeking the nomination are as follows:
l^The subsequent discussion of specific provisions
of the law is based upon the language in the statute. See
Acts and Resolves (1972), c. 810.
1 '^Candidates for
national,

county, city, and town

offices are not subject to Chapter 810.
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GovejTnoir

Lieutenant governor
Attorney general
Secretary of state
^""^

ludltor""
Governor's councillor
State senator
State representative

general

^lll'ola
J^J'ggg
lOo'SSo
100! 000

H'lH
siooo

With one exception, identical limits
apply during the
general election period. Because a

party's candidates for

governor and lieutenant governor now run
as a team once the
nominations have been decided, candidates
for governor and
lieutenant governor may together spend no
more than $500,000
for the election. Between them, a
total expenditure of no
more than $1,100,000 for the primary and
election is permissible. Insofar as the other candidates
regulated by the
new statute are concerned, their total allowable
expenses
for the primary and election are as follows:

Attorney general
Secretary of state
Treasurer and receiver general
Auditor
Governor's councillor
State senator
State representative

$500,000
200,000
200,000
200,000
50,000
30,000
10,000

Chapter 810 also requires all candidates and their
committees to submit to the secretary of state seven reports
during an election year on the following dates:

on the

tenth day of March, June, and September; on the fifteenth
and fifth day before the election; and thirty days following
the primary and election.

The provision requiring these
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periodic reports was an improvement
over the previous law,
which did not require reports of any
kind from candidates
for the Governor's Council, Senate,
and House until after
the primary and election.
Upon receipt, the secretary of
state is required to review them for
compliance with the
law's expenditure limits, and to inform
the attorney general
immediately of any violations. Any excess
spending by
a

candidate, or by any person or ccxranittee
acting on his
behalf, is subject to a fine of up to
three times the amount
of the excess spending.

Chapter 810 can be faulted, however, with respect
to
the spending limitations it imposes.

Apart from the ceil-

ings on expenditures by candidates for statewide office,

particularly for governor and lieutenant governor, it can
be argued that the limits for candidates campaigning for the
Governor's Council, Senate, and House are rather meaningless
(unless inflation continues unabated)

.

In Chapter II it was

^^The number of reporting dates was reduced by
Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973. Candidates for statewide
office are now required to submit only five reports on the
tenth day of March and June, eight days before both the primary and election, and on the tenth day of January following
an election year. Candidates for the Governor's Council and
the state legislature are required to submit only three
reports eight days before both the primary and election,
and on the tenth day in January following an election year.

—

—

19a new penalty for excessive spending was stipulated by Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973. Offenders are
liable to imprisonment for not more than one year, a fine
of not more than $1,000, or both.
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established that in 1970 the most expensive
Council race
cost $16,788, only one candidate for
the Senate spent in
excess of $30,000, and only four House
candidates spent more
than $10,000. Moreover, some important
types of campaign
expenditures are not regulated at all. Printing,
a major
expense for virtually all candidates, is one.
Public opinion
polling is another. A third is radio and television
"pro-

duction" expense.

Although Chapter 810 specifically limits

expenditures for radio and television "time," it omits any

mention of the often considerable expense connected with
the
production of such advertising. 20
Chapter 810 was the first campaign finance legislation of any consequence enacted in Massachusetts since 1962.

Although its limitations upon spending, especially by candidates for governor and lieutenant governor, seem reasonable, and its requirement of reports prior to the primciry

and election appears justifiable, it did not deal with other

problems which were more important.

It did not, for example,

treat campaign contributions in any way.

The potential for

abuse by candidates of the testimonial dinner, the principal

unregulated source of campaign funds, was not checked by the
statute; full disclosure of contributions, therefore, was
20

"Campaign expenditures for printing, public opinion
polling, and other purposes were made subject to the spending
limitations of Chapter 810, when it was amended by an
initiative petition approved by the voters on November 5,
1974.
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not achieved.

Moreover, Chapter 810 did not attack the

problem of enforcement.

The responsibility for the review

of all campaign finance reports continued
to reside with
the secretary of state, who thereafter was
expected to call

violations to the attention of the attorney general,
an
arrangement which in the past has not resulted in
vigorous
enforcement of the law because of the political nature of

each of those offices.

There apparently has not been a

single prosecution for any campaign finance violation since
the law underwent major revision in 1962.^^

Chapter 810

proved to be a first step, however, in amending the state's

campaign finance law.

Additional legislation, intended to

deal with these deficiencies, and others, was enacted in
1973 as the Watergate story continued to unfold.

Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973

On December 10, 1973 Governor Francis W. Sargent
signed into law Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973, legislation

which amended the state's campaign finance law in several
important ways.

The bill, which became effective immediately

because of its emergency preamble, was essentially the same

measure

— with

one major exception

— that

had been recommended

by the joint Committee on Election Laws earlier in the
^^Russell F. Landrigan, Chief Clerk, Attorney General's Office, could not recollect any. Interview, Boston,
5 November 1974.
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legislature's lengthy 1973 session. 22

The new law was given

initial approval by the House on a 220-2
roll call vote on
November 1,23
f .^.^^ debated in the Senate in
midNovember.

As originally approved by the House, the bill
did
not contain a provision for any change in the
way by which
the law, if enacted, would be enforced.
Representative

George Keverian (Democrat-Everett)

House Chairman of the

,

Committee on Election Laws, shepherded the bill through
the
lower house and was successful in preventing any substantive

amendment to the committee's version.
"All the bases have been touched

.

.

Keverian argued that,
.

All policy matters

have been checked with those who can harm it (the bill),"
and threatened not only to vote against the bill, but to

work for its defeat if it were amended on the House floor. 24

Keverian 's bill did not escape amendment, however,
in the upper house.

John F. Parker

(

On November 14 Senate Minority Leader

Republican-Taunton) introduced an amendment

to the House-passed bill providing for a campaign finance

commission with authority to appoint an administrator,
22For a helpful statement contrasting the law in
effect with the proposal of the Committee on Election Laws,
see the nine-page letter sent to fellow legislators by
House Chairman George Keverian after his committee reported
out its bill.
(Mimeographed, undated.)

23jonathan Fuerbringer, "Bay State House Votes
220-2, Initial Approval of Campaign Money Disclosure,"
Boston Globe , 2 November 1973, p. 3.
^^Ibid.
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independent of the secretary of state,
with substantial
power to enforce the state's campaign
finance law. Parker's
motion was introduced at the request of
Governor Sargent.
During a press conference called when the
House was considering the legislation, Sargent had threatened
to keep the
legislature in session unless it passed a campaign
finance
measure in 1973. Parker's motion to amend
prevailed on a
35-0 vote, 25
House concurred with this important

change a few days later.

Each house gave its final approval

to Chapter 1173 on November 28, 1973.

The General Court's approval of Chapter 1173 was as

pleasing to the proponents of campaign finance reform as it

was unexpected.

Much earlier in the year, a major advocate

of change, the Massachusetts breinch of Common Cause, advised

its supporters that

future."

tliis

legislation faced "an uncertain

They explained that the lawmakers seemed "indis-

posed" to enact any new campaign finance law in 1973, and

reminded their supporters that a similar measure (the "Truth
in Politics Act") had been buried in the Senate Ways and

Means Committee just hours before the General Court prorogued in 1972.

.

Common Cause also pointedly noted the open

opposition expressed by two prominent House Democrats,

Majority Leader Thomas W. McGee of Lynn and I4ajority Whip
25peter Lucas, "Mass. Senate Votes Campaign Watchdog,
Disclosure, $1 Tax Donation," Boston Globe , 15 November 1973,
p. 10.

William

Q. MacLean,

Jr. of Pairhaven.26

By August, Common

Cause was more optimistic about
the chances for the enactment Of reform legislation. its
judgment then was that the
revelations of Watergate would help
insure a "thorough airIng" of campaign finance
legislation before the General
Court, although it thought that
the possibility for passage
of legislation such as Chapter
1173 was only "fair. "27
In brief, the following changes
were made in the Bay

State's campaign finance statute by
the enactment of Chapter
1173 of the Acts of 1973, aptly titled,
"An Act Relative to
the Pull Disclosu^o of Campaign
Contributions and Expenditures "
.

1.

The term "candidate" was defined so that
incumbents and non-incumbents who receive
contributions and make expenditures,
whether or not they are announced candidates, are subject to the law's reporting
requirements.

2.

A four-member campaign finance commission

was authorized to appoint a director of
campaign and political finance, independent
of the secretary of state, with substantial
authority to enforce the new law.

3.

The maximum permissible campaign contribution by an individual to a candidate
and/or his committees in a calendar year
was reduced from $3,000 to $1,000.

-^^Common Cause/Massachusetts, A Report to the People;
The Massachusetts Legislature in the Year of Watergate
Campaign Finance," undated, pp. 4-5.
,

27common Cause/Massachusetts, A News Letter
Moves On Beacon Hill," August, 1973, pT~T.

,

"Reform

The use of cash was curtailed sharply
Any contribution larger than $100, and
any expenditure larger than
$50, must
be made by check.

Reports of contributions, expenditures,
and liabilities must now be made in
advance
of both the primary and election by
all
candidates and their committees, in addition, annual reports in non-election
years
were required.

Most of the statutory language dealing
with these reports was modified so that
they will provide more detailed and meaningful information to any person reviewing
them.

Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972 was amended
to require fewer reports from candidates
and tlieir committees. Depository candidates
must submit five reports, rather than seven;
non -depository candidates, three, rather
than seven.
The term "contributions" was defined so that
corporations may no longer purchase advertising space in prograun books (ad books)
used by individuals and political parties
in connection with their fund-raising events.

The penalties for violations of the law by
corporations and corporate officers were
increased.

Candidates were allowed to establish only
two campaign committees, rather than three,
as before.

Depository candidates were required to designate their depository banks "forthwith upon
becoming candidates." The banks are obliged.
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as before, to commence reporting
transactions on behalf of candidates
and their committees twice each month. 28

Several of the aforementioned changes, but
not all,
were intended to help achieve the primary
objective
of the

new law, the full disclosure of campaign
contributions and
expenditures.
in this category are the provisions which
define "candidate," greatly restrict the use of
cash
in

campaigns, require reports in non-election years, and

require depository candidates to designate their banks

much sooner than before (items

1,

4,

5,

and 11).

Several

other purposes were intended, however, by those who drafted
the new law, and they were furthered by other provisions

incorporated into Chapter 1173.

More effective enforcement

should be possible because of the provision creating the

campaign finance commission and authorizing the appointment
of a director of campaign and political finance (item

2)

The two provisions which forbid the purchase of space in
ad books by corporations, and impose heavier penalties for

corporate violators, should strengthen the law's longstanding prohibition against corporate contributions (items
8

and

9)

.

The provision which reduces the number of reports

^^This summary of changes to the campaign finance
statute is based upon a discussion about Question 5 (on the
state ballot on November 5, 1974) found in a publication
mailed by the secretary of state to all registered voters
in Massachusetts,
See Official Information to Voters , pp.
16-17.
For the text of the new statute, see Acts and
Resolves (1973), c. 1173.

240

about media expenditures, required
by Chapter 810 of the
Acts of 1972, will ease the reporting
burden upon candidates
and their committees {item 7)
The influence of large con.

tributors should be lessened by the
provision which limits
individual contributions to $1,000 (item
3).
The requirement of pre-primary and pre-election reports
by all candidates (not just statewide candidates as
before) will provide
information much earlier, before the voters
go to the polls
(item

5)

.

And finally, the provision limiting each candidate

to two campaign committees, rather than three,
and the

requirement of more detailed information (to be reported
by
all candidates and their committees on forms devised for

the

1974 election by the secretary of state)

should facilitate

the review and analysis of campaign finance reports (items
6

and 10)

All ot these amendments to the Bay State's campaign
finance statute seem reasonable and should rectify many of
the deficiencies in the previous law.

Two of them

— those

which define who a candidate is, and provide for the enforcement of the statute

— are

especially important and worthy of

additional comment.
Fuller Disclosure Possible:

"Candidate" Defined .

Most of the legislators on the Committee on Election Laws
consider the definition of "candidate" in Chapter 1173^9 to
^^A candidate is defined as "any individual who seeks
nomination or election to public office, whether or not such
individual is nominated or elected. For the purpose of this
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be "the most meaningful reform" of
all.

The following

statement by a majority of the committee's
members supports
this contention more clearly and succinctly
than any known
to the author:
The meaning of the word "candidate," alv/ays
confused, was clearly defined for the first
time.
A law that placed responsibilities on
"candidates" was of doubtful value if one could
escape its consequences by arguing that one is
not technically a "candidate." And, in fact,
this is what was occurring.

No longer would an individual be able to
"receive contributions euid make expenditures"
without becoming a candidate. No longer was
the filing of nomination papers, the establishment of a non-elected political committee, or
public announcement of one's intent to seek
public office, the legal test of candidacy, if,
in fact, they ever were.
No longer would a public office-holder, an
"incumbent", be able to hold any fund-raising
chapter, an individual shall be deemed to be seeking nomination or election to such office if he has (1) received a
contribution or made an expenditure, or has given his consent
for any other person or committee to receive a contribution
or make an expenditure, for the purpose of influencing his
nomination or election to such office, v/hether or not the
specific public office for which he will seek nomination or
election is known at the time the contribution is received
or the expenditure is made, or (2) taken the action necessary
under the laws of the commonwealth to qualify himself for
nomination or election to such office, or, if said individual
holds elective public office, whether elected or appointed
to such office, and he has (3) received any money or anything
of value, or made any disbursement resulting from any purchases, made from said individual, or a committee, or a
person acting on behalf of said individual or committee,
whether through the device of tickets, advertisements, or
otherwise, for any fund-raising activity, including a testimonial, regardless of the purpose of said activity, held on
behalf of said individual at any time while he holds said
public office." See Acts and Resolves (1973), c. 1173,

Section

1.
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activity, including a testimonial
dinner, durina
his term of office, "regardless
of the pirpose^
^''^^"^ reporting the rented
receipts
rfceiuts'anr.'^^K'
and disbursements as political con<-yiK»
P^-^^^^cai contributions and expenditures. 30

This provision of the law, which
applies to incumbents and non-incumbents alike,
does not prohibit fund
raising years in advance of an
election, nor does it restrict
the recipient in his use of any
funds raised, but it should
serve as a healthy restraint on
most individuals and groups
who might otherwise solicit funds
or make contributions for
purposes unconnected with the funding of
electoral campaigns. Most importantly, by their
careful and painstaking
definition of "candidate," the framers of
that particular
provision of Chapter 1173 have laid the
foundation for much
fuller disclosure. It should now be possible
for any interested party to know who gave how much to whom.

A New Enf orcement

Ac^ency .

A second provision of

Chapter 1173 which potentially represents a very
significant
change in the state's campaign finance statute is the
one

which authorized the establishment of a campaign finance
commission and a new enforcement agency, the Office of the
Director of Campaign and Political Finance.

Although a

number of persons played important roles in effecting this
change. Representative Francis C. Lapointe (Democrat-Chicopee)
•^^

Official Information to Voters

,

p. 16.

^^ Acts and Resolves
(1973), c. 1173, Section 1.
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and the citizens' lobby. Common
Cause/Massachuaetts, were
principally responsible. In 1972,
Lapointe, a veteran member
of the legislature's joint
Committee on Election Laws, filed
the legislative petition providing
for the reform (H.
1692),

and worked vigorously for its
enactment.

Common Cause,

which essentially supported Lapointe's
petition in principle, while differing with him about
some details, organized an initiative petition drive in
1973 to accomplish

the

same end if the legislature failed
to enact Lapointe's

petition into law. 32
Other proponents of this reform, although their
pro-

posals differed substantially in some cases, were:

John M. Quinlan (Republican -Norwood)

,

Senator

who, like Common Cause,

mounted an initiative petition drive in 1973; ^3 Governor
Francis W. Sargent, who first publicly aired his ideas in
32
•'^Common Cause/Massachusetts, Petition for Estab-

lishment of a Director of Campaign and Political FinanceFact Sheet.
(Mimeographed undated ) The initiative petition drive proved unnecessary. It was dropped by Common
Cause when the legislature provided for the office by
statute late in 1973.
,

.

33unlike Common Cause's, the petition sponsored by
Quinlan 's Committee to Reform Election Law was not limited
to addressing the enforcement problem, but proposed many
other substantive changes to the campaign finance law. It
is discussed later in the chapter.

244

April, 1972,34

^^^^

support to the change during the
Senate's consideration of the matter
late in 1973; ^5 ^nd

the

Boston Globe , which continued to report
extensively on campaign finance, and lent its editorial support,

also, to the

proposed reform.

There were a number of individual legis-

lators, in addition, such as Representative
Paul H. Guzzi

(Democrat-Newton), who were active advocates.

Finally,

Boston attorney Jerome Medalie, a proponent of
campaign
finance reform for almost a decade, co-sponsored
H. 1692
and worked quietly behind the scene.

On the other hand,

support from the legislative leadership for a change in
the

way in which the law would be enforced was noticeably absent.
And yet, both houses of the legislature eventually adopted it
by overwhelming votes.

While not denying the proponents of

this reform their due, one cannot help but wonder to what

extent public opinion, shaped by the revelations of Watergate, was responsible.
"'^Sargent proposed a five-member commission, consisting of the secretary of state emd four appointees by the
governor (no more than two to be members of the same political party) to receive campaign finance reports and to oversee
the receipt and expenditure of money by candidates. See
"Outline of Governor Francis W. Sargent's Campaign Expenditure and Complete Disclosure Plan," in the "Sargent Press
Kit.

3^The Senate gave its initial approval for a caimpaign
finance commission on November 14, 1973. Senator John F.
Parker (Republican-Taunton) , acting on Sargent's behalf, made
the proposal which was accepted on a voice vote. See Lucas,
"Mass. Senate Votes Campaign Watchdog," p. 10.
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Chapter 1173 authorized the
establishment of a fourmember campaign finance commission
comprised of the secretary of state, the state chairmen
of the Democratic and
Republican parties, and the dean of
a Massachusetts law
school, to be chosen by the
governor. The commission, whose
chairman is the secretary of state,
has the authority
to

appoint a director of campaign and
political finance.
Their choice must be by unanimous
vote.
The statute authorizes the full-time director to
examine the campaign finance
reports of all candidates and political
committees, checking
them for their lawfulness, validity,
completeness, and
accuracy.

He is further granted subpoena power to
facilitate
his investigations, and when he determines
the law has been
violated, he is empowered to call upon the
attorney general
for appropriate assistance, including the
prosecution of

offenders.

To enable him to accomplish his task. Chapter

1173 authorizes the director to employ a staff, exempt
from

civil service regulations.

This full-time staff, consisting

of at least two investigators, an accountant, a
secretary,

and a clerk, can be temporarily expanded in election years

by three additional part-time persons.

The director is

appointed for six years (and may be reappointed)

,

is paid

$22,000 annually, must be a resident of Massachusetts, and

cannot engage in any partisan political activity during his
^^The subsequent discussion of the authority of the
commission and the director is based upon c. 1173, Section 1.
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term in office.

The campaign finance commission can
remove
him at any time by unanimous vote
of its members.

Although the law authorizing the campaign
finance
commission became effective on December
10,

1973, the com-

mission did not choose a director of campaign
and political
finance until less than four months before
the September,

1974 primary.

Governor Sargent had selected Northeastern

University Law School Dean John C. 0 'Byrne by January
30,
1974,

37

but as late as April 12 no candidates for the posi-

tion had been interviewed, nor had Republican State
Com-

mittee Chairman William A. Barnstead seen any of the
seventy-five applications submitted to the commission by

persons who were interested in the job.^®

The delay can be

explained partially by the forced resignation on March 25
of Barnstead' s predecessor. Otto A. Wahlrab, who lost his

position because of differences with Governor Sargent.

Two

months later, on May 27, 1974, the commission chose W. Norman
Gleason, a career state employee who had administered the

Elections Division for six years under Secretary of State

John F. X. Davoren.

After Gleason 's appointment, further

delay ensued because Gleason then had to recruit a staff,
and locate, rent, furnish, and occupy suitable space for the
37

-"Peter Lucas, "Law Dean to Help Select Election
Fund Chief," Boston Globe 31 January 1974, p. 5.
,

^^Jonathan Fuerbringer, "State Panel Picking Campaign
Finance Director May Miss April 30 Deadline," Boston Globe
15 April 1974, p. 4.
,
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newly created Office of Campaign
and Political Finance.
Until Gleason's appointment,
John J.

McGlynn, a Davoren

appointee responsible for
administering the campaign finance
law since early in 1973, served
as acting director.

Although in office for but a short
time, Gleason
demonstrated his intention to exercise
his authority and
enforce the new law when he stated
that two statewide nominees. Democrat Paul H. Guzzi
(candidate for secretary
of

state) and Republican Governor
Francis W. Sargent had made

illegal loans to their 1974 campaigns.

Chapter 1173,

Gleason claimed, while permitting
unlimited personal loans
from a candidate to his own campaign,
prohibits any loans
from another individual which total
more than $1,000. Sargent had borrowed $40,000 from his wife
after he was nominated, and Guzzi— ironically, very active
in drafting
Chapter 1173— had accepted loans totaling
$14,300 from four
persons to help finance his primary campaign.
Each had
subsequently loaned this money to their campaign
committees.
Guzzi and Sargent soon thereafter negotiated bank
loans to

repay their initial loans, but the legality of their actions,
and the final disposition of these cases, will not be

settled until after the 1974 election, according to Gleason.
^^See the following five articles written by Jonathan
Fuerbringer for the Boston Globe
"Guzzi Apparent Violator
of Own Campaign Law," 17 October 1974, p. 1; "Guzzi Says
Second Mortgage Will Repay Controversial Loans," 21 October
:
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Because it barely began functioning
in time for the
1974 primary, it is too early to tell
whether the new
enforcement agency will fulfill the
expectations of its
proponents. Moreover, the very future
of the Office of the
Director of Campaign and Political
Finance is uncertain
because the voters of the commonwealth
approved an initiative petition, providing for further
campaign finance

reform,

which appeared on the ballot during the
1974 election.
Reform by the Voters;

The Quinlan Petition

By their approval of Question

5

on November

5,

1974,

the voters overrode their lawmakers, who had
rejected the
petition during the legislature's 1974 session. The
decision by the electorate, which became law thirty
days later,

substantially modified several provisions of Chapter
1173 of
the Acts of 1973. There are some unresolved legal
questions
about precisely what changes have occurred, especially
in
the critical area of enforcement.

In addition, the matter

is further complicated because it is unknown how the state

legislature will respond to the voters' decision during its
1975 session.

When the chief sponsor of the initiative petition.

Senator John M. Quinlan (Republics-Norwood)

,

launched his

1974, p. 3; "Sargent's Loan from Wife May Violate Financing
Law," 23 October 1974, p. 1; "Sargent Explains Loan, but
Aide's Story Differs," 24 October 1974, p. 1; and "News
Analysis: When Is a Loan a Political Contribution?", 29
October 1974, p. 3.

drive on July

1973 for a major reform to the
state's
campaign finance law, he maintained
that it was the only
vehicle available to the citizens
of Massachusetts to achieve
meaningful reform. Quinlan stated:
9,

th; Club dSrira°h^t^
T ^

intentionally remained outside
^^"s in the Massachusetts

Quinlan, who was proved wrong a few
months later when the
legislature enacted Chapter 1173 of
the Acts of 1973, argued
that it was necessary to bypass a
"recalcitrant" state legislature which:

.has historically refused to enact
.
.
campaign safeguards. Year after year, effective
reform
measures die quietly in committee, or pass
one
branch of the Legislature with great fanfare,
only to be shelved by the other branch. 41
After a very demanding effort, lasting
about sixteen months,
Quinlan 's Committee to Reform Election Law met
with success
when their petition was approved by the voters. 42

40

1973

release by Senator John M. Quinlan, July

9,

4 ^Committee

to Reform Election Law, "The Necessity
of Complexity," Norwood, Mass., 1973.
(Mimeographed).
A

O

Article XLVIII of the amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution enables the voters to enact a law by means
of an initiative petition. The procedure does not completely
bypass the legislature. Quinlan 's Committee to Reform Election Law gathered more than 75,000 signatures by December 5,
1973.
The legislature, obliged to consider the measure, but
prohibited from amending it, rejected the proposed law.
Quinlan 's committee then gathered the additional signatures
necessary to place the question on the ballot on November 5,
1974.
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One purpose the petition's
sponsors sought to achieve
was to close the loopholes in
the campaign finance law.
To
do this, the petition included
the following provisions:
All candidates for office above the
1.
town level would be treated alike. city and
Candidates for the Governor's Council,
the state
legislature, and county offices would
longer be "non-depository" candidates. no
2.

All "depository" candidates would be
to designate one bank as a depository required
for
funds and as a keeper of records.
These
records would be open to public scrutiny.

3.

Candidates would be allowed to have only
one
political committee operating on their
behalf.

4.

No candidate would be permitted to receive
or
spend in excess of $25 except by check.

5.

No vendor would be permitted to accept a
cash
payment in excess of $25 from a candidate or
his committee.

6.

Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972, which placed
limits upon certain media expenditures, would
be amended to include other expenditures such
as printing and public opinion polls.

7.

All firms providing TV, radio, newspaper,
billboard, magazine, advertising, public relations, printing, opinion polls, computer,
telephone and telegraph services would be
required to report a candidate's purchases of
such services.

8.

Candidates would be required to report all
funds received and expenditures made since
the date of the last election for the office
they seek. This report is due upon their
official announcement of candidacy or their
filing of nomination papers, 43

43senator John M. Quinlan, "Initiative PetitionChanges in the Current Statute."
(Mimeographed, undated.)
For the complete text of the petition, and arguments for and
against it, see Official Information to Voters , pp. 8-25.

A second purpose of the petition's
sponsors was to
provide a means to enforce the
law more effectively. To
accomplish this, the petition authorized
the establishment
of an independent corrupt
practices commission consisting
of five persons appointed by
the governor for staggered

five-year terms.

The corrupt practices commission
would

have the authority to investigate
alleged violations of the
law, would meet in closed session
to avoid damaging publicity to candidates whom it was investigating,
would have
subpoena powers, and could require cooperation
from all
state agencies. If it found "probable
cause," it would be
authorized to call upon the attorney general to
initiate
the process which ultimately could result
in the imposition
of either criminal or civil sanctions by the
courts. 44

The third purpose of the petition's sponsors was
to

deter violations of the law by authorizing heavier
penalties
for violations by both individuals and corporations
(includ-

ing their officers)

.

Before Chapter 1173 of the Acts of

1973 was enacted, the law provided for a $500 fine and/or

imprisonment for six months for most violations by individuals.

The petition provided that individual violations

would be punishable by a maximum penalty of one year's
imprisonment and/or a $10,000 fine.

The previous law also

provided that a violation by a corporation was punishable
44Quinlan, "Initiative Petition."
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by a maximum fine of $10,000.

The petition increased this

to $50,000 and made corporate
officers liable to the same
penalty as any individual violator.
The penalty for cor-

poration officers under the previous law
was a maximum fine
of $5,000 and/or six months
imprisonment; the petition
doubled the penalty. In addition to
these criminal penalties, the petition authorized the
corrupt practices
commis-

sion to initiate procedures to accomplish
the removal from
office of any person who had won election
by corrupt elec-

tion practices.

There is no question, in a legal sense, that the
voters' acceptance of Senator Quinlan's initiative
petition

substantially modifies many of the provisions of
1173 of the Acts of 1973.

chapter

Unless the state legislature, at

its peril, decides to amend the electorate's decision,
hun-

dreds of candidates in subsequent elections, rather than a
handful, will be "depository" candidates; media expenditure

limitations will be much stricter; hundreds of vendors of

campaign materials and services, never before required to
file reports, will have to; all candidates will be allowed

only one campaign committee; and violators of the law will
be subject to more severe penalties

more important
4 5 Ibid.

— to

mention some of the

cJrianges.

Chapter 1173 did impose heavier penalties
for violations, but they were not as severe as those authorized by the petition. Individual violators were lieJ^le to
one year's imprisonment and/or a $1,000 fine; corporations
were liable to a $20,000 fine.
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Quinlan's petition fortunately did not modify
one
major reform of Chapter 1173 of the
Acts of 1973, the definition of who a candidate is, but it did
address a second
major reform of that law, the question of
enforcement,
it

is in this critical area that the legal
waters have been

muddied.

Chapter 1173, it will be recalled, established
a

campaign finance commission; it also authorized a
wellstaffed agency, independent of the secretary of
state, which
would receive all campaign finance reports and enforce
the

law.

The agency's director would be chosen by unanimous

vote of the commission.

Quinlan's petition, on the other

hand, requires all reports to be submitted to the secretary

of state, and establishes a corrupt practices commission

with investigatory authority similar to that of the inde-

pendent agency's director.

At the same time, it did not

expressly abolish either the ccimpaign finance commission or
the Office of Campaign and Political Finance authorized by

Chapter 1173.

It did authorize the corrupt practices com-

mission to appoint an executive director and a staff to
enable the commission to perform its functions. 46

Quinlan,

who made the petition a campaign issue in 1974 when he
The executive director of Quinlan s Committee to
Reform Election Laws argues that the corrupt practices commission is intended "to supplement not to replace the
present director of campaign and political finance." See
Thomas L. Saltonstall, "In Support of Referendum Question
5," Boston Globe, 26 October 1974, p. 6.
'

—

—
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ran unsuccessfully for secretary of
state, has argued that,
"what the initiative petition does not
address, it does not
affect."^*' Such a claim, however,
does not really clarify
the law.

Its meaning, according to others, remains
uncer-

tain. 48
197 8,

Fortunately, there is no statewide election
until
which should give the 1975-76 legislature
ample time

to address itself to the problem,

it probably will deal with

it early in its 1975 session. 49

Despite the numerous and substantial changes
to the
Bay State's campaign finance statute which were
accomplished

by the legislature's enactment of Chapter 1173 of the
Acts
of 1973, and the voters' approval of the Quinlan
petition in
1974, the pressures for further reform have not subsided.

In 1975 the state legislature will once again consider

various proposals for the public subsidy of electoral campaigns, a matter to which it seriously addressed itself

during its 1974 session, when it rejected a proposal for the

public subsidy of one statewide postprimary campaign.

Our

attention now turns to it.
47 official Information to Voters
p. 24.
,

48interviews with John J. McGlynn (who administered
Chapter 1173 until the appointment of W. Norman Gleason)
and William B. Sullivan III, Deputy Director, Office of Campaign and Political Finance, Boston, 5 November 1974. See
Mary Thornton, "Quandary of Question 5: What Will It Do to
New Campaign Law?", Boston Globe 31 October 1974, p. 3.
See also, Jonathan Fuerbringer, "New Campaign Law Won by 2-1
Margin; May Bring Problems," Boston Globe , 26 November 1974,
,

p.

3.

49interview with McGlynn,

5

November 1974.
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A Proposal for Public c;„Ko<^y.
The Bartley-GuzzilsriT

—

Late in 1973, a petition was
filed in the House of
Representatives which, if enacted
into law, would have subsidized the postprimary campaigns
of the nominees of the two
major parties for governor and
lieutenant governor. 50 This
legislation, popularly known as
the Bartley-Guzzi Bill, was
drafted by Boston attorney Jerome
Medalie for Representative
Paul H. Guzzi (Democrat-Newton),
a member of the legislature's joint committee on Election
Laws. 51 cuzzi and Medalie
obtained the support of House Speaker
David M. Bartley
(Democrat-Holyoke) , whose name appeared
on the petition as
a cosponsor along with forty-five
other persons. The proposed legislation would have authorized
the allocation of

$1,000,000 of public funds for the election
campaigns of the
Democratic and Republican nominees for governor
and lieutenant governor ($500,000 to each team) . it
also would have
allowed each team of candidates to raise an
additional

$150,000 in private contributions.

The provisions of Chapter

810 of the Acts of 1972, as amended, would still apply;
that
is, a party's nominees for governor and
lieutenant governor

would together be prohibited from spending more than
$500,000

19/4.

SOpor the full text of the petition, see
H. 3066,

51lnterview with Representative Paul H. Guzzi, Boston,

27 September 1974.

during their election campaign for
the purchase of media
time and space, and other services
enumerated in that
statute.

The Bartley-Guzzi Bill failed to win
passage in
either the House or Senate, but its
legislative history is
important because it represented the first
serious effort
by the state legislature to provide
a public subsidy for
campaigns. It was also the first to have
the support of
several prominent politicians.

Referred to the legisla-

ture's joint Committee on Election Laws early
in 1974, the

Bartley-Guzzi Bill and other proposals for the public
financing of campaigns were discussed at a public hearing
in the Gardner Auditorium on March 27, 1974.

At this

hearing— attended by Bartley, who had requested that

it be

scheduled during the evening— representatives of Governor
Sargent, Michael S. Dukakis, and Robert H. Quinn expressed

support for the idea of public financing of the 1974 guber-

natorial election.

Common Cause, which had submitted an

even more far-reaching proposal, was also numbered among
the proponents. 52

About one month later, on April 23, 1974,

the Election Laws Committee, chaired by Bartley 's appointee,

George Keverian (Democrat-Everett)

,

voted to recommend to

^^Michael Kenney, "Massachusetts Candidates, Reform
Groups Urge Public Funding for Campaigns," Boston Globe ,
28 March 1974, p. 17.
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the House of Representatives that the
subject of public

financing be studied further by the Election
Laws Committee. 53

The committee's recommendation reached the
House

floor on May 28, 1974, and prevailed in a 115-109
roll call
vote, which rejected an attempt by Representative
Guzzi to

substitute the original bill for the committee's
recommendation for further study.

Why did the Bartley-Guzzi Bill fail when it reached
the House floor?

One reason was that Bartley, originally in

favor of testing the idea of public subsidy, ^5 became less

enthusiastic.

Although he voted for Guzzi 's motion to sub-

stitute, Bartley did not fully exercise the power available
to him.

In speaking for the motion to substitute, Bartley

spoke not as the House Speaker, but as a representative from

Holyoke.

Rather than casting his vote early in the roll

call, he waited until the very end.^^

Guzzi explained that

Bartley 's loss of enthusiasm occurred after the evening
hearing, which was sparsely attended (less than 200 people,

many of them legislative staffers, were present)

.

The bill

was untimely, in Bartley 's judgment, because there was an
^^ Jonathan Fuerbringer, "Campaign Reform?
Year," B oston Globe 24 April 1974, p. 3.

Not This

,

^^Jonathan Fuerbringer, "House Bars '74 Vote Financing," Boston Globe , 29 May 1974, p. 5.
55peter Lucas, "Bartley to Seek Public Financing
for Test Race," Boston Globe 19 November 1973, p. 1.
,

^^Fuerbringer, "House Bars '74 Vote Financing," p.

5
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absence of sufficient public
pressure; and the press
had not
Vigorously pushed this legislation. 57
a second reason for
the bill's rejection was that
it was opposed by Election
Laws Conunittee Chairman
Keverian, who had earlier
described
the proposal as a radical
change, one which would
require
time (Which the legislature
did not have) to consider
the
constitutional issues raised. Besides,
1974 was a bad year
to frame public subsidy
legislation, according
to Keverian,

because the debate would become
enmeshed in personalities. 58
Guzzi explained that Keverian was
probably philosophically
opposed to the idea of public financing
of elections. 59
The bill fared even more poorly in
the Senate. On
June 3, 1974, less than one week after
the House voted
to

study public financing further, the Senate,
in a 22-12 roll
call, voted its initial approval for
further study by
the

Committee on Election Laws.

Senator David H. Locke

(Republican-Wellesley) was apparently the only outspoken

supporter of the Bartley-Guzzi Bill in the upper
house.

He

unsuccessfully moved, as Guzzi had done earlier in the House,
to substitute the original bill for the Election Laws
Com-

mittee's recommendation for further study.
2

During the

1/2-hour debate, Locke complained, "What kind of a day is

57interview with Guzzi, 27 September 1974.
58Fuerbringer, "Campaign Reform?", p. 3.
cq

-'^Interview with Guzzi.

it when a Republican senator
has to move substitution of
a

Democratic Speaker's bill?"60

j^^^^^ ^^^^

unsuccessfully
moved substitution of a Common
Cause/Massachusetts proposal
for public financing which went
far beyond the Bartley-

Guzzi Bill.

That proposal called for a public
subsidy of
the primary and election campaigns
of all the major-party

nominees for statewide office in 1978.
a 21-11 roll call vote.^^

it was defeated on

An earlier proposal by Common

Cause, discussed during the public
hearing several weeks
previously, would have subsidized legislative
races as well,
and would have cost $6 million. ^2

The Bartley-Guzzi Bill was only a beginning for
the
proponents of the public subsidy of electoral campaigns
in

Massachusetts.

Guzzi, successful in his campaign for elec-

tion as secretary of state in 1974, has already filed
a

legislative petition providing for the public subsidy of
all statewide campaigns in the 1978 election.

Court will consider it during its 1975 session.

The General

Guzzi

's

petition provides for a partial subsidy of the primary campaigns of all candidates.

If enacted,

the state would match

all private contributions of $50 or less during the primary
^

^Jonathan Fuerbringer, "Public Campaign Funding
Rejected by Mass. Senate," Boston Globe 4 June 1974, p.
,

3.

^^Ibid.

^^Kenney,
Urge," p. 17.
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with grants in cash.

It also would provide flat
grants in

cash to all statewide nominees,
while allowing them to raise
a limited amount of money from
private contributions during
their election campaigns. 63 The
principal private advocate
of public subsidy. Common
Cause/Massachusetts, had not, as
of November, 1974, filed any
petition.
It will do so,
according to its leader, but is undecided
about the scope
of its proposal.
It may, as in 1974, advocate a subsidy for
legislative candidates, but is concerned that
the cost of
such a proposal might lessen its chances of
gaining legislative approval. 6^

Summary and Conclusions
It is apparent that there has been a serious and

constructive effort in Massachusetts since the 1970 election

by many public officials and private parties to deal with
the problem of campaign finance by reforming the state's

campaign finance law.

Although the response to date has,

for some, been too slow and less comprehensive than thought
necesseiry, no informed observer caai deny that substantial

changes to the law have been enacted, especially by Chapter
810 of the Acts of 1972, Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973,

and most recently, by the voters' approval of the Quinlan
63jean Cole, "Campaign Reform Central Issue,"
Boston Herald American 1 November 1974, p. 8.
,

Interview with Mary Ann Fen ton. Director, Common
Cause/Massachusetts, Boston, 5 November 1974.
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petition.

In many ways,

the Bay state now has a very
good

campaign finance law, indeed, and
those persons responsible
for it deserve to be commended.
The current law should provide the fullest disclosure of campaign
contributions and
expenditures in the commonwealth's history.
Despite the
confusion worked by the Quinlan petition,
which undoubtedly
will be resolved by the 1975-76 state
legislature, the law
also promises more effective enforcement
than ever
before.

In addition, the law has curbed the
testimonial dinner

racket, checked the influence of large
contributors, imposed
a ceiling upon media expenditures,
restricted the use of

cash, and improved the reporting system.

Unless the pur-

poses of the law are emasculated by interpretation, or

frustrated by half-hearted enforcement, it should serve the

commonwealth well.
As commendable as the reforms enacted in the past

few years are, however, electoral campaigns in Massachusetts
still rely exclusively upon private funding.

In Chapter II,

it was established how substantial this funding was, especi-

ally for the major statewide campaigns.

In Chapter III, it

was shown that these funds were largely raised by candidates
and their committees from individual contributors, and that

the roles played by political parties and organized interest

groups in funding cemipaigns, by comparison, were negligible.
Furthermore, at least for the major statewide campaigns.
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large contributions were quite
important,

m

Chapter IV,
some evidence was presented to
support the contention that
large contributions influenced'
some of the decisions made
by public officials with rewards
at their disposal. Despite
the promising provisions of the
current law, the system of

financing campaigns in the Bay State
has not essentially
been changed. Perhaps the most serious
flaw in the campaign
finance law is that it does not address
these matters adequately.

As long as politicians in Massachusetts,
especially
statewide candidates, require large suras of
money to finance
their campaigns, and until some new public
policy is adopted
which permits more widespread support of their
campaigns,

they will continue to rely upon a relatively small
number of
contributors.

Some form of public subsidy, at least for

statewide candidates, seems to be one reasonable way to

rectify the bias in the system, and to check this situation,

potentially corrupting for candidates and contributors alike.
There are other values at stake, too.

Public confidence in

the integrity of the electoral process would increase.

The

undeniable advantages of incumbency could be fairly offset.
Competition for public office would increase.

A policy that

assured more adequate funding of campaigns would encourage a
larger number of able men and women of modest means, with no

particular access to those who are ready to contribute
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substantially, to run for office.

No suggestion is being

advanced to prohibit private contributions
entirely, which
not only raises a constitutional
question, but would deny
all citizens a way of directly participating
in the political process. Moreover, it is not
unreasonable
to ask

politicians who seek the authority to govern
us that they
ask for our money as well.

Without further advocacy of the merits of some
form
of public subsidy of electoral campaigns
in Massachusetts,
nor discussion of some of the difficulties the
proposition

raises (and it does)

,

the idea deserves a trial.

This

nearly occurred in 1974, it will be recalled, when the
state

legislature seriously considered, but rejected, the BartleyGuzzi proposal for a partial public subsidy of the post-

primary campaigns of the major party candidates for governor
and lieutenant governor.

The 1975-76 legislature will con-

sider proposals of this kind, but it ought not limit its

attention only to them.

There are other possibilities for

further reform of the way in which campaigns are financed
in the Bay State which merit their attention.

A tax incen-

tive that would divert public funds to the state's political parties, which in Chapter III were shown to be very
weak, indeed, is but one.
In conclusion, the reader is reminded that we

entrust the formulation and administration of our public

policies to men and women who ask for
our support in free
elections. The quality of those
candidates, of their campaigns, and the subsequent conduct of
the victors
at the

polls is inextricably entwined with the
way in which those
campaigns are financed.
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